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ABSTRACT 
     This study explores how the general American public thinks about Asian Americans, who 
are a multiethnic, immigrant-dominated, fast-growing, and understudied group.  Understanding 
Americans’ views toward Asians is important in light of the changing face of the American 
electorate, whose recent additions comprise largely of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, 
and the likelihood that Americans’ beliefs or thoughts about race and ethnicity will be altered 
beyond the black-white divide in U.S. politics.  As an attempt to gain such understanding, the 
purpose of this study is to provide a systematic study of Americans’ attitudes toward Asians in 
terms of positive/negative evaluations that they have of Asians (i.e., affect-based perceptions) 
and their perceptions of factual attributes of Asians, such as perseverance and intelligence (i.e., 
cognition-based perceptions). 
     Americans’ perceptions of Asian Americans are examined using a conceptual framework 
based on theories and measures that have been discussed in past studies of intergroup relations 
largely directed at the relationship between white and black Americans, including the personal 
contact, context, self-interest, and symbolic politics theoretical perspectives.  The major findings 
of the effects of these key explanatory factors on Americans’ affect- and cognition-based 
perceptions of Asians indicate some mixed and conflicting results.  The findings confirm some 
aspects of the personal contact, self-interest, and symbolic politics hypotheses, but not the 
context hypothesis.   
     The major findings of this study have provided some important insights into Americans’ 
views of Asians, suggesting that a better or fuller understanding of contemporary racial attitudes 




CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Asian Americans currently make up just an estimated five percent of the U.S. population 
(2009 American Community Survey); yet, they are one of the fastest growing racial/ethnic 
populations—relative to percentage increase—and immigrant-dominated groups in America 
(National Research Council et al., 2001).1  With this population growth, the Asian American 
community has received increasing scrutiny and attention from scholars, politicians, and the 
media in recent years, but in many ways it remains misunderstood.  For example, a number of 
scholars (e.g., Lien et al., 2004; Said, 1978; Okihiro, 1994) have noted that many non-Asians 
perceived Asian Americans in general as foreigners, although only more than half of the current 
Asian American population is foreign-born.   
This dissertation explores how Americans think about Asian Americans, specifically in 
terms of positive/negative evaluations that they have of Asians and their perceptions of factual 
attributes of Asians (such as perseverance and intelligence).2  Understanding Americans’ views 
toward Asians, a politically meaningful but understudied group, is important in light of the recent 
immigration-based changes in the nation that affect the changing face of the American electorate.  
With the introduction of a considerable number of immigrants, largely from Asia and Latin 
America, to the polity in recent years, it is likely that Americans’ beliefs or thoughts about race 
and ethnicity3 will be altered beyond the black-white schism in U.S. politics, signaling, for 
                                                 
1 The 2000 U.S. Census Bureau categorizes Asian Americans collectively as individuals from Chinese, Japanese, 
Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Asian Indian, and “other” Asian descents.  However, Asians are greatly diverse in 
ethnic origin, and no individual ethnic group constitutes a majority.  This dissertation is concerned with perceptions 
of Asians as a racial out-group and does not examine the different ethnic groups.  Thus, I refer to Asian Americans 
as a single, broad group in spite of the two dozen groups that this term covers. 
2 This dissertation focuses on respondents from the four major racial/ethnic groups in the U.S., including Asians, 
whites, blacks, and Hispanics. 
3 The definitions of race and ethnicity and how they are related are still unclear.  Even though some scholars use 
these terms alternately, ethnicity refers generally to a person’s cultural background or country of origin, while race is 
used frequently to describe the mutually exclusive racial and politically meaningful groupings of white, black, 
Latino, and Asian American (Junn and Matto, 2008).  The term “Hispanic” is classified by the U.S. government as 
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example, a potential for political coalitions founded in multiple races/ethnicities (Junn and 
Matto, 2008; Lien et al., 2004).  
It is a fact, although some consider it a truism, that the United States is a nation of 
immigrants, populated from persons all over the globe.  Historian Edward Countryman (1996) 
hails Americans as a “collision of histories” with a mixture of races, ethnicities, cultures, 
religions, and socioeconomic groups (see also Welch et al., 2009).  Changes in the recent U.S. 
population mix arise largely from immigration, and today’s immigrants came overwhelmingly 
from Asia and Latin America and not from Europe or Africa (National Research Council et al., 
2001).  The 2000 Census indicates that the Asian American population has the highest 
proportion of legal immigrants at 61 percent (National Research Council et al., 2001), while 40 
percent of Hispanic Americans are foreign-born (Suro and Passel, 2003).  Findings based on the 
2000 Census, as shown in Figure 1.1, give a detailed picture of how the U.S. population has 
changed in the past few decades, particularly in comparing the Asian, white, black, and Hispanic 
populations.4  Figure 1.1 shows demographic trends of the racial/ethnic makeup of the U.S. 
population from 1900 to projections through 2050.  In terms of the racial/ethnic proportion to the 
total U.S. population, Asian and Hispanic Americans experience the highest growth, particularly 
from 1980 onward.  The black population has remained relatively stable and is projected to 
continue in this way.  In contrast, Figure 1.1 reveals a downward trend in the proportion of the 
white population to the total U.S. population each decade, and this trend is expected to persist 
(National Research Council et al., 2001).   
                                                                                                                                                             
an ethnicity rather than a race; however, a number of past studies have used “Hispanic” interchangeably with 
“Latino” to represent individuals of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Central and South American, and other Hispanic 
origins.  In this dissertation the Hispanic and Latino terms are used interchangeably. 
4 For the purposes of this project, I use “Asian American,” Hispanic American,” “white American,” and “black 
American” interchangeably with “Asian,” “Hispanic,” “white,” and “black” to emphasize the racial/ethnic identities 
of these groups. 
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Figure 1.1 The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Population5 
 
     Yet, it is paradoxical that, throughout American history, a nation of immigrants perpetually 
has “nativist,” or anti-foreign, views or sentiments.  Some native-born Americans have fears of 
job and economic competitions from new immigrants, and in some cases foreign-born 
Americans develop anti-immigration attitudes as well.  A number of native-born Americans also 
perceive cultural threats from non-English-speaking individuals or people with different cultural 
traditions and religious beliefs (Welch et al., 2009).  Such anti-foreign sentiments are typically 
most prominent when levels of immigration are elevated, and this is why strong anti-foreign 
sentiments have affected American politics throughout its history and today, manifested in part 
                                                 
5 Reprinted with permission from America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, 2001 by the National 
Academy of Sciences, Courtesy of the National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.  The letter of permission is 
included in Appendix A. 
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by the ever-changing and controversial U.S. immigration policy (Welch et al., 2009; Lien et al., 
2004).  In particular, a number of overtly discriminatory immigration laws directly targeted the 
Asian population, which is still heavily immigrant today, in the early periods of American 
history.  The Immigration Exclusion Act of 1882, the Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924, and 
the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 blocked practically all immigration from certain Asian 
countries, such as China, Japan, and India, and prevented citizenship to Asians already residing 
in the U.S. (Wong et al., 2008; Lee, 1999).  It was not until the 1965 Immigration Act, which 
contained favorable immigration and naturalization reforms for Asians, that the Asian population 
started to increase sharply in the U.S., especially between 1970 and 2000.  Since 1970 and the 
end of immigration limits initially enforced in 1924, the Asian American population has 
augmented from 1.5 million to almost 12 million in 2000 (including mixed race) and is predicted 
to increase to 20 million by 2020 (National Research Council et al., 2001).   Compared with the 
white, black, and Hispanic populations, the Asian American population has undergone dramatic 
changes in growth rate.  As Table 1.1 shows, the Asian American population is the fastest-  
 
Table 1.1 Population Growth Rate by Racial/Ethnic Group 
 % Growth Rate: 1980-1990 % Growth Rate: 1990-2000 
Asians 96.1 72.0 
Hispanics 53.0 39.4 
Blacks 12.0 15.3 
Whites 4.1 5.1 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2001 Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
 
growing of all the major racial/ethnic groups, both from 1980-1990 and 1990-2000, followed by 
Hispanics, blacks, and whites, respectively.  In the 1980-1990 decade, the Asian population 
experienced a phenomenal growth rate at 96 percent, predominantly due to the resettlement of 
political refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.  The Asian community underwent a 
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lower, but still exceptional, growth rate of 72 percent in 1990-2000.  The Hispanic population 
follows with a growth rate of 53 percent in 1980-1990 and 39 percent in 1990-2000. 
Nativist sentiments appear also to be in conflict with other American values.  Despite the 
resentments they have faced, immigrants from Asia (and other countries of the world) have been 
noted for their important roles in building America.  For example, Chinese immigrants helped to 
construct the transcontinental railroad that connected the eastern part of America to its western 
region.  Japanese and Hispanic immigrants contributed to California’s status as the country’s 
chief food producer.  In more recent times, Chinese and Indian immigrants have played a 
prominent part in U.S. high-tech industry.   
The general salience of racial attitudes in the U.S. is indisputable, both in positive and 
negative ways.  Scenes of disagreement, misunderstanding, discord, and even open bigotry in 
major urban areas in the U.S. are not hard to call to mind (Bobo and Johnson, 2000).  For 
example, in a front-page Los Angeles Times story written before the 1992 riots (in Los Angeles), 
Frank Clifford conveyed a general sense of apprehension and tension with the racial divide in 
this manner: 
Cultural collisions, often violent, occasionally fatal, are occurring every day.  
Hostilities between black residents and Korean shop-keepers, Latinos and blacks 
vying for jobs at Martin Luther King Jr./Drew Medical Center, interracial fighting 
at Lawndale high school, and repeated charges of police brutality against 
minorities--all of this is disturbing the city's racial peace in a way that has some 
political analysts recalling Watts. [Frank Clifford, "Tension among Minorities 
Upsets Old Rules of Politics."  Los Angeles Times, August 11, 1991, p. A1] 
 
Moreover, in a review of the movie Crash, Roger Ebert suggests that racial perceptions of 
various groups are prevalent even in a mix-race community, and everyone, no matter his/her 
racial/ethnic background, holds some sorts of personal prejudice of other groups in society:  
“Crash” tells interlocking stories of whites, blacks, Latinos, Koreans, Iranians, 
cops and criminals, the rich and the poor, the powerful and powerless, all defined 
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in one way or another by racism. All are victims of it, and all are guilty of it. 
Sometimes, yes, they rise above it, although it is never that simple. Their negative 
impulses may be instinctive, their positive impulses may be dangerous, and who 
knows what the other person is thinking? [Roger Ebert, “Crash.” 
www.rogerebert.com, May 5, 2005] 
 
      However, racial conflict, division, and personal prejudice do not completely characterize 
race relations in American communities.  For instance, following the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, 
a diverse group of black, Hispanic, and Asian community leaders drafted a call for progressive 
leadership on race and established the Multicultural Collaborative to develop long-term solutions 
to intense ethnic conflict (Bobo and Johnson, 2000).   
In America, significant cleavages have formed between groups identified by racial or 
ethnic indicators.  As Bobo (1999) notes, American society currently faces “a potentially historic 
turn against many of the civil rights accomplishments of the past four decades: a great chasm of 
misunderstanding still separates black and white Americans, and a rising tide of anti-immigrant 
fervor is gathering force” (446).  The recent influx of immigrants from Asia and Latin America 
has demographically changed the racial and ethnic landscape of America, transforming it from a 
nation “monochromatically divided between blacks and whites into a ‘prismatic’ nation 
composed of a polychromatic range of ethnic and racial groups” (Oliver and Wong, 2003: 567).  
In many American cities, immigration has added rising numbers of Asians and Hispanics to the 
core of black and white ethnic urban neighborhoods (Jackson et al., 1994).  Even as it heads 
toward a relative multiracial majority, the United States is still divided by color.  Thus, there are 
many reasons that researchers continue to be committed to unraveling the nature of prejudice and 
hostility among racial groups.   
Although the Asian American presence has been felt since the first large wave of Asian 
immigrants who arrived in the United States in 1848 and the current increases in the Asian 
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population, Americans’ perceptions of Asians are still relatively unclear and often ambivalent in 
the scholarly literature and American society.  Scholars of Asian American studies indicate that 
the perceived status of Asians in the U.S. has run the gamut from perpetual “yellow peril” 
foreigners coined in the 1800s to initially represent Chinese immigrants and later other Asian 
immigrants as a threat of Asiatic immigration, demeaning “coolies” to typecast Chinese 
immigrant workers in the mid-1900s, and “enemy race” and “yellow peril” to characterize 
Japanese Americans in World War II, to the esteemed “model minority” and well-educated 
immigrants post-1965 (Lee, 1999; Chan, 1991; Lee et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2005; Yen, 2000; Lien 
et al., 2004).  Widely held views of the general public toward the current and future influence of 
Asians on American society and politics continue to be largely seen through the stereotype of 
Asians (1) as a “model minority” who have achieved great social and economic successes and 
are politically compliant and even passive, or (2) as perpetual foreigners who are not interested 
in blending into the larger American society and political culture (Lien et al., 2004).  These 
complex and contradictory perceptions of Asians, however, have not been thoroughly examined 
because past studies typically treat racial attitudes and prejudice as if they were strictly a black-
white concern (Lin et al., 2005).   
Perceptions of Racial Out-Groups in the United States 
Racial attitudes have been a critical factor in studies of intergroup relations and issues of 
race in America.  They largely take the form of a white majority’s views toward a particular 
minority out-group, such as black Americans.  In the substantial scholarly ink devoted to 
research on racial attitudes since Gunnar Myrdal’s classic An American Dilemma in 1944, black 
Americans have been noticeable chiefly as the “objects” of racial attitudes.  Racial attitudes have 
figured prominently in black-white relations by and large because of the strained relationship 
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brought about by the presence of a large black population comprised of individuals who had 
been unfairly degraded as slaves and then treated as second-class citizens in a country formed on 
democratic ideals of equal opportunity.  The racial system in America is inextricably linked to 
our nation’s history as well as to its core values and ideals (Croll, 2007; Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 
2001; Gerstle, 2002; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Lewis, 2004; Omi and Winant, 1994).  This 
tension has troubled and preoccupied American ideas, discourse, and leaders for centuries 
(Schuman et al., 1985).  Thomas Jefferson, a prominent figure in developing American 
democracy, believed that the existence of a harmonious white-black society was implausible 
because of whites’ deep-rooted prejudices toward blacks and blacks’ aggrieved resentments 
toward whites (Schuman et al., 1985).  A century later, Alexis de Tocqueville echoed Jefferson’s 
view that a merging of the races in U.S. society was not conceivable; moreover, he believed that 
blacks and whites could not live in any society as equals (Schuman et al., 1985).  As Tocqueville 
and Jefferson predicted, racial beliefs and attitudes have long influenced Americans and 
American politics.   
In fact, most of what is known about the roots and consequences of racial and ethnic 
attitudes and perceptions of minority groups in American politics stems from studies of black 
Americans, and the majority of these works have focused on the black-white schism in U.S. 
politics (e.g., Schuman et al., 1985; Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Sniderman and Carmines, 
1997; Gilens, 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1998; Tate, 1994, 2003; Sniderman and Piazza, 2002).  
The perceptions and stereotypes of blacks have helped to shape whites’ political views on racial 
issues, such as welfare and crime (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1998; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998).  
Numerous scholars, such as Myrdal (1944), Allport (1954), Tocqueville (1956) and Takaki 
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(1979), have concluded that whites’ derogatory views of blacks have, to a great extent, shaped 
the politics, social structure, economy, and culture of American society. 
Racial beliefs about black Americans have assumed two particular forms in the literature.  
First, genetic stereotype was at the hub of the social Darwinism movement that perceived blacks 
as biologically and socially inferior (Schuman et al., 1985).  This stereotype persuaded many 
whites to believe that blacks should be separated from white society, and contributed to the 
proliferation of the Jim Crow laws in the 1800s (Schuman et al., 1985).  Yet, several studies have 
shown that genetic stereotyping of blacks that was popular in the 1940s has now been rejected by 
a majority of whites (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Schuman et al., 1985; Sigelman and Welch, 1991).  
Moreover, Sigelman and Welch (1991: 48) indicate that “many whites now tend to eschew overt 
expressions of racist sentiment, but at the same time want to keep blacks at arm’s length.”  
Second, behavioral stereotype, which supplanted genetic stereotype, has become relevant as a 
large number of whites today view blacks as “violent” or “undisciplined” and “lazy” (Peffley and 
Hurwitz, 1998).  Kluegel and Smith (1986) convey that “the majority of whites believe that 
blacks do not face strictly racial barriers to opportunity, and attribute race differences in 
socioeconomic status to a lack of motivation among blacks” (191).  The resulting resentments 
are rooted in the belief that “blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and 
self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline” (Kinder and Sears, 1981: 416; also 
McConahay and Hough, 1976; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988).  These perceptions are 
important in the sense that they often are transformed into political and policy attitudes that tend 
to be unfavorable to blacks (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1998).  
The recent changing face of the American electoral landscape has prompted an 
adjustment to the racial context of politics, shifting Americans’ thinking about race and ethnicity 
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beyond the black-white division in politics (Junn and Matto, 2008).  The country’s current 
demographic composition has changed considerably in the last 25 years according to the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  Unlike the black community—who once made up the largest minority group but 
are now experiencing only slight increases in population growth rate—the Hispanic and Asian 
populations have undergone tremendous growth in recent years.  With Hispanics now 
supplanting blacks as the largest minority group in the U.S., researchers have started to focus on 
racial attitudes toward Hispanics and Hispanics’ perceptions of other racial groups (Sanchez, 
2008; McClain et al., 2006; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004; Sniderman 
and Piazza, 2002; Fox, 2004; Stein et al., 2000).  Compared with those of blacks, whites’ racial 
attitudes toward Hispanics are much less negative.  For example, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) 
find that contact between whites and Hispanics in certain settings helps to mitigate anti-Hispanic 
stereotypes.  Similarly, Stein et al. (2000) indicate that frequent contact between Hispanics and 
whites enhances the majority group’s affinity toward Hispanics.  Blacks’ perceptions of 
Hispanics are somewhat mixed, although they are often positive.  A number of studies of black-
Hispanic relations show a history of mutual support and collaboration through their common 
political party affiliation (Hahn et. al, 1976; Munoz and Henry, 1990; Hero, 1989; Sonenshein, 
1989; De Leon, 1991).  However, some studies, such as Gay (2006), contend that competition for 
scarce resources influences blacks’ anti-Latino sentiments.  Hispanics’ perceptions of other racial 
groups, however, are less straightforward.  McClain et al. (2006) find that Hispanic immigrants 
mostly have negative stereotypical views of blacks and perceive that they have more in common 
with whites than with blacks.  Conversely, Sanchez (2008) indicates that Hispanic group 
consciousness affects greater perceptions of commonality with black Americans, but concludes 
that Hispanic panethnic identity is not yet well defined.  
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Studies of Americans’ racial attitudes toward Asians, in contrast, are conspicuously 
deficient in the political science literature.  There are a few exceptions with such multi-racial 
studies as Oliver and Wong (2003) and Jackson, Gerber, and Cain (1994), but these studies have 
mixed or inconclusive results concerning Asians due, in part, to the distinct time and place of the 
surveys used (i.e. in Los Angeles during or after a period of great urban tension involving Asian 
business owners).  Compared with what is known from empirical research about whites, blacks, 
and, more recently, Hispanics, little is known or understood about the patterns and determinants 
of racial perceptions and attitudes toward Asians.  In fact, Asian Americans are an understudied 
group in the literature, particularly in comparison to blacks and Hispanics. 
Perceptions of Asian Americans 
      Some scholars of Asian American studies suggest that Americans’ perceptions of Asians 
are seen largely through the lens of prevailing myths about this group.  In particular, two 
contrasting and disputed stereotypes have dominated contemporary views of Asian Americans. 
Asian Americans as a Model Minority 
      Asians as a group are most commonly perceived today as a “model minority.”  Definitions 
of model minority vary, but it is generally described as a racial out-group who has attained 
economic success and social acceptance through hard work and conservative values (Lee, 1999; 
Lee et al., 2008; Lien et al, 2004).  This stereotype accentuates perceived competence of Asians 
by portraying them as diligent and successful in their educational and economic endeavors (Lin 
et al., 2005).  In fact, public figures, the media, and educators have commended Asian 
Americans for their educational achievements, hard-working values, high family incomes, stable 
family structures, and low levels of criminal behavior (Lee et al., 2008; Lee, 1999; Yen, 2000).   
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     The model minority term was first used in the mid-1960s by sociologist William Petersen 
to epitomize Asian Americans.  In a New York Times Magazine article, entitled “Success Story, 
Japanese American Style,” Petersen (1966) suggests that Japanese Americans’ 
cultures/values/ethics of hard work and strong family bonds made it possible for them to 
overcome racial barriers and achieved great academic and economic success in mainstream 
society (see also Lee et al., 2008).  During the 1980s the media perpetuated the model minority 
image by honoring Asian Americans in school with various praises and complimentary titles.  
For example, such articles as Newsweek’s “The Drive to Excel” (April 1984), The New 
Republic’s “America’s Greatest Success Story: The Triumph of Asian Americans” (July 1985), 
Fortune’s “America’s Super Minority” (November 1986), and Time’s “The New Whiz Kids” 
(August 1987) highlighted the Asian “success” story in which Asians were described as 
underprivileged Americans who persevered to achieve success by acquiring the “American 
Dream” (Lee et al., 2008: 70).  
     The formation of the model minority stereotype can be explained by various political and 
social factors, such as the U.S. immigration policy and the social climate of the 1960s and 1970s 
(Lien et al., 2004; Lee, 1999; Yen, 2000; Lee et al., 2008).  The model minority stereotype has 
been linked to the 1965 Immigration Act that led to rapid increases in the Asian population in the 
U.S. (Lien et al., 2004: Yen, 2000).  Even though this statute eased previous restrictions on 
immigration from Asia, it permitted mass entry to specific classes of Asians, including 
individuals with desirable occupational skills, close relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents, and political refugees (Lien et al., 2004).  The post-1965 immigrants from Asia were 
composed largely of highly educated and wealthy groups in their homelands, even though a large 
number of political refugees of much more modest backgrounds from Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
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Laos resettled in the U.S. in 1975 and later (Lien et al., 2004).  Under the preference of “skilled 
workers,” the U.S. recruited graduate students, professionals, and technicians, and policymakers 
sought to attract Asians for technical and scientific positions not successfully filled by American 
students (Lien et al., 2004; Yen, 2000).  Hence, the 1965 Immigration Act regulated the quality 
of immigrants from Asia in ways that it did not for immigrants from non-Asian countries (Lien et 
al., 2004; Yen, 2000).  The inundation of post-1965 immigrants altered the demographics and 
character of the Asian American community by bringing status, expertise, and wealth to an out-
group that primarily contained mostly uneducated and poor laundry and restaurant owners, 
although many of the political refugees who arrived in 1975 and later became part of the working 
class (Yen, 2000; Lien et al., 2004). 
The social atmosphere of the Civil Rights era also helped to propagate the model 
minority stereotype.  In particular, the acknowledgment of Asian achievements, through such 
venues as Petersen’s (1966) article on Japanese Americans, took place during a period of social 
upheavals for other minority groups, especially increases in the crime and poverty rates among 
blacks and Hispanics that drew widespread apprehension (Yen, 2000; Lee, 1999; Lee et al., 
2008).  Some scholars of Asian American studies (such as Lee, 1999) suggest that the model 
minority image of Asians was used to challenge Civil Rights activists’ concerns about equal 
opportunities for all races (see also Lee et al., 2008).  As Lee (1999) indicates, by the late 1960s 
an image of a socioeconomically successful Asian community was promoted as a model of 
productivity and nonpolitical, nonmilitant upward mobility for other racial minorities to emulate.      
Although the model minority stereotype is seemingly positive, it actually conveys mixed 
feelings of respect that can be harmful to the Asian community (Lin et al. 2005; Yen, 2000; 
Chou and Feagin, 2008; Lee et al., 2008).  This ambiguity reveals the paradox of the model 
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minority image.  For example, many Asian Americans do not conform to model minority traits.  
The stereotype does not take into account the poverty among such Asian ethnic groups as the 
unemployed Hmong, Vietnamese refugees, and Filipino farm laborers (Lee et al., 2008; Yen, 
2000).  It assumes Asians to be a monolithic group comprised of exchangeable members, but, in 
reality, important differences are present within and between the distinct Asian ethnic groups 
(Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Lien et al., 2004; Chong and Kim, 2006).  Yet, the image of Asians as 
a model minority has persisted, likely because, on average, Asians score at higher levels on 
various measures of socioeconomic success (e.g., education and income) than other groups, 
particularly other racial minority groups (Alba and Nee, 2003).   
The Threat of the Yellow Peril or Perpetual Foreigners 
      Since the term was coined in the 1800s, Asians have been typecast first as the “yellow 
peril,” a label with more pejorative connotations than the model minority image, which came 
into existence decades later.  The stereotype depicts Asians as perpetual foreigners with 
generally inferior cultural practices and lower moral standards than white Americans (Lee, 1999; 
Yen, 2000).  Hence, as yellow peril outsiders, Asians (whether newcomers or second-plus 
generation) are perceived as a danger to American stability and a threat to the American national 
family (Lee, 1999).  
The yellow peril stereotype originated with the experiences of early Chinese immigrants 
who came to California in the 1800s as railroad and agricultural workers (Lee, 1999; Lien et al., 
2004).  These immigrants were generally considered to be uneducated, corrupt, treacherous, and 
exotic (Lee, 1999; Yen, 2000).  Although, at best, white Americans viewed the immigrants with 
a sense of curiosity, their perceptions became more negative when many of the Chinese shifted 
from being laborers in plantations owned by whites to becoming business owners in urban areas 
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(Lee, 1999; Yen, 2000).  Anti-Chinese sentiments resulted in violence and culminated in the 
passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited virtually all immigration from 
China and forbade Chinese residents in the U.S. and their American-born children from 
becoming citizens (Hing, 1993; Lien et al., 2004; Lee, 1999).  By the dawn of the 1900s, other 
immigrants from Asia settled in America, and the yellow peril label was used to characterize 
Asian immigrants in general as a renewed threat of “Asiatic” immigration—an invasion of 
“yellow men” and “little brown brothers” (Lee, 1999: 10).  This label, along with the “enemy 
race” image (Chan, 1991), was also used to portray Japanese Americans, whose loyalties to 
America were unjustly questioned regardless of their American citizenship and years in the U.S., 
during World War II (Lee, 1999; Wu, 2002). 
Contemporary images of the yellow peril stereotype are less demeaning than its initial 
images, but Asian Americans appear to still be viewed as foreign and peculiar (Lien et al., 2004).  
The foreign component is especially enduring.  Asians in general are perceived as foreign-born 
residents with black hair and almond eyes, no matter if they are U.S.-born and have many 
generations of U.S.-born ancestors in their family tree (Lien et al., 2004; Yen, 2000; Okihiro, 
1994).  Furthermore, the stereotype gives the impression that many Asians are interested more in 
preserving their distinct cultures and Asian homeland connections than in assimilating into 
mainstream American society and political system (Lien et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2008).  
Plan of Dissertation 
Compared with black and Hispanic Americans, Asians Americans constitute a 
comparatively smaller proportion of the U.S. population size, are concentrated residentially in a 
few states, and tend to be perceived as a silent minority politically (Junn and Matto, 2008; Lien 
et al., 2004).  Thus, it is not surprising that little scholarly attention has been given to 
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understanding the political attitudes and behavior of Asians.  However, the 2000 U.S. Census 
indicates that Asians are among the fastest-growing minority groups in the country, and it is 
projected they will increase in population size to eight percent of the U.S. population by 2050 
(Junn and Matto, 2008).  This explosive growth, along with the diffusion of Asians across states 
in recent years, has helped to stimulate a fresh interest in studying the politics of Asians (Lien et 
al., 2004; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Wong et al., 2008; Junn and Matto, 2008).   
So far, little is known about Americans’ racial attitudes toward Asians and the potential 
effects of these views on political opportunities and consequences for Asians.6  A major reason 
for this lack of knowledge is a deficiency of survey data that asks questions specifically and 
comprehensively about attitudes toward Asians.  Although a great deal has been learned and 
more is still to be learned from studies of the racial perceptions and attitudes among whites, 
blacks, and Hispanics, understanding racial attitudes in contemporary American politics would 
not be complete without also exploring attitudes toward Asian Americans.  Thus, in this 
dissertation I seek to shed some light on Americans’ political views of Asians, who are often 
viewed as politically acquiescent and low-key actors in the political system (Lien et al., 2004).  
For instance, Asians tend to have lower overall voting levels than whites, blacks, and Hispanics, 
as noted in the last three presidential elections (File and Crissey, 2010); however, Lien et al. 
(2004) argue that their lower turnout rates are not due to apathy but mainly to dissatisfaction with 
the citizenship and voter registration requirements. 
As Schuman et al. (1985) noted in their work on racial attitudes in the U.S., some may 
question the concern with attitudes in studying racial relations in America.  Nonetheless, 
attitudes provide valuable guidance to understanding individuals’ behavior.  For example, 
                                                 
6 Not much is known about Asians’ perceptions of non-Asian Americans, but this inquiry is not the focus of this 
dissertation. 
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attitudes toward Asians may help to determine whether non-Asian Americans would support an 
Asian candidate for office.  Beyond their usefulness to understanding behavior, attitudes are 
critical components of the larger American social climate.  Race relations in the U.S. involve 
more than such important determinants of the quality of life as education attainment, 
employment status, and family incomes; they also concern the interpersonal, intrapersonal, and 
cultural characteristics that influence the subjective experiences of Asian and non-Asian 
Americans (Schuman et al., 1985).  Hence, attitudinal responses collected from surveys provide 
crucial and useful clues to the meaning of race in the U.S.  
The fundamental research question of this dissertation focuses on Americans’ perceptions 
of Asian Americans. Two aspects of perceptions toward Asians are explored: (1) affect-based 
perceptions, which address the positive and negative evaluations that Americans have about 
Asian Americans; and (2) cognition-based perceptions, which are concerned with Americans’ 
perceptions of factual attributes of Asian Americans (e.g., how hard-working or intelligent Asian 
Americans are perceived to be).  The main objective of this dissertation is to develop and test a 
series of models to determine the patterns and sources of racial attitudes toward Asians in terms 
of context, contact, self-interest, symbolic politics, and socio-demographic correlates.  This 
analysis uses different national surveys to test competing theories of racial attitudes toward 
Asians. 
In this analysis the views of Asian respondents are included for group comparison 
purposes to the views of white, black, and Hispanic respondents.  Examining how Asian 
Americans see themselves provides an important comparison point for estimating how whites, 
blacks, and Hispanics view Asian Americans.  For instance, to what extent (if at all) do Asian 
Americans perceive themselves as “hardworking”?  If Asians, blacks, whites, and Hispanics all 
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see Asians as hardworking, this leads to a different interpretation compared with if blacks, 
whites, and Hispanics see Asians as hardworking but Asians do not.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I focus on the general Asian American population, both U.S.-born and foreign-born, 
even though the current Asian population in the U.S. is predominantly immigrant.  The choice is 
based on data limitations.  It is also impractical to distinguish among the major Asian American 
groups (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino) because social interaction and discourse frequently 
depend on stereotypes associated with the broad “Asian” category.   
The analysis proceeds in a simple progression.  I begin in Chapter 2 with a descriptive 
overview of the current status of Asian Americans and their politics.  The goals of this chapter 
are (1) to shed light on this fast-growing minority group whose status in popular accounts tends 
to be unclear and ambivalent and dogged by prevailing myths, and (2) to ascertain the factual 
basis (or lack thereof) of persistent stereotypes about Asian Americans.  This chapter is 
constructed to impart a context for the ensuing analyses of the affect- and cognition-based 
perceptions of Asians in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
In Chapter 3, I conduct a literature review of the competing theories of racial attitudes 
toward Asians in terms of contact, context, self-interest, and symbolic politics.  These theories 
have largely been directed at studies of black-white relations; however, they provide a useful 
framework in which to study the affect- and cognition-based perceptions of Asians in Chapters 4 
and 5, respectively.   
      In Chapter 4, I explore Americans’ affect-based perceptions of Asian Americans.  The 
term affect has been commonly described as positive and/or negative feelings, emotions, or 
drives that an individual links with an attitude “object” (Edwards, 1990; Edwards and von 
Hippel, 1995).  In this chapter I develop and test two models that estimate the impact of context, 
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contact, self-interest, symbolic politics, and socio-demographic factors on Americans’ affect-
based perceptions of Asians.  The first model uses as the dependent variable evaluations of 
individual favorability toward Asians.  The second model uses assessments of closeness to 
Asians in terms of ideas, interests and feelings.  Data for these models are drawn from the 2004 
American National Election Study (ANES) and the 2004 National Politics Survey (NPS). 
      Chapter 5 follows a similar pattern to that of Chapter 4, but with an analysis of a series of 
models that estimate the effects of the independent variables on cognition-based perceptions of 
Asian Americans.  The cognition term has been commonly used to express beliefs, judgments, or 
thoughts about positive and/or negative attributes of an attitude “object” (McGuire, 1969; 
Fabrigar and Petty, 1999; Edwards, 1990).  Researchers in social psychology argue that 
cognition can contribute to the structure of attitudes in conjunction with or separate from affect.  
For example, whites might feel warmly toward Asians and view Asians as hardworking and 
intelligent.  Conversely, whites might have no or neutral feelings toward Asians but regard 
Asians as hardworking and intelligent.  Thus, to understand Americans’ attitudes toward Asians, 
it is important not only to explore their positive and/or negative evaluations of Asians, but also to 
examine their beliefs of positive and/or negative traits attributed to Asians.  In Chapter 5, I focus 
on stereotypes or generalizations about the traits of Asian Americans by examining people’s 
beliefs about specific personal attributes of Asians and their general stereotypes of Asians.  Data 
for these models are drawn from the 2004 ANES and 2004 NPS. 
      Chapter 6 concludes with a review of the major findings and a discussion of possible 
future research on attitudes toward Asian Americans.  This chapter will also discuss some 
implications of the findings in terms of how Americans’ perceptions of Asian Americans might 
 20
affect political opportunities or empowerment for Asians, such as in coalition building with other 
racial/ethnic groups and increasing Asian political representation. 
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CHAPTER 2:  WHO ARE ASIAN AMERICANS? 
      While the Asian American population is generally a fairly recent addition to the nation’s 
ethnic mix, comparatively large waves of Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese immigration took 
place in the mid-to-late 19th century, with the first large-scale immigration from Asia to America 
happening in 1848.  Although the Asian presence in the country is more than a century and a half 
old, little is known or understood about the Asian community.  Who are Asian Americans?   
      Asian Americans today represent an immensely diversified and rich combination of 
languages, cultures, beliefs, and practices, many of which differ extensively from those of 
European Americans (Lin and Cheung, 1999; Lee, 1998).  The Asian American community 
comprises 24 distinct Asian ethnic groups (Barnes and Bennett, 2002), each with its distinct 
language, culture, religious beliefs, dietary practices, physical and social characteristics, and 
immigration history (Lin and Cheung, 1999; Lee, 1998).  Moreover, each ethnic group, such as 
Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese, encompasses broad disparities in levels of education, English 
proficiency, family income, residential preferences, exposure to war trauma, and levels of 
acculturation (Lin and Cheung, 1999; Lien et al., 2004; Lee, 1998).  In spite of the diversity of 
the Asian American population, the “Asian” label is used by most non-Asian Americans to 
describe members of this population and is officially recognized by the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget in 1977 as a separate racial category in federal statistics to represent all 
the members (Lee, 1998).  However, most Asians, particularly those who are immigrants, are 
more likely to identify themselves in ethnic-specific terms rather than as “Asian American” 
(Lien et al., 2004).  This discrepancy indicates the importance of understanding who Asian 
Americans are, since the use of the Asian American label is likely to affect how Asian 
Americans are viewed both by themselves and by other racial/ethnic groups.  Hence, to better 
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comprehend the patterns and sources of Americans’ attitudes toward Asians—the objective of 
this dissertation—requires first having an understanding of the meaning of “Asian American” in 
contemporary America.   
In this chapter, I conduct a descriptive overview of the Asian population to shed light on 
what it means to be “Asian American” in today’s society and politics by highlighting its diversity 
and community.  First, I explore how the Asian American population has evolved in terms of 
ethnic diversification, population growth, and geographic concentration using data collected by 
the U.S. Census Bureau and findings from other studies.  Second, I confront popular myths and 
perceptions of Asians by assessing the factual sources, or lack thereof, of these perceptions using 
data also from the U.S. Census Bureau and findings from other studies.   
An Evolving Asian Population 
Ethnic Diversification 
      Who is “Asian” American?  An Asian American is commonly any Asian who is a U.S. 
citizen or has permanent or long-term residency in the United States, regardless of the person’s 
citizenship or other legal status (Lien et al., 2004; Lee, 1998).  However, what it means to be 
Asian has significantly changed over the last century and a half because of alterations in the 
racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. population and shifts in the political concerns and 
social attitudes about racial and ethnic minorities (Lien et al., 2004).  Also, the changing needs of 
the federal government for demographic data to deal with the increasing diversity within 
minority groups and across individuals with multiple racial/ethnic identities have brought about 
important modifications in the collection, classification, and tabulation of race and ethnicity in 
the U.S. Census (Lien et al., 2004; Espiritu and Omi, 2000; Lee, 1998).   
The changing definitions of “Asian” in American society and politics can be illustrated 
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by the historical evolution of the U.S. Census categories for the Asian population (see also Lien 
et. al, 2004).  The first U.S. decennial census in 1790 collected data on race, but no distinction 
was made for individuals of Asian descent.  Since the first large and persistent influx of 
immigrants to the U.S. was from China, “Chinese” became the initial Asian category, and data 
have been collected on the Chinese population since the 1860 Census.  Japanese immigrants 
entered in sizeable numbers around the turn of the twentieth century, and a “Japanese” category 
was added later.  Data on the Japanese population have been accumulated since the 1870 Census.   
The racial classification was extended in the 1910 Census to get separate figures on other 
groups, including Filipinos, Asian Indians, and Koreans who all arrived in America in large 
numbers in the early twentieth century.  However, only Filipinos, along with Chinese and 
Japanese, were listed in the Asian group in the 1950 Census.  Data on Filipinos, Asian Indians, 
and Koreans, moreover, were collected on an intermittent basis through the 1970 Census.  The 
“Hawaiian” category debuted under the Asian classification in the 1960 Census.   
The Vietnamese are the only major Asian American group that does not have a 
considerable presence and long history in the U.S. before 1965, and they are also the only major 
group that came to the U.S en masse as political refugees in 1975, following the end of the 
Vietnam War (Lien et al., 2004).  Hence, in the 1970 Census, the Vietnamese population was 
included in the “Other” race category.  The 1970 Census also included “Korean” as a separate 
Asian category, while, interestingly, Asian Indians were classified as white.  In the 1980 Census, 
there were six separate categories for Asians: Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, 
and Vietnamese.  These six categories also appeared on both the 1990 and 2000 Census 
questionnaires.  In addition, for the 2000 Census, a separate “Other Asian” category was added 
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with a write-in area for respondents to indicate specific Asian groups not included on the 
questionnaire. 
According to the 2000 Census, an “Asian” refers to “people having origins in any of the 
original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent, including, for 
example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, 
Thailand, and Vietnam” (Office of Management and Budget, 1997).  Asian groups are not 
restricted to nationalities, but also encompass ethnic terms, such as the Hmong who are an Asian 
ethnic group from the mountainous regions of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.  The 2000 
Census is the first U.S. census that allows people to report more than one race.  It also separated 
the “Asian and Pacific Islander” category found in the 1990 Census into distinct “Asian” and 
“Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander” categories.  As the current census categories for 
Asian Americans show, the Asian population is diverse with a myriad of national origins (and 
languages).  No one Asian ethnic group is dominant, and more than six ethnic groups are 
classified collectively as Asian American in the 2000 Census, including Chinese, Filipino, Asian 
Indian, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese, and an “other Asian” category. 
Population Growth 
      Various scholars (e.g., Lee, 1998; Lien et al., 2004) have indicated that population growth 
and ethnic diversification play essential roles in the evolving meaning of “Asian American.”  
Today, the Asian American community is increasing at an awe-inspiring pace.  The U.S. Census 
Bureau recently estimated that the Asian population (alone or in combination with another race) 
in 2009 to be 15.7 million or 5.1 percent of the U.S. household population, compared with 236.4 
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million or 77 percent for whites, 48.5 million or 15.8 percent for Hispanics, and 40.8 million or 
13.3 percent for blacks.7 
     Although Asians still constitute a comparatively small proportion of the population, the 
2000 Census indicates that Asians are among the fastest-growing minority groups in the country.  
With a 72 percent growth rate in 1990-2000, they have the highest growth rate among the four 
major U.S. racial/ethnic groups (see Table 1.1).  Moreover, Table 2.1 shows that all of the major 
Asian ethnic groups, except Japanese Americans, have fairly substantial growth rates in 1980-
1990 and 1990-2000.  For example, in 1980-1990 Koreans (134.8 percent) were the fastest 
growing group, followed closely by Asian Indians (125.6 percent), Vietnamese (125.3 percent), 
and Chinese (104.1 percent).  In 1990-2000 Asian Indians (113.4 percent) and Vietnamese (80.7 
percent), in particular, continued to grow at a healthy rate. 
It is projected that Asian Americans will increase in population size to six percent of the 
U.S. population by 2025 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010) and to eight percent of 
the population by 2050 (Junn and Matto, 2008).  These projections extend the demographic 
 
Table 2.1 Population Growth Rates of the Largest Asian Ethnic Groups 
Asian Ethnic Group % Growth Rate: 1980-1990 % Growth Rate: 1990-2000 
Asian Indian 125.6 113.4 
Chinese 104.1 39.8 
Filipino 81.6 32.5 
Japanese 20.9 -9.4 
Korean 134.8 34.3 
Vietnamese 125.3 80.7 
Source: Le, C.N. 2010. “Population Statistics & Demographics” Asian-Nation: The Landscape 
of Asian America. 
                                                 
7 The population data for the four major racial/ethnic groups was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 
American Community Survey 1-Year Demographic and Housing Estimates.  The population data collected by the 
U.S. Census Bureau on race is divided into two broad categories: the race alone population and the race in 
combination population, which encompasses respondents who reported more than one of the six races included in 
the 2000 Census.  The race in combination population is often used to report the population characteristics of a 
racial/ethnic group to include all respondents who reported the respective race/ethnicity. 
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trend that has been noted since the 1965 Immigration Act, which liberalized prior restrictions on 
immigration from Asian countries (Lien et al., 2004).  
Geographic Concentration 
     In the early history of Asians in the United States, Asian Americans lived predominantly in 
the western part of the country.  In 1860, 100 percent of Asians resided in the West, and by 1940 
about 90 percent lived in this region (Lee, 1998).  Today, however, they are less concentrated 
geographically than ever before.  The tendency of new immigrants to settle in a number of 
nonwestern states, refugee resettlement programs, and the gradual diffusion of U.S.-born Asians 
and longer-term residents have widened the geographic distribution of Asian Americans (Lee, 
1998).  This dispersion also affects the changing meaning of “Asian American,” since the 
residences of Asians in different parts of the country will likely have a cultural, economical, and 
political impact beyond the western region.   
According to the 2000 Census, the geographic distribution of the Asian population differs 
from regions, states, and counties in the U.S.  In terms of regions, Figure 2.1 shows that most 
Asian Americans still reside in the West, likely reflecting the closeness of the western states to 
Asia.  Of all respondents who reported Asian, 49 percent lived in the West, 20 percent resided in 
the Northeast, 19 percent lived in the South, and 12 percent resided in the Midwest.8  Moreover, 
as Table 2.2 reveals, the West region has the highest proportion of Asians in its total population 
in addition to the largest total Asian population.  About nine percent of all respondents in the  
 
                                                 
8 The West region includes the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  The Northeast region includes the states of Connecticut, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  The 
South region includes the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District 
of Columbia, a state equivalent.  The Midwest region includes the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 












Figure 2.1 Percent Distribution of the Asian American Population by Region, 2000 
Note:  The population data is based on the Asian alone or in combination population category 
from the Census 2000 Summary File 1 that represents the total number of people who identified 
entirely or partially as Asian.  This category also describes people who reported Asian, whether 
or not they reported any other races. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Asian Population for the United States, Regions, and Selected States, 2000 
Area Asian population % of Total Population 
     United States 11,898,828 4.2 
Region   
     Northeast 2,368,297 4.4 
     Midwest 1,392,938 2.2 
     South 2,267,094 2.3 
     West 5,870,499 9.3 
State   
     California 4,155,685 12.3 
     Florida 333,013 2.1 
     Hawaii 703,232 58.0 
     Illinois 473,649 3.8 
     Massachusetts 264,814 4.2 
     New Jersey 524,356 6.2 
     New York 1,169,200 6.2 
     Texas 644,193 3.1 
     Virginia 304,559 4.3 
     Washington  395,741 6.7 
Source and Note:  See Figure 2.1. 
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West reported Asian, compared with 4.4 percent in the Northeast, 2.3 percent in the South, and 
2.2 percent in the Midwest. 
Table 2.2 also shows the 10 states with the largest Asian populations in 2000.  They 
include, from highest to lowest: California (4.2 million), New York (1.2 million), Hawaii (0.70 
million), Texas (0.64 million), New Jersey (0.52 million), Illinois (0.47 million), Washington 
(0.40 million), Florida (0.33 million), Virginia (0.30 million), and Massachusetts (0.26 million). 
According to the 2000 Census, over half (51 percent) of Asians reside in only three states, 
including California, New York, and Hawaii (Barnes and Bennett, 2002).  Together, these states 
represent 75 percent of the Asian population, but only 47 percent of the total population in the 
U.S. (Barnes and Bennett, 2002).  Furthermore, in terms of region, the 2000 Census indicates 
that California, Hawaii, and Washington have the highest concentrations of Asians in the West; 
New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts in the Northeast; Texas, Florida, and Virginia in the 
South; and Illinois in the Midwest. 
Figure 2.2 displays the distribution of the Asian American population in 2000 at the 
county level.  Unsurprisingly, the counties in the U.S. with the highest percentage of Asians (25  
percent or higher) are in Hawaii, including Honolulu county (62 percent) and three other 
counties that are more than 47 percent Asian, followed by two counties each in Alaska and in the 
San Francisco Bay area in California (Barnes and Bennett, 2002).  Asian Americans live in a 
range of counties, as Figure 2.2 shows; however, the largest concentrations of Asians are more 
likely to be found in coastal and/or urban counties, while smaller concentrations tend to be 
scattered throughout the U.S. (Barnes and Bennett, 2002).   
Most of the counties with Asian populations more than twice the national average are 





Figure 2.2 Percent Asian American Population by County, 2000 
Note:  See Figure 2.1.  Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1, American 
FactFinder at factfinder.census.gov. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Largest Metropolitan Areas in Asian American Population, 2000 
Metropolitan Area Asian American Population  % of Total Population 
New York, NY 872,777 10.9 
Los Angeles, CA 407,444 11.9 
San Jose, CA 257,571 28.8 
San Francisco, CA 253,477 32.6 
Honolulu, HI 251,686 67.7 
San Diego, CA 189,413 15.5 
Chicago, IL 140,517 4.9 
Houston, TX 114,140 5.8 
Seattle, WA 84,649 15.0 
Fremont, CA 80,979 39.8 
Source and Note:  See Figure 2.1.
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Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area of California; New York, New York; Honolulu, Hawaii; 
Chicago, Illinois; and Houston, Texas (Barnes and Bennett, 2002).  Table 2.3 displays the 10 
metropolitan areas with the largest Asian populations in 2000.  The results in Table 2.3 indicate 
that New York, NY has the largest Asian population (872,777), followed next by Los Angeles 
(407,444).  Eight places have Asian populations over 100,000:  five in the West (Los Angeles; 
San Jose; San Francisco; Honolulu; and San Diego) and one each in the Northeast (New York, 
NY), the Midwest (Chicago), and the South (Houston). 
      What is the political impact of the evolving Asian population in the racial landscape of the 
United States?  Compared with the white, Hispanic, and black populations, the Asian American 
population may appear, on the surface, small on a national level.  Nonetheless, in many of the 
most dynamic and important states and metropolitan areas, the demographic numbers in Tables 
2.2 and 2.3, respectively, suggest that Asians are a culturally, economically, and politically vital 
and integral part of that respective population.  Moreover, competitive elections in the 2008 
presidential primaries emphasized the political significance of Asian voters in states with large 
numbers of delegates, such as New York and California (Junn and Masuoka, 2008).  Discussion 
of a possible “Asian American” vote has permeated the national discourse and rekindled 
speculation about how political preferences of Asians compare to those of whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics (Junn and Masuoka, 2008).  Yet, answers to this broad question are incomplete 
because political scholars have given little notice to Asians until recently.  Attention to the 
politics of Asians is a recent phenomenon because of the relatively small Asian population size, 
the residential concentrations of Asians in a few states, and the perception of Asians as 
politically compliant and inactive (Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Wong et al., 2008).   
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Confronting Popular Myths and Perceptions of Asian Americans 
      A number of scholars have noted that there are some particularly persistent stereotypes 
which popular accounts typically attribute to today’s Asians Americans.  Two of those prevailing 
myths were introduced in the previous chapter, including the image of all Asian Americans as a 
model minority and the assumption that all Asian Americans are perpetual foreigners.  One other 
persistent stereotype assumes that all Asian Americans are the same.  In other words, many 
people are unable or unwilling to differentiate between distinctive Asian ethnic groups, such as a 
Korean American from a Chinese American or a Filipino American from a Japanese American.  
Many of these scholars, however, argue that the prevailing myths do not describe today’s diverse 
Asian American community; in other words, they contend that the Asian community is neither a 
model minority, nor perpetual foreigners, nor one-and-the-same Orientals.   
In this section I examine the three myths to ascertain the factual basis, or lack thereof, of 
these stereotypes by presenting summary findings from various sources.  I start with an 
assessment of the perception that all Asian Americans are the same by comparing the population, 
socioeconomic, and political characteristics of the six largest Asian ethnic groups.  An 
examination of the perception of Asians as perpetual foreigners follows with comparisons of 
Asian Americans with the other major racial/ethnic groups in terms of English language ability, 
naturalization rate, racial intermarriage rate, and residential segregation index.  Finally, I assess 
the model minority perception by evaluating Asians and other major racial/ethnic groups relative 
to their socioeconomic characteristics and SAT9 mean scores. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The SAT is formerly known as the Scholastic Assessment Test and the Scholastic Aptitude Test and is designed to 
help predict how well students will perform in college rather than to be used as an indicator of student achievement. 
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Perception of Asian Americans as One-and-the-Same Orientals   
Interethnic differences are present across the Asian groups, but they share a common 
perceived origin as “the Orient” (Said, 1978; Lien et al., 2004).  They also have common 
experiences of being viewed as one and the same, under the umbrella “Asian” label in both 
negative and positive ways.  Asian Americans have increasingly complained about blanket 
stereotyping of them by other Americans (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  For instance, in the 1992 
Los Angeles riots anti-Asian anger was primarily directed toward Korean Americans; yet, many 
Asian shopkeepers, particularly those of Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese origins, whose 
stores were looted by the rioters—who were mostly blacks and Hispanics—believed that they 
were targeted because the rioters assumed they were Korean Americans.  In a Los Angeles Times 
article about the Los Angeles riots and Asian Americans, journalist Susan Moffat conveyed this 
wholesale stereotyping as follows: 
For many Asian Americans, the Los Angeles riots brought home a sobering truth: 
The one thing they all have in common is that many other Americans cannot tell 
them apart. The fear that joined the wealthy fourth-generation Japanese-American 
in Bel Air to the war-scarred, welfare dependent Cambodian refugee in Long 
Beach was a wake-up call to anyone with black hair and almond eyes: No one is 
safe from anti-Asian anger.... Many Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese 
Americans say their shops were damaged because rioters thought they were 
Korean. And some have accused Korean immigrants of making trouble for all 
Asian Americans by treating blacks badly. (Susan Moffat, "Splintered Society: 
U.S. Asians," Los Angeles Times, July 31, 1992, p. Al) 
 
As the article suggests, the perception that all Asian Americans are one and the same has been 
debunked by Asians themselves.  Further, this clash between Asians and blacks and Hispanics 
suggests that Asians are likely to be stereotyped by other racial/ethnic groups besides whites, and 
presents a key reason to expand the study of Asian stereotypes to cover groups other than whites.   
      Many non-Asian Americans describe the Asian term in different ways but generally with a 
supposition that they all mean the same thing.  For example, most non-Asian Americans interpret 
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“Asian” as Chinese, Japanese, or “oriental” (Lee, 1998), assuming that each of these labels, 
particularly the Chinese or Japanese label, applies to all Asian Americans (even if they are not 
Chinese or Japanese).  A possible reason for the Chinese and Japanese labels is that Chinese and 
Japanese Americans have the longest and more familiar presence in the U.S., so some non-Asian 
Americans are more likely to identify Asian individuals, particularly newcomers like 
Vietnamese, as Chinese or Japanese.  The one-and-the-same perception of Asians has been 
perpetuated, though inadvertently, also by researchers, since researchers often combine Asian 
Americans under one category (as they also do for European and Hispanic Americans).  Part of 
the reason for this grouping is due to data limitations in surveys; for example, the American 
National Election Study (ANES) tends not to include much information about different Asian 
groups, and even if there were such data the sample sizes would be relatively small.  Hence, 
scholars typically create a dichotomous variable for Asians to include in their models. 
Results from the 2000 Census and other sources (Tables 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5 and Figure 2.3), 
however, highlight the diversity among Asian Americans, challenging the view that Asian 
Americans are all the same.  Table 2.1 reports the growth rates of the six largest Asian ethnic 
groups from 1980 to 2000.  The results of Table 2.1 indicate that the Asian groups differ 
considerably in population growth both in 1980-1990 and 1990-2000.  For example, between 
1980 and 1990, Koreans (134.8 percent) have a higher growth rate than do Asian Indians (125.6 
percent), Vietnamese (125.3 percent), Chinese (104.1 percent), Filipino (81.6 percent), and 
Japanese (20.9 percent).  In 1990-2000 most of the Asian groups experience growth, although at 
a very different pace.  Between 1990 and 2000, Asian Indians (113.4 percent) grew faster than 
Vietnamese (80.7 percent), Chinese (39.8 percent), Korean (34.3 percent), and Filipino (32.5 
percent).  The Japanese are the only Asian group that lacked growth in 1990-2000.  The Japanese 
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population plunged by almost 10 percent in this decade as Table 2.1 reveals, and this decline is 
likely due in part to a gradual decrease in immigration from Japan (Lee, 1998). 
The results of Table 2.4 also showcase the diversity among the Asian groups relative to 
their populations at the national level.  Table 2.4 presents demographic data of the six largest 
Asian ethnic groups whose “Asian alone” population in 2000 was at least 500,000.  Table 2.4 
shows that Chinese is the most populous Asian group in the U.S., both in the “Asian alone” (2.3 
million) and “Asian in combination with one or more other races or Asian groups” (0.4 million) 
categories.  A total of 2.7 million people disclosed Chinese alone or in any combination with at 
least one other race (such as white) or Asian group (such as Japanese).  Filipino and Asian Indian 
are the next two largest Asian groups.  A total of 2.4 million people reported Filipino alone or in 
any combination, and a total of 1.9 million people reported Asian Indian alone or in any 
combination.  Collectively, Chinese, Filipinos, and Asian Indians comprise approximately 58 
percent of all respondents who reported a single Asian group; in addition, of all Asian groups in 
race/ethnic combinations, these three groups represent about 57 percent of all responses.10   
 
Table 2.4 Asian American Population by Detailed Group, 2000 
Detailed 
Group 
Asian Alone Asian in Combination with 
One or More Other Races 
or Asian Groups 
Asian Group Alone or in 
Any Combination  
Asian Indian 1,678,765 220,834 1,899,599 
Chinese 2,314,537 420,304 2,734,841 
Filipino 1,850,314 514,501 2,364,815 
Japanese 796,700 352,232 1,148,932 
Korean 1,076,872 151,555 1,228,427 
Vietnamese 1,122,528 101,208 1,223,736 
Source: See Figure 2.1. 
 
                                                 
10 The calculations for the single Asian group and Asian in race/ethnic combination categories are based on the 
population data of all 25 Asian detailed groups (including the “other Asian, not specified” category) in the Census 
2000 Brief (2002).  Table 2.4 lists the six largest of these Asian detailed groups. 
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Conversely, Japanese is the least populous group among the Asian groups in Table 2.4, with 0.8 
million people reported Japanese alone and an additional 0.35 million people who disclosed 
Japanese with at least one other race or Asian group. 
Moreover, the Asian groups tend to vary in their likelihood of reporting a single 
race/ethnicity or multiple races/ethnicities.  Figure 2.3 displays the percent distribution of the six 
largest Asian groups based on the “Asian alone” and “Asian in combination with one or more 
other races or Asian groups” populations of each group in Table 2.4.  Of the Asian groups in 
Figure 2.3, the Japanese are most likely to affirm belonging to more than one population group, 
i.e., being multiracial or multiethnic.  Of all respondents who reported Japanese, either alone or 




















Alone In combination with one or more races or Asian groups
 
Figure 2.3 Percent Distribution of the Largest Asian Groups by Alone or in 
Combination Population, 2000 
Source: See Figure 2.1. 
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Vietnamese are least likely to be multiracial or multiethnic.  Of all respondents who reported 
Vietnamese, only about eight percent revealed one or more other races or Asian groups. 
Besides population differences, the results of Table 2.5 indicate that socioeconomic 
disparities exist among the largest Asian ethnic groups.  Table 2.5 presents the socioeconomic 
characteristics from the 2000 Census of the six largest (in population size) Asian ethnic groups in 
the U.S.  In terms of education attainment, Asian Indians have the highest rate of obtaining a 
college degree and an advanced degree, with an astonishing 64.4 percent possessing a college 
degree and 12.5 percent holding an advanced degree.  Japanese Americans (9.5 percent) are least 
likely to have less than a high school education.  In contrast, Vietnamese Americans are most 
likely to have less than a high school education (37.8 percent) and least likely to have college 
(13.8 percent) and advanced degrees (2.5 percent).   
The results in Table 2.5 also show that only seven percent of Filipinos are more likely to 
lack English proficiency.  Conversely, a very high 40 percent of Vietnamese have a greater 
likelihood of being unskilled in the English language.  A possible reason for this language 
deficiency is that a large proportion of Vietnamese came to the U.S. as political refugees and not  
 



























Chinese 23.6 46.3 8.5 67.1 65.7 41.9 $58,300 13.1 1.8 31.3 
Filipino 13.1 42.8 4.3 62.7 67.6 29.7 $65,400 6.9 1.6 7.0 
Asian 
Indian 
12.6 64.4 12.5 74.9 56.8 51.6 $69,470 8.2 0.9 8.4 
Korean 13.8 43.6 5.6 69.0 51.9 27.0 $48,500 15.5 1.6 32.9 
Vietnamese 37.8 13.8 2.5 61.2 60.0 22.6 $51,500 13.8 4.8 40.4 
Japanese 9.5 40.8 4.6 60.7 70.8 32.0 $61,630 8.6 0.9 10.0 
Note: Entries in the columns are in percentages, except for median family income. 
Source: Le, C.N. 2010. “Socioeconomic Statistics & Demographics” Asian-Nation: The 
Landscape of Asian America; based on Census 2000. 
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as voluntary immigrants, most of whom entered the U.S after 1965 with a degree of English 
proficiency, such as Filipinos and Asian Indians (Lien et al., 2004).  Voluntary immigrants tend 
to self-select relative to English-language proficiency, whereas for refugees immigrating to a 
new country is more likely a concern for personal survival (Borjas, 1991). 
Of the Asian groups in Table 2.5, Asian Indians have the highest median family income 
($69,470), while Koreans have the lowest median family income ($48,500).  Over half of Asian 
Indians (51.6 percent) are more likely to work in a high-skill profession, such as engineering and 
management.  Conversely, only 23 percent of Vietnamese are more likely to have a high-skill 
job.  Asian Indians also have the highest rate of being married (74.9 percent), while Japanese 
have the lowest marriage rate (60.7 percent).  Japanese (70.8 percent) are most likely to be 
homeowners, whereas Koreans (51.9 percent) are least likely to own a home.  Filipinos (6.9 
percent) possess the lowest poverty rate, while Koreans (15.5 percent) have the highest poverty 
rate.  In terms of public assistance, both Asian Indians (0.9 percent) and Japanese (0.9 percent) 
are least likely to receive government help.  In contrast, Vietnamese (4.8 percent) are most likely 
to accept public assistance. 
The Asian groups also differ significantly in their political orientations as Tables 2.6 and 
2.7 reveal.  Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the percent distributions of partisanship and political 
ideology, respectively, of the Asian groups using data from the 2000-2001 Pilot National Asian 
American Political Survey (PNAAPS).11   
The results in Table 2.6 show that in each Asian group, except Vietnamese, the 
percentage of Democratic identifiers is higher than that of Republican and Independent  
                                                 
11 The “no party” and “not sure” categories in Table 2.5 and the “not sure” category in Table 2.6 are included for 
each Asian group because a relatively high percentage of PNAAPS respondents reported a “no party” or a “not sure” 
response to the partisanship question and a “not sure” response to the political ideology question. 
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Chinese 8 24 1 1 1 7 2 33 23 308 
Filipino 22 18 6 5 3 16 7 13 10 266 
Japanese 12 28 9 8 3 11 1 18 11 198 
Korean 8 35 3 8 1 20 2 8 15 168 
South Asian 23 21 5 10 9 11 6 6 10 141 
Vietnamese 4 7 1 12 1 5 11 31 27 137 
Note: The South Asian group includes Asian Indians and Pakistanis.  D = Democrat, R = 
Republican, INDEP = Pure Independent.  Some row totals do not equal to 100 percent due to 
rounding.  
Source: Pilot National Asian American Political Survey, 2000-2001. 
 
 
identifiers.  Nonetheless, the Asian groups tend to differ in the direction or strength of 
partisanship.  The results also reveal differences among the Asian groups relative to no-
partisanship (the unaffiliated and the undecided).   
Starting with the Democratic partisanship categories in Table 2.6, South Asians (23 
percent), which include Asian Indians and Pakistanis, are more likely than the other Asian 
groups to identify as strong Democrats.  Compared with the other groups, Koreans (35 percent) 
have a greater tendency of identifying as weak Democrats.  Japanese (nine percent) are more 
likely to consider themselves leaning Democrats than are the other groups.  In contrast, 
Vietnamese are less likely among the Asian groups to identify with any of the Democratic 
partisanship categories.  Relative to the Republican partisanship categories, Vietnamese (11 
percent) are most likely, while Japanese (one percent) are least likely, to identify as strong 
Republicans.  Koreans (20 percent) have the strongest likelihood, whereas Vietnamese (five 
percent) have the weakest likelihood, of considering themselves weak Republicans.  South 
Asians (nine percent) are most likely to identify as leaning Republicans, while Chinese (one 
percent), Koreans (one percent), and Vietnamese (one percent) are least likely to be leaning 
Republicans.  In terms of the pure Independent category, Vietnamese (12 percent) are most likely 
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to adopt the Independent identification, while Chinese (one percent) are least likely to classify 
themselves as Independents.   
Across all the partisanship categories of each group in Table 2.6, Filipinos (22 percent) 
and South Asians (23 percent) have greater odds of identifying as strong Democrats, whereas 
Chinese (24 percent), Japanese (28 percent), and Koreans (35 percent) are more likely to identify 
as weak Democrats.  Vietnamese (12 percent) are more likely to be pure Independents than are 
any of the other Asian groups.  Relative to the no-partisanship categories, Chinese (33 percent) 
are most likely, while South Asians (six percent) are least likely, to report no affiliation with any 
of the traditional party categories of Democratic, Republican, and Independent; and Vietnamese 
(27 percent) are most likely, while both Filipinos (10 percent) and South Asians (10 percent) are 
least likely, to disclose uncertainty about their partisanship. 
In terms of political ideology, Table 2.7 shows that the Asian groups tend to vary in their 
ideological self-placements, although in each group the proportion of liberals is higher than that 
of conservatives.  South Asians (61 percent) are more likely to identify themselves as very liberal 
or somewhat liberal than are Filipinos (40 percent), Japanese (34 percent), Koreans (33 percent), 
Chinese (30 percent), and Vietnamese (22 percent).  Filipinos (34 percent) have a higher  
 
Table 2.7 Percent Distribution of Political Ideology by Ethnic Origin 
 Chinese Filipino Japanese Korean South Asian Vietnamese 
Very liberal 4 8 9 4 18 12 
Somewhat liberal 26 32 25 29 43 10 
Middle-of-the-road 42 18 37 28 16 47 
Somewhat conservative 11 29 20 27 14 5 
Very conservative 2 5 4 4 3 4 
Not sure 15 6 4 8 6 21 
Note: Column totals may not equal to 100 percent due to rounding and omitted categories.  The 
South Asian group includes Asian Indians and Pakistanis.   
Source: See Table 2.6.  
 
 40
likelihood of placing themselves in one of the conservative categories than do Koreans (31 
percent), Japanese (24 percent), South Asians (17 percent), Chinese (13 percent), and 
Vietnamese (nine percent).  Relative to the “not sure” category, Vietnamese (21 percent) are 
most likely, whereas Japanese (four percent) are least likely, to be undecided about their 
ideological identity. 
In sum, the findings of Figure 2.3 and Tables 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 indicate that 
significant Asian ethnic group differences exist across population, socioeconomic, and political 
characteristics, hence disputing the perception of contemporary Asian Americans as one and the 
same.  For example, Asian Indians have the highest growth rate in 1990-2000, while Japanese 
Americans experience an almost 10 percent decline in their population in the same period (Table 
2.1).  The Asian groups tend to differ also in other population characteristics (Table 2.4 and 
Figure 2.3).  For instance, according to the 2000 Census, Chinese is the most heavily populated 
Asian group in the U.S, while Japanese is the least populous Asian group.  Moreover, Japanese 
Americans are most likely to disclose having multiple races or ethnicities, while Vietnamese 
Americans are most likely to report a single race or ethnicity.  Comparisons of the Asian groups 
using various socioeconomic measures in Table 2.5 show a number of disparities.  For instance, 
Asian Indians have the highest median family income, whereas Koreans have the lowest median 
family income.  Filipinos are most likely, while Vietnamese are least likely, to be proficient in 
English.  The Asian groups also differ in their political orientations (Tables 2.6 and 2.7).  For 
example, South Asians are more likely to identify themselves as strong Democrats, while 
Vietnamese are less likely to affiliate with a Democratic identification.  South Asians also have a 
greater likelihood of considering themselves liberal, while Vietnamese are less likely to identify 
themselves as liberal.  Overall, these differences suggest that, while it is useful to consider the 
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Asian American community as a group, especially for research purposes, it is also important to 
recognize the diversity among Asian Americans and between various Asian ethnic groups in 
order to better understand the meaning of “Asian American” in today’s society and politics.   
Perception of Asian Americans as Perpetual Foreigners   
      Asians have been collectively perceived as eternally alien “Orientals” who are 
interchangeably and sometimes concurrently stereotyped as “the coolie, the deviant, the yellow 
peril, the model minority, and the gook” (Lee, 1999: 8).  As foreign “Orientals,” Asian 
Americans have a common heritage of ethnic mistreatment in Asia and segregation from 
mainstream American society (Lien et al., 2004).  Political scholars have given credence to the 
notion that Asians are racially triangulated between white and black Americans (Kim, 1999, 
2000; Kim, 2002; Junn and Masuoka, 2008).  For example, Asians are more likely to be viewed 
as foreigners, whereas whites and blacks are seen as insiders in mainstream U.S. society (Kim, 
2002).  This stereotype of Asian Americans may have some plausibility because once largely 
U.S.-born and composing mainly of Japanese and Chinese Americans, the Asian American 
population today is predominantly foreign-born and spread across a number of different 
nationalities and ethnicities (National Research Council et al., 2001; Junn and Masuoka, 2008; 
Lien et al., 2004).  However, the stereotype fails to recognize the fact that many Asian American 
families have been U.S. citizens for a number of generations.   
Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, stereotyping Asians in this fashion suggests 
that many Asians, especially those who are foreign-born, are interested more in holding on to 
their unique cultures and Asian homeland ties than in becoming part of mainstream U.S. society 
and integrating into the American political culture.  To substantiate the perceived deficiency of 
Asians’ interest in assimilating into mainstream America and its political system, several 
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researchers (e.g., Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Lien et al., 2004) suggest that English language 
ability and naturalization connect Asians to the broader American society and political culture. 
The results of Table 2.8, which compares the rates of English proficiency and naturalization 
among immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and Europe/Canada, generally support these 
researchers’ suggestion.  For instance, immigrants from Asia (23.4 percent) are less likely than 
those from Latin America (44 percent) to lack English proficiency, although immigrants from 
Europe/Canada (11.5 percent) have a higher proportion of English proficiency than do those 
from Asia.  Moreover, immigrants from Asia are more likely to become American citizens once 
they enter the U.S. than are immigrants from Europe/Canada and Latin America.  By 2001, 67 
percent of Asian immigrants are naturalized citizens compared with 65 percent of 
European/Canadian immigrants and 58 percent of Hispanic immigrants. 
 
Table 2.8 Socio-political Characteristics of Immigrant Groups by Region of Birth 
 % Lacking English Proficiencya 
(2000) 
% U.S. Citizenshipb 
(2001) 
Asia  23.4 67 
Europe/Canada 11.5 65 
Latin America 44.0 58 
a Source: Le, C.N. 2010. “Demographic Characteristics of Immigrants” Asian-Nation: The   
  Landscape of Asian America; based on Census 2000.   
b Note: Entries are percentages of respondents obtaining American citizenship by 2001. 
  Source: Fix, Michael, Jeffrey S. Passel, and Kenneth Sucher. 2003b. “Trends in  
  Naturalization.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
 
Some scholars (such as Lien et al., 2004) also suggest that the experiences of racial 
interaction may link Asians to mainstream U.S. society, such as interracial marriage and 
residential integration.  Figure 2.4 displays the intermarriage rates of newlyweds from major 
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Figure 2.4 Intermarriage Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 2008  
Note: The chart shows the percentage of newlyweds in 2008 who married someone of a  
different race/ethnicity.  “Newlyweds” refers to people who got married in the 12 months  
before the survey.  All groups (other than Hispanic) are non-Hispanic single races.  
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2008 American Community Survey (ACS),  

















Figure 2.5 Intermarriage Rates among Newlyweds by Gender, 2008 
Source and Note: See Figure 2.4. 
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likely to marry someone whose race or ethnicity is different from their own.  Hispanics (25.7 
percent) are the next group with the highest intermarriage rate, followed by blacks (15.5 percent) 
and whites (8.9 percent).   
There are also gender differences among the major racial/ethnic groups in the tendency to 
wed outside their own racial group, as Figure 2.5 shows.  Among whites and Hispanics in Figure 
2.5, there are no gender differences in intermarriage rates.  About nine percent of both male and 
female white newlyweds in 2008 married a nonwhite spouse, and about 25 percent of both male 
and female Hispanic newlyweds married someone who is not Hispanic.  In contrast, there are 
significant gender differences among blacks and Asians.  Twenty-two percent of black male 
newlyweds married outside their race, compared with only nine percent of black female 
newlyweds.  Among Asians the gender pattern is reversed.  Forty percent of Asian female 
newlyweds married a non-Asian spouse, compared with only 20 percent of Asian male 
newlyweds.  Across the four racial/ethnic groups in Figure 2.5, Asian females are most likely to 
marry outside their race.  
To compare the levels of residential integration between Asian Americans and other 
racial groups, a commonly used segregation index (index of dissimilarity) is reported in Table 
2.9 for the 10 U.S. cities with the largest Asian populations in 2000.12  The results in the first 
column of Table 2.9 show that the dissimilarity index between Asians and whites ranges from a 
low of 29 percent in Fremont, California to a high of 50 percent in San Diego.  A dissimilarity 
index of 29 percent indicates that either 29 percent of Asians or 29 percent of whites in Fremont 
would need to move to different census tracts for the two groups to attain equal distributions 
across all census tracts.  In other words, Asians are likely to have a higher level of residential  
                                                 
12 The segregation index measures residential segregation between two population groups, such as Asians and 
whites.  The measurement of segregation is at the level of census tracts.  It would be informative to also include a 
segregation index between Asians and Hispanics for comparison purposes, but no such measure was reported. 
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New York 42 63 63 
Los Angeles, CA 47 69 73 
San Jose, CA 48 31 41 
San Francisco, CA 41 58 59 
Honolulu, HI 36 58 47 
San Diego, CA 50 50 62 
Chicago, IL 48 87 86 
Houston, TX 45 68 72 
Seattle, WA 48 34 60 
Fremont, CA 29 26 24 
Note: The segregation index measures the percentage of a racial group that would have to  
move to a different census tract to reach equal distribution across all census tracts.  The last 
column reports the dissimilarity index between whites and blacks for comparison purposes. 
Source: www.psc.isr.umich.edu/residentialsegregation, accessed January 10, 2011. 
 
integration with whites in Fremont than are they with whites, say, in San Diego.  The results in 
the second column of Table 2.9 reveal that the dissimilarity index between Asians and blacks 
varies from a low of 26 percent in Fremont to a high of 87 percent in Chicago.  These results 
indicate that segregations between Asians and whites and between Asians and blacks are still 
significant.  For example, in Los Angeles the dissimilarity index is 47 percent between Asians 
and whites and 69 percent between Asians and blacks, although the index between whites and 
blacks is even higher at 73 percent.  These numbers suggest that residential segregation is 
moderately high between Asians and whites, while residential segregation is very high between 
Asians and blacks and between whites and blacks.  With the exception of Fremont and San Jose, 
the level of residential segregation between Asians and whites is much lower than that between 
whites and blacks.  For six of the 10 cities, including New York, NY, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Honolulu, Chicago, and Houston, the segregation between Asians and whites is much 
lower than that between Asians and blacks.  Yet, for the remaining cities, the segregation 
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between Asians and blacks is either comparable to that between Asians and whites (Fremont and 
San Diego) or smaller than that between Asians and whites (San Jose and Seattle).  The overall 
results in Table 2.9 suggest that Asian Americans do not wholly live a segregated social life, 
separated from other racial groups.  Moreover, Asians are likely to have a higher level of 
residential integration with whites nationwide compared with that of Asians with blacks and that 
of whites with blacks. 
In sum, the results of Tables 2.8 and 2.9 and Figures 2.4 and 2.5 generally disconfirm the 
perception of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners who are not interested in becoming part 
of mainstream American society and political culture.  For example, compared with Hispanic 
Americans, who are another immigrant-dominated group, Asian Americans are more likely to be 
proficient in English and become U.S. citizens, and, thus, have qualities that, for instance, make 
active political participation likely.  Moreover, the results of Figures 2.4 and 2.5 and Table 2.9 
suggest that Asians do not lack racial interaction experiences.  For instance, Asians are more 
likely to marry outside their race than are whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  Compared with that of 
blacks with whites, Asians tend to hold a higher level of residential integration with whites 
throughout the country. 
Perception of Asian Americans as a Model Minority   
The most contemporary view of Asians is that they are a “model minority” who have 
overcome disadvantages and achieved “success” through hard work, strong family values and 
structures, and emphasis on the education of children (Lin et al., 2005; Lee, 1999; Lien et al., 
2004).  The model minority stereotype presumes that Asians’ comparatively high socioeconomic 
status emanates from inherent cultural attributes and group beliefs about the importance of work 
ethic and perseverance, family, and education (Lien et al., 2004; Lee, 1999).  The Asian success 
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is viewed as a product of innate group characteristics and values that are attained without group-
based political demands (Lien et al., 2004: 7).  
In many ways Asian Americans have been remarkably successful in achieving the  
American Dream both socially and economically—to the extent that the perception of Asians as 
a model minority is not completely groundless.  In fact, the results of Table 2.10 largely support 
this perception, especially in comparing Asians with other racial minorities, such as blacks and 
Hispanics.  Based on the 2000 Census, Table 2.10 evaluates the four major racial/ethnic groups 
using various measures that sociologists called “socioeconomic achievement.”   
In every category in Table 2.10, Asians outperform both blacks and Hispanics.  Asians 
(19.5 percent) are less likely than blacks (29.1 percent) and Hispanics (48.5 percent) to have less 
than a high school education.  Asians (42.9 percent) have a much higher proportion of college 
graduates than do blacks (13.6 percent) and Hispanics (9.9 percent).  Asians (6.5 percent) are 
also more likely to have advanced degrees than are Hispanics (1.6 percent) and blacks (1.2 
percent).  Asians have the highest median family income ($59,000), while blacks have the lowest 
median family income ($33,300).  Asians (34.6 percent) are more likely to work in a high-skill 
profession (e.g., management and engineering), whereas Hispanics (9.6 percent) are less likely to 
have a high-skill occupation.  Seventy-five percent of Asians are married compared with 56 
 



















Asians 19.5 42.9 6.5 74.9 68.2 34.6 $59,000 11.5 2.2 
Whites 15.3 25.3 3.0 64.5 78.2 21.4 $48,500 9.4 1.3 
Blacks 29.1 13.6 1.2 38.0 54.4 12.3 $33,300 24.9 4.5 
Hispanics 48.5 9.9 1.6 56.3 52.4 9.6 $36,000 21.4 3.5 
Source and Note:  See Table 2.5.
 48
percent of Hispanics and 38 percent of blacks.  Asians (68.2 percent) are more likely to own a 
home compared with blacks (54.4 percent) and Hispanics (52.4 percent).  Asians (11.5 percent) 
are less likely to be living in poverty than are Hispanics (21.4 percent) and blacks (24.9 percent).  
Asians (2.2 percent) are also less likely to receive public assistance than are Hispanics (3.5 
percent) and blacks (4.5 percent).  
Asians also score better than whites on many of the socioeconomic measures in Table 
2.10.  Asians (42.9 percent) have a greater likelihood of graduating from college than do whites 
(25.3 percent).  Asians (6.5 percent) are more likely to have advanced degrees than are whites 
(three percent).  Asians (74.9 percent) are more likely than whites (64.5 percent) to be married.  
Asians have a higher median family income ($59,000) compared with whites whose median 
family income is $48,500.  Asians (34.6 percent) are more likely, while whites (21.4 percent) are 
less likely, to be employed in a high-skill profession.   
Conversely, whites are more likely to outdo Asians on measures of homeownership, 
poverty state, public assistance acceptance, and secondary education underachievement.  Whites 
(78.2 percent) have a greater likelihood of owning a home than do Asians (68.2 percent).  Whites 
(9.4 percent) are less likely to be living in poverty compared with Asians (11.5 percent).  Whites 
(1.3 percent) are less likely than Asians (2.2 percent) to accept public assistance.  Whites (15.3 
percent) are less likely than Asians (19.5 percent) to have less than a high school education.   
Comparisons between Asians and other major racial/ethnic groups relative to SAT mean 
scores in Table 2.11 generally support the model minority perception of Asians as well.  Table 
2.11 presents the SAT mean scores of college-bound seniors from major racial/ethnic groups in 
recent annual school periods (2004-05 through 2008-09).  Across all school periods in Table 
2.11, Asian students perform much better than black and Hispanic (Mexican American)  
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Table 2.11 SAT Mean Scores of College-Bound Seniors by Race/Ethnicity: Selected Years, 
2004-05 through 2008-09 
Race/Ethnicity 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
SAT-Critical Reading      
Asian 511 510 514 513 516 
White 532 527 527 528 528 
Black 433 434 433 430 429 
Mexican American 453 454 455 454 453 
SAT-Mathematics      
Asian 580 578 578 581 587 
White 536 536 534 537 536 
Black 431 429 429 426 426 
Mexican American 463 465 466 463 463 
Note: Relative to Hispanic students, the SAT mean scores were reported for college-bound 
seniors from different Hispanic groups, including Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other 
Hispanics.  Because the mean scores of the students from these Hispanic groups are comparable, 
only the scores of Mexican American students are used to compare with those of students from 
other racial groups.   
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2010. Digest of 
Education Statistics, 2009 (NCES 2010-013), Chapter 2.  
 
 
students in both the critical reading and mathematics sections.  In the critical reading section 
Asian students tend to score in the low-500s, while black and Mexican American students have a 
tendency of scoring in the low- and mid-400s, respectively.  In the mathematics section, on 
average, Asian students (with scores in the upper-500s) have the highest mean scores among the 
four groups of students across all school periods, followed by white (with scores in the lower-
500s), Mexican American (with scores in the upper-400s), and black (with scores in the low-
400s) students.  Asian students are also competitive with white students in the critical reading 
section across all school periods, with Asian students having mean scores in the 510s and white 
students mostly in the 520s.  
The overall results of Tables 2.10 and 2.11 indicate that the perception of Asian 
Americans as a model minority is not altogether baseless.  For example, Asians are more likely 
to perform better than blacks and Hispanics not only in every socioeconomic achievement 
measure in Table 2.10, but also in both sections of the SAT across every school period in Table 
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2.11.  Asians also tend to outdo whites in many of the socioeconomic categories in Table 2.10 as 
well as in the mathematics section of the SAT across all school periods in Table 2.11.  Yet, this 
stereotype overlooks external factors that contribute to the socioeconomic achievement of 
Asians, such as favorable U.S. immigration policies that seek to attract largely wealthy and 
educated immigrants from Asia (Lien et al., 2004).  It also ignores the socioeconomic division 
among Asian Americans and between different Asian ethnic groups, as shown in Table 2.5.      
Conclusion 
What it means to be “Asian” has changed a great deal throughout American history, as 
illustrated by the many alterations to the term in the U.S. Census that call attention to the ethnic 
diversification of Asian Americans.  Changes in the population growth and geographic 
concentration of Asians also influence the evolving meaning of “Asian American” in today’s 
society and politics. 
Contemporary Asian Americans cannot be easily understood as a cohesive population 
with common history, identity, culture, and politics.  The Asian American population today is 
diverse in terms of such attributes as national origins and multiple concerns unique to each ethnic 
community, such as English proficiency, naturalization, and progress in socioeconomic mobility 
(Lien et al., 2004; Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Lee, 1998).  In fact, Asian Americans currently 
represent over 20 Asian ethnic groups, each with its own distinct features, such as language, 
culture, religious beliefs, and immigration history.   
Despite these differences, the Asian community shares experiences of being dogged by 
several prevailing stereotypes, including the perceptions of Asians as one-and-the-same 
Orientals, perpetual foreigners, and a model minority.  The summary findings in this chapter call 
into question the validity of particularly the first two stereotypes and point to the danger of 
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stereotyping Asians en masse, since a consequence of such stereotyping is that important 
differences among Asian Americans and between the Asian ethnic groups are minimized or 
ignored completely.  For example, some Asian ethnic groups, such as Vietnamese Americans, 
are more likely to be low achievers in many of the socioeconomic measures in Table 2.5 than are 
other Asian ethnic groups, such as Asian Indians; thus, stereotyping Asian Americans 
inclusively, for instance, as a model minority may be problematic since this stereotype masks the 
underachievement of such Asian ethnic groups as Vietnamese Americans.   
However, as noted in the previous chapter, it is not practical to distinguish among the 
Asian ethnic groups, especially in the forthcoming analyses of Americans’ affect- and cognition-
based perceptions of Asians in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, because social interaction and 
discourse often depend on concepts, such as favorability evaluations and stereotypes, associated 
with the broad “Asian” American category.  Moreover, data limitations also prevent such 
differentiation.  Most surveys with samples containing multiple racial/ethnic groups like the 
American National Election Study often place respondents in respective common racial/ethnic 
categories, such as “Asian,” “white,” “black,” and “Hispanic/Latino,” and, hence, do not usually 
include categories for specific ethnic groups, such as “Chinese” and “Mexican,” or have 
questions pertaining to these ethnic groups.  Even if these surveys include such data about 
particular ethnic groups, the sample sizes would likely be comparatively small. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF RACIAL ATTITUDES 
A number of scholars have considered racial perceptions that people have about members 
of different racial and ethnic groups to be essential in shaping intergroup relations (Allport, 
1954; Jackman and Crane, 1986; Schuman et al., 1985; Sigelman and Welch, 1993; Welch and 
Sigelman, 2000; Massey et al., 2003).  Societal accounts about the assumed dominance or 
lowliness of racial or ethnic groups affect our perceptions of others and ourselves (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991; Massey et al., 2003). 
What individuals learn from society about various racial and ethnic groups underlies their 
perceptions of how individuals like themselves are viewed by others and the type of treatment 
they may expect to get as a consequence (Massey et al., 2003; Fiske et al., 2002).  Perceptions of 
Asian Americans have ranged from the pejorative (e.g., perpetual foreigner, yellow peril) to the 
esteemed (e.g., model minority, “America’s success story”).  The nature of these perceptions of 
Asians, however, has not been systematically examined because previous studies on intergroup 
relations tend to focus mostly on whites’ attitudes toward blacks, although recently there have 
been some studies of whites’ as well as blacks’ attitudes toward Hispanics.  Such an approach 
provokes questions about whether theories and measures founded on whites’ stereotypes (of 
blacks) can best predict the response tendencies of multiracial groups when Asians are the racial 
target.  However, these theories and measures provide a useful framework from which to explore 
systematically attitudes toward Asians.   
Contemporary research in racial relations suggests that various factors influence the 
racial attitudes and perceptions of groups in American society.  Previous studies on determinants 
of racial attitudes have proposed such theoretical perspectives as personal contact, context, self-
interest, and symbolic politics to play a role in shaping the social, political, and policy attitudes 
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of groups in society and in influencing race relations in the U.S.  In this chapter these theoretical 
perspectives are presented to provide a framework for the examination of Americans’ affect- and 
cognition-based perceptions of Asian Americans in the ensuing chapters. 
Personal Contact Perspective 
A widely accepted explanation for a majority group’s perceptions and attitudes toward 
minorities is the personal contact perspective, initially proposed by Allport (1954).  The contact 
perspective suggests that close, positive interpersonal contact between individuals of different 
races promotes constructive or favorable racial attitudes and perceptions and that the absence of 
such contact advances racial prejudice and hostility (Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Sigelman and 
Welch, 1993; Allport, 1954).  Personal contact largely represents individual interaction between 
members of the majority group and those of a particular minority group (Stein et al., 2000), 
although recent studies also focus on personal contact between minority groups, such as blacks 
and Hispanics, and between multiracial groups.  The perspective also argues that increased 
contact between two segregated groups who perceive each other in a negative manner will bring 
about a reduction in negative attitudes (Hood and Morris, 1998).   
Advocates of the contact perspective regard isolation as a source of ignorance that acts as 
a breeding ground for offensive and adverse stereotypes and racial hostility (Sigelman and 
Welch, 1991).  They argue that if stronger social connections can be formed between a majority 
group and a minority out-group racial attitudes would dramatically become more positive 
(Sigelman and Welch, 1993).  Hence, personal contact, such as friendships between different 
racial/ethnic groups, can enhance a particular group’s affect-based perceptions of another group 
such that the former group would have more favorable or positive evaluations of the latter group.  
Stronger social bonds between groups may also help to disconfirm what Allport (1954, 1979) 
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terms “rationalizers” of prejudice—negative stereotypes—of minority out-groups (Dixon and 
Rosenbaum, 2004).  Thus, friendships between two different racial/ethnic groups can also 
promote a given group’s cognition-based perceptions—or beliefs about traits attributed to a 
certain group—of another group in a positive way.  Affect- and cognition-based perceptions are 
discussed in more details in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
Allport (1954) and other researchers, such as Pettigrew (1971, 1998), identify several 
particular attributes of contact that foster positive attitudes of members of the majority group 
toward minority groups.  These attributes include such conditions as the frequency of contact, the 
nature of contact (i.e., whether it occurs in a cooperative or competitive milieu), status 
characteristics of participants (i.e., the degree to which the interaction is between the majority 
group and minority group with “equal” race or socioeconomic status), the social context of 
contact (e.g., real, artificial, or segregated), and the interactive areas of contact, such as work and 
school (Stein et al., 2000: 288; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004).  Each condition may increase the 
likelihood that shared values and beliefs will be perceived and expressed, and thus will provide 
the source for interpersonal connection between members of different racial groups, and, under 
optimal conditions, lead to favorable racial perceptions and attitudes toward out-group members 
(Stein et al., 2000).   
A number of previous studies of race relations, mostly focusing on whites’ racial attitudes 
toward blacks, have found that positive personal interactions between members of different races 
encourage auspicious racial perceptions and attitudes toward out-groups (Key, 1949; Allport, 
1954; Sigelman and Welch, 1993; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004).  For example, Sigelman and 
Welch (1993) find that positive personal contact between blacks and whites contributes to 
favorable white attitudes toward blacks.  They also find that interracial friendships with whites 
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mitigate blacks’ perceptions of racial hostility (Sigelman and Welch, 1993: 13).  Other studies 
find that racial prejudice is less frequently observed among young whites who sustain closer 
relationships or contacts with blacks (Deutsch and Collins, 1951; Meer and Freedman, 1966; 
Aberbach and Walker, 1973; Nieto, 2000; Orfield, 2001).   
Furthermore, a number of scholars have found augmented contact under certain 
conditions proposed by Allport (1954) (e.g., interdependence, common goals, equal status, and 
encouragement by authorities) promotes tolerance (or even amity) and mitigates prejudice 
(Jackman and Crane, 1986; Sigelman and Welch, 1993; Amir, 1969, 1976; Ellison and Powers, 
1994; Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995; Powers and Ellison 1994; Stephan and Stephan, 1985; 
Welch et al., 2001).  For instance, Jackman and Crane (1986) find that whites who report having 
black friends tend to have more favorable views of blacks.  Some studies also report that white-
Hispanic acquaintanceships promote positive views of Hispanics (Stein et al., 2000; Dixon and 
Rosenbaum, 2004).   
Yet, as Stein et al. (2000) note, past studies show mixed results for the notion that these 
optimal conditions are required for contact to influence the perceptions and attitudes of a 
majority group in a positive way.  For example, friendships or acquaintanceships or even 
comparatively superficial contact are found to foster more positive attitudes among blacks, 
whites, and Hispanics (Ellison and Powers, 1994; Powers and Ellison, 1995; Dixon and 
Rosenbaum, 2004; Sigelman and Welch, 1993; Welch and Sigelman, 2000; Stein et al., 2000).  
Jackman and Crane (1986) also report that whites who have black friends with higher 
socioeconomic status are more likely to have favorable racial attitudes toward blacks.  Forbes 
(1997), however, contends that equal status between majority and subordinate groups is not a 
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significant condition for contact to positively affect the majority’s racial attitudes toward the out-
groups.   
Overall, the contact literature suggests that personal contacts, such as friendships and 
acquaintanceships, lessen unfavorable affect- and cognition-based perceptions between members 
of different racial/ethnic groups.  The contact perspective has largely been tested with whites, 
blacks, and, more recently, Hispanics, while research on the effect of contact on Americans’ 
perceptions and attitudes toward Asians is practically nonexistent.  There is also a lack of studies 
that estimates the effect of contact on a given racial/ethnic group’s affect- and cognition-based 
perceptions of its own members.  It is plausible that positive contact might promote Asians’ 
favorable affect-based and/or cognition-based perceptions of fellow Asians.  For example, 
friendships among Asians might foster the perception of fellow Asians as “trustworthy.”  
Further, as Allport (1954) suggests, socioeconomic status among fellow Asians or between 
Asians and a non-Asian group is likely to be an important condition for contact to affect 
perceptions of Asians.  In Chapter 2 socioeconomic comparisons among the four racial/ethnic 
groups (Table 2.4) indicate that Asians are more likely to do better than blacks and Hispanics 
and, to a certain extent, whites, while socioeconomic comparisons among the Asian ethnic 
groups (Table 2.3) emphasize the diversity among these ethnic groups.  Hence, contact among 
Asians or between Asians and a non-Asian group with different socioeconomic statuses is likely 
to enhance less favorable evaluations of Asians and more negative stereotyping of them. 
Context Perspective 
The context perspective suggests that the size of the out-group or minority group in a 
specific geographic location, such as county, neighborhood, state or region, affects racial 
relations with a majority group (Key, 1949; Stein et al., 2000; Giles and Evans 1985; Taylor 
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1998).  For example, the geographic proximity of whites to large populations of racial/ethnic 
minorities, such as blacks, brings about perceptions of competition and threat from these 
minorities.  In contrast to the contact literature, the context literature finds that members of the 
majority group who live in areas highly populated with minorities have much stronger 
unfavorable attitudes toward minority out-groups than members of the majority group who reside 
in areas less densely populated with minorities (Oliver and Wong, 2003; Stein et al., 2000).  
Supporters of the context perspective contend that the geographic nearness of a majority group to 
residents of racial and ethnic minority groups generate perceptions of competition and threat 
with these minorities, particularly in terms of economic and political threats (Key, 1949; Oliver 
and Wong, 2003; Blalock, 1967).  This perceived group competition becomes apparent in the 
majority group’s negative attitudes toward minorities and policies that have an impact on them, 
as the presence of the minority population increases (Stein et al., 2000). 
Stein et al. (2000) indicate that past studies have failed to explore the relationship 
between context and contact, especially the interaction between them.  The authors argue that 
since social contact is likely to take place within a particular milieu, context—in terms of the 
proportion of members of an out-group that live in a specific area—determines the frequency and 
likelihood of intergroup contact (Stein et al., 2000: 289).  In other words, where individuals 
reside, work, and spend their free time affects the opportunities for personal contact.  Stein et al. 
(2000) indicate that even though context and contact are linked, it is not understood how context 
functions to promote personal contact or how these concepts interact to structure the attitudes of 
a majority group toward minority groups.  Part of the reason for this deficiency is that past 
studies of racial attitudes tend to examine the effect of context and personal contact separately.  
One exception, however, provides some evidence that context and contact are related.  Sigelman 
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and Welch (1993) find that both personal contact (measured as white respondents’ reported 
contact with blacks) and context (measured as white respondents’ perception of the racial 
makeup of their neighborhood) are positively related to whites’ racial attitudes toward blacks.  
This finding suggests that members of a majority group are less likely to have personal contact 
with members of a minority group without the presence of the minority group within a particular 
venue.  It is likely that personal contact (e.g., friendship) among Asian Americans or between 
Asians and another racial/ethnic group in a neighborhood with a high concentration of Asians 
would enhance more favorable views of Asians. 
The context perspective has been largely used to explain whites’ anti-black prejudice in 
the intergroup relation literature and has been predominantly tested separately from personal 
contact (e.g., Wright, 1977; Giles and Evans, 1985; Key, 1949; Allport, 1954).  For instance, a 
number of past studies have convincingly linked the size of the black population to whites’ racial 
animosity toward blacks (Giles and Evans, 1985; Wright, 1977; Glaser, 1994; Quillian, 1996; 
Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000) and to sentiments of in-group solidarity among whites (Giles and 
Evans, 1985).  Key (1949) finds that voting for white conservative candidates among Southern 
whites is related to a high number of blacks residing in southern localities.  Huckfeldt and 
Kohfeld (1989) find similar results for areas outside the South, such as urban localities in the 
Northeast and Midwest.  In fact, across numerous diverse research data and time periods, many 
studies find that racial hostility increases among whites as the black population increases in size, 
particularly in counties and cities (Giles and Evans, 1985; Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000).     
Studies of the effect of context on whites’ racial attitudes toward other minority groups in 
the United States, such as Hispanics and Asians, have not been carried out as extensively as 
those involving white-black relations.  There is also a lack of studies that estimates the effect of 
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context on a racial/ethnic group’s perceptions of fellow members.  Further, the findings of the 
few studies on Hispanics and particularly on Asians have been inconclusive or mixed, or have 
been found to contradict the context perspective’s central arguments.  For example, Hood and 
Morris (1997) find that the impact of context on the attitudes of whites toward Hispanics 
depends on whether a state has a high proportion of Hispanic residents and not on whether 
whites live in close proximity to Hispanics in the state.  In a multiracial study Oliver and Wong 
(2003) find that whites who live in largely white neighborhoods harbor more unfavorable views 
of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.   
      Moreover, Oliver and Wong (2003) contend that in multiethnic contexts, the relationship 
between racial environments and attitudes resists simple formulations.  Hostility toward another 
group is based not simply on that group’s size, but on its relative economic position, the 
historical period, and the contextual unit being measured (Oliver and Wong, 2003: 579).  Gay 
(2006) also argues that although previous studies of intergroup relations largely based their 
analyses on racial environments, it is more the relative economic status of racial groups—and 
less the relative size of racial groups—that influences blacks’ attitudes toward Latinos.  For 
example, Gay (2006) finds that in neighborhoods where Latinos have more economic advantages 
than do their black neighbors, blacks are more likely to hold negative perceptions of Latinos.  
Hence, the applicability of the context perspective to other racial/ethnic out-groups is uncertain, 
especially Asians.  This is because the perspective was developed to explain largely black-white 
relations, and Asians do not share similar historical relationships with whites as blacks do.   
      The perception of Asians as passive political actors would hardly present a political threat 
to the majority population.  However, the perceived socioeconomic success of Asians may foster 
unfavorable evaluations and stereotyping of Asians from whites and other minority groups, such 
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as Hispanics and blacks.  How can we understand context and racial attitudes with respect to 
Asians?  As the context perspective suggests, the challenge which Asians present to a majority 
group or to other minority out-groups may depend on their group size in a given geographic 
region (Oliver and Wong, 2003; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004; Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000).  
Hence, the context perspective would predict that less favorable affect- and cognition-based 
views of Asian Americans from other groups will be enhanced as the size of the Asian 
population increases in a specified venue.  However, since the Asian population tends to be 
concentrated in a few states and metropolitan areas rather than spread across the country, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Asians’ perceptions of fellow Asians are more likely to be positive in an area 
with a high concentration of Asians. 
Self-Interest Perspective 
      Theorists (Hobbes, 1651 [1950]; Smith, 1776; Downs, 1957) have long argued that self-
interest plays an important or even major role in forming and maintaining social and political 
attitudes.  For example, Hobbes (1651 [1950]) believed that human beings are motivated first 
and foremost by self-interest or that human behavior is selfishly motivated (see also Sears and 
Funk, 1991; Miller 1999).  Downs (1957), moreover, assumes that citizens embrace policy 
preferences that advance their private interests and vote for political candidates who back such 
policy positions, suggesting that decision-making is rational within the limits of available 
information (see also Sears et al., 1979; Sears, 1993).   
Sears et al. (1979: 369) indicate that a self-interested attitude, as employed in ordinary 
discourse and by public opinion researchers, is generally defined rather restrictively as “one 
which is directed toward maximizing gains or minimizing losses to the individual’s tangible 
private well-being,” and among these costs and benefits are chiefly economic ones.  Miller 
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(1999) further indicates that the self-interest motive affects individuals’ actions and opinions in 
addition to the explanations they provide for their actions and opinions; in particular, it leads 
individuals to act and speak as if they are more concerned about their material self-interest than 
they do.  For example, Miller and Ratner (1996, 1998) find that individuals, who will benefit 
materially from a social policy’s implementation, are more likely to have favorable attitudes 
toward the policy than are those who will not.   
In studies of intergroup relations, the self-interest perspective posits a simple, objective 
pocketbook rationale to explain prejudice and stereotypes among diverse groups.  It contends 
that resentment between members of two different groups signals a fundamental collision of 
material interests, primarily economic interests but, to a smaller degree, political interests as well 
(Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Blalock, 1967; Bonacich, 1972; Lieberson, 1980; Olzak, 1992; Fetzer, 
2000; Gay, 2006).  Objective individual susceptibility to largely economic deprivation presents 
the direct source for intergroup prejudice and animosity (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Gay, 2006; 
Simon, 1987; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Fetzer, 2000).   
As with most studies of context and personal contact, studies of self-interest have largely 
involved black-white relations.  Many of these studies suggest that racial animosity is affected by 
perceived higher levels of competition for scarce economic resources and jobs between the white 
majority and black minority group, threatening the economic and social advantages of the 
majority group (Bonacich, 1972; Blalock, 1967); yet, other studies, notably Sears and Kinder 
(1971), find that racially based threats to whites’ personal lives, such as personal economic 
competition with blacks, do not influence whites’ prejudice toward blacks.  Some recent studies, 
however, have started to focus on Hispanics.  For instance, in an examination of black-Hispanic 
relation, Gay (2006) finds that the relative economic status of Hispanic Americans strongly 
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influences black Americans’ attitudes toward them, such that as Hispanics’ wealth and education 
advantages increase, blacks’ anti-Hispanic sentiments are more likely to escalate.  
There are a small number of self-interest studies that involve Asians either implicitly in 
immigrant/immigration research or explicitly in multiracial research.  Relative to 
immigrant/immigration research, some proponents of the self-interest perspective contend that 
economic concerns are likely a significant reason for negative attitudes toward immigrant 
groups, such as Hispanics and Asians (Simon, 1987; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Fetzer, 2000).  
For example, Simon (1987) argues that immigrants pose a larger threat to the livelihoods and 
living standards of lower-status (mainly native-born) individuals than they do to individuals with 
better education and more skills; therefore, the poorer the individual, the greater the fear and 
anxiety that more immigrants will signify, for example, fewer jobs, fewer chances for upward 
mobility, and lower pay rates.  Burns and Gimpel (2000) also indicate that for some individuals 
prejudice of immigrants originates in economic insecurity, although such prejudice also has roots 
that are fairly autonomous of economic anxiety (as Citrin et al. [1990] find).  Kessler (2001) 
suggests that individuals at the lower end of the country’s occupational and/or educational 
distribution are more likely to have negative views toward immigrants and increased 
immigration.  Feltzer (2000) finds that being unemployed heightens anti-immigrant sentiments, 
while having a high income and working in a high-status occupation reduce negative perceptions 
of immigrants; yet, Burns and Gimpel (2000) indicate that anti-immigrant sentiments are not 
likely to vanish just because individuals’ economic conditions improve.  These studies suggest 
that Americans, especially those who are underprivileged, are more likely to hold negative 
perceptions of Asians, an immigrant-dominated population.   
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Relative to multiracial research, the few studies (such as Bobo and Hutchings, 1996) that 
include Asians along with the other major racial/ethnic groups indicate that the relationship 
between racial hostility and economic competition tends to vary among these groups.  For 
instance, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) find that blacks are more likely to perceive greater job 
competition with Asians than with Hispanics, while Hispanics tend to perceive more competition 
with Asians than with blacks.  Conversely, whites are most likely to feel threatened economically 
by Asians and least likely by blacks, with Hispanics typically sandwiched between the other two 
minority groups (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  These findings support the notion that perceived 
socioeconomic successes of Asian Americans might threaten particularly disadvantaged 
members of non-Asian American groups, such as whites, Hispanics, and blacks.   
Other studies, however, claim that political factors, rather than only economic ones, 
affect intergroup relations, although these studies tend to be inconclusive about the relationship 
between racial hostility and political interests (Blalock, 1967; Parker et al., 2001; Sears and 
McConahay, 1973).  For example, one study (Parker et al., 2001: 124) reports that blacks 
indicate overall levels of distrust and suspicion of whites’ intentions as well as increasing distrust 
in political and legal institutions that are predominantly white (see also Sears and McConahay, 
1973). 
The self-interest perspective provides relatively clear and straightforward assertions 
about the determinants of intergroup animosity.  In particular, members of a racial/ethnic group 
who are confronted with unemployment, have low incomes, or are in low-skill occupations are 
more likely to feel vulnerable to or threatened by perceived competition from members of other 
racial/ethnic groups (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  The findings in Chapter 2 reveal that some 
Asian ethnic groups tend to have higher levels of socioeconomic achievement than other Asian 
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ethnic groups and that Asians are more likely to be successful socioeconomically than blacks, 
Hispanics, and, to a smaller degree, whites.  Thus, this perspective suggests that self-interest 
measures, especially those of economic self-interest, contribute to less favorable views and 
evaluations of Asians from lower-status fellow Asians and members of non-Asian groups, while 
they are expected to play a role in more privileged Americans’ positive perceptions of Asians. 
Symbolic Politics Perspective 
      In contrast to the context, personal contact, and, in particular, self-interest analyses of 
intergroup relations and attitude formation, the symbolic politics analysis engenders fairly 
different predictions about attitudes toward various racial/ethnic groups.  According to this 
perspective, individuals obtain in childhood enduring, stable predispositions or affective 
preferences, with little forethought to future benefits and costs of these attitudes, that influence 
their adult perceptions and attitudes (Sears et al., 1979; Sears et al., 1980; Sears, 1993).  This 
theory further contends that the symbols personified in an attitude object stimulate long-standing 
attitudinal predispositions, which in turn affect responses to the attitude object (Sears et al., 
1980: 492).  For example, the significance of political symbols, such as the American flag, the 
national anthem, or the U.S. Constitution, is likely to evoke fundamental predispositions, such as 
nationalism (feelings of national or American identity).  The importance of other political 
symbols, such as “busing,” “blacks,” “integration,” or “segregation,” is likely to elicit such 
predispositions as an individual’s racial tolerance or prejudice (Sears et al., 1979).  The most 
important of these long-standing predispositions are typically rather general preferences, such as 
party identification, political ideology, nationalism, or racial prejudice (Sears et al., 1980; Sears, 
1993).   
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The symbolic politics model is supported by three fundamental areas of research.  First, 
studies on political socialization have shown that many important social and political attitudes 
are initially acquired during childhood (Campbell et al., 1960; Sears, 1993; Sears et al., 1979).  
For example, the development of adult partisanship is believed to start in childhood and is by and 
large influenced by the political orientations of one’s parents (Beck and Jennings 1975; Clarke 
1973; Niemi and Jennings 1991).  The continuity of these pre-adult attitudes into adulthood has 
been unavoidably more difficult to document; nonetheless, many of such attitudes have 
demonstrated remarkable persistence and are impressively resistant to change in adulthood as 
well (Klapper, 1960; Sears, 1975; Sears et al., 1979).  Second, responses to political events in 
adulthood are influenced to a great extent by attitudes stemmed from socialization in pre-adult 
years.  A large number of studies (e.g., Sears and Chaffee, 1979; Becker and Heaton, 1967; 
Campbell et al., 1960) have shown the strong impact of such residues of socialization as party 
identification and racial prejudice on adults’ responses to the flood of information that they 
encountered in their later lives.  Lastly, the cognitive consistency theories have strongly argued 
for the consistency of attitudes (Abelson et al., 1968); following these theories, adults’ attitudes 
toward current political events would emerge as coherent with their predispositions (Sears et al., 
1979).  
Earlier versions of symbolic politics place more importance on people’s personal 
interests rather than their standing predispositions relative to their responses to political symbols.  
For example, Gusfield (1963) suggests that the debate over prohibition in the U.S. was more 
likely a symbolic struggle for power and prestige between social groups, particularly between 
Protestant and Catholic immigrants (see also Sears, 1993).  Edelman (1971), moreover, 
highlights attitudinal reactions of the general public, who, as Edelman indicates, is driven more 
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by emotion than by cognition, to political symbols because of its anxiety about a threatening, 
complex world (see also Sears, 1993).  Edelman (1971) suggests that individuals endorse 
political beliefs or myths, such as the 19th century American belief (the Manifest Destiny) that 
the U.S. was destined to expand across the North American continent or the continuing belief in 
an American mission to promote and defend democracy throughout the world, because these 
beliefs assure security from future threats and meet their needs for status (see also Sears et al., 
1979).  Thus, according to Edelman (1971), people will more likely accept a political myth to the 
extent that it fulfills their personal interests.  However, more recent studies argue that people 
accept political beliefs to the extent that they are harmonious with long-standing attitudinal 
predispositions, whose pre-adult roots are not of much relevance to their adult material well-
being (e.g., Sears et al., 1979; Sears et al., 1980; Sears, 1993).  In a large number of studies that 
compare self-interest and symbolic politics as contending motives in mass politics (such as Sears 
and Funk, 1991; Sears et al., 1979; Sears et al., 1980; Sears and Allen, 1984), self-interest is 
found to be less influential on, for example, policy opinions and candidate preferences than long-
standing predispositions. 
      Much research has documented the effects of long-standing predispositions, such as party 
identification, political ideology, nationalism, or racial prejudice, on political attitudes toward the 
major racial/ethnic groups.13  For example, some studies find that racial prejudice is an important 
determinant of whites’ opposition to black electoral candidates (e.g., Kinder and Sears, 1981; 
Sears and Kosterman, 1991).  Other studies, such as Sears et al. (1979), find that racial 
intolerance and political conservatism strongly influence whites’ resistance to busing school 
children for racial integration of the public schools.  Moreover, studies that explore the 
                                                 
13 This dissertation focuses on only party identification, political ideology, and nationalism as measures of symbolic 
politics in the forthcoming analyses of Asians in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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relationship between nationalism (sense of American national identity) and racial attitudes reveal 
a significant linkage.  For instance, Citrin et al. (1990) find that nationalism has a strong and 
negative effect on general attitudes toward immigrant-dominated groups (Hispanics and Asians).  
Stein et al. (2000) also find that nationalism is negatively related to whites’ affect toward 
Hispanics.  The effects of party identification and political ideology on racial attitudes, however, 
are mixed.  For example, in their study of whites’ stereotypes of blacks, Peffley and Hurwitz 
(1998) find that neither political ideology nor party identification has an effect on anti-black 
stereotypes.  In their study of whites’ attitudes toward Hispanics, Stein et al. (2000) find that 
political ideology has a significant impact, while party identification has no influence, on whites’ 
affect toward Hispanics.  Citrin et al. (1990) also find that having a conservative ideology is 
significantly related to negative attitudes toward Hispanics, while ideology has no effects on 
attitudes toward Asians.  Based on findings from previous research, symbolic politics measures, 
particularly nationalism, are expected to influence Americans’ perceptions of Asians. 
Conclusion 
Focusing largely on the relationship between whites and blacks, researchers seek to 
determine whether personal contact, context, self-interest, and symbolic politics affect intergroup 
animosity.  The contact literature by and large finds that personal or direct contact between 
members of different racial/ethnic groups is likely to mitigate negative views of members of the 
specified out-group.  The context literature indicates that a high concentration of a minority 
group in a given area is more likely to foster a majority group’s unfavorable perceptions of the 
minority group.  Studies of self-interest contend that perceived economic threats (and to a lesser 
extent political threats as well) account for a racial/ethnic group’s unfavorable perceptions of 
another racial/ethnic group, although some researchers (such as Citrin et al., 1990) indicate a 
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weaker impact of self-interest compared with that of symbolic politics relative to intergroup 
relations.  Symbolic politics research has demonstrated the effects of long-standing 
predispositions, such as party identification, political ideology, and nationalism, on political 
attitudes toward racial/ethnic groups. 
The nation’s rapidly expanding Asian population, however, has been largely ignored in 
these studies.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine how affect- and cognition- based perceptions of 
Asians, respectively, are influenced by contact, context, self-interest, and symbolic politics—
theoretical perspectives which are often explored separately from each other.  Although these 
perspectives have been directed primarily at studies of black-white relations, they provide a 
constructive framework and guidance to study Americans’ perceptions of Asians.    
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CHAPTER 4:  AFFECT-BASED PERCEPTIONS OF ASIAN AMERICANS 
  As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Americans’ perceptions toward Asians are unclear and 
often ambivalent.  The idea that Asians are less hampered by unfavorable racial stereotypes, 
compared with black Americans, suggest a reduction in the group identity and consciousness of 
being “Asian” and a “gradual assimilation into mainstream, white America” (Junn and Masuoka, 
2008: 730).  Simultaneously, however, there also are views that Asians remain a distinct, 
politically meaningful racial group which is crucial, in some situations, to the result of an 
election (Junn and Masuoka, 2008; Lien et al., 2004).  In light of these contrasting perspectives 
on the Asian racial identity, how will the general American public view Asian Americans in 
comparison with the other major racial/ethnic groups (i.e., whites, blacks, and Hispanics)?  Do 
Americans hold favorable views of Asians?  Do Americans feel close to Asians in terms of ideas, 
interests and feelings?  Do the evaluations of Asians differ across racial and ethnic groups?  To 
seek answers to these questions, this chapter examines affect-based perceptions of Asians and the 
other major groups in terms of the context, contact, self-interest, and symbolic politics 
perspectives outlined in the previous chapter and also socio-demographic indicators.       
Affect-Based Responses in Groups  
  Researchers in social psychology have for quite some time considered that the fundamental 
formation of attitudes can stem from affect (Fabrigar and Petty, 1999; Edwards, 1990; Edwards 
and von Hippel, 1995; Katz and Stotland, 1959; Breckler, 1984; Zajonc and Markus, 1982).  In 
the modern literature, the term affect has been typically referred to as an emotional response that 
expresses an individual's degree of preference for an entity (Breckler, 1984; Edwards and von 
Hippel, 1995).  It has also been commonly described as positive and/or negative feelings, 
emotions, or drives that an individual links with an attitude object (Edwards, 1990; Edwards and 
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von Hippel, 1995; Fabrigar and Petty, 1999).  In terms of attitude acquisition, affective responses 
are surmised to exercise a crucial and powerful effect on the individual, and the affect-based 
attitude is first obtained with little cognitive appraisal (Edwards, 1990).  Relevant information 
that is obtained following these affective responses helps to support or confirm the initial attitude 
(Edwards, 1990).   
In studies of groups, the affective response is an integral dimension of the classical 
prejudice model, associated with Allport (1954).  The study of prejudice and stereotypes has a 
long history in the social sciences.  The distinction between prejudice and stereotypes is rather 
unclear, since definitions of prejudice that are generally used in social science research are likely 
to integrate notions of stereotypes (Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004).  For instance, Allport ([1954], 
1979: 9) defines prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” of 
a group.  Blumer (1958: 4) suggests a more general definition of prejudice as a “cultural product 
consisting of feelings that the out-group is alien, different, and inferior” relative to one’s own 
racial/ethnic group.  Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004: 259) further indicate that stereotypes are 
“faulty and inflexible generalizations that lack the affective component of prejudice.”   
Stereotypes are discussed in more details in the next chapter. 
The prejudice model emphasizes individual psychological dispositions and a substantially 
irrational calculus of racial conflict rather than objective reality and a largely rational calculus of 
group hostility (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Allport, 1954; Jackman, 1994).  Allport’s prejudice 
model strongly suggests that group hostility is irrational and that part of this irrationality is based 
on ignorance of members of a particular out-group (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Katz, 1991).  In 
recent studies of the in-group/out-group dichotomy, the affect responses to groups have been 
largely examined as a function of various contexts, such as racial group competition (Bobo and 
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Hutchings, 1996), intergroup hostility (Giles and Evans, 1986); residential integration (Bobo and 
Zubrinsky, 1996; Taylor et al., 1978), school busing (Bobo, 1983; Sears and Kinder, 1985); and 
sexual prejudice and gender (Herek, 2000).  Most of these studies, however, do not include 
Asians in their evaluation of affect responses to groups. 
To determine Americans’ views of Asians, in this study I examine attitude-relevant 
responses to Asians as dependent variables.  I construct two models to determine affect-based 
perceptions of Americans toward Asians.  The first model uses as the dependent variable 
evaluations of individual favorability toward Asians, and the second model uses assessments of 
closeness to Asians in terms of ideas, interests and feelings.  I estimate these models as functions 
of context, personal contact, self-interest, symbolic politics, and socio-demographic measures, 
with the general Asian American population as the target population.14  Moreover, because 
perceptions of Asians necessitate a comparison of how people view Asians relative to how they 
see other racial/ethnic groups, particularly whites, blacks, and Hispanics, each model is estimated 
separately for each of the four racial/ethnic groups so that there are four models evaluating 
favorability toward each group and four models assessing closeness to each group.  This allows 
an evaluation of the extent to which the coefficients for the independent variables vary across the 
groups.   
Data and Measures 
The data for the favorability models are from the 2004 American National Election Study 
(ANES).  This survey contains a national sample of Americans and is conducted by the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.  The 2004 
                                                 
14 Although it would be useful to examine Asian immigrants separately from the general Asian American 
population, some issues arising from the survey data used in this study make it difficult to evaluate Asians in this 
way. The survey data used in this project, including the 2004 ANES and the 2004 NPS, tend to have smaller samples 
of Asians, compared with the other distinct racial groups.  Also, both surveys do not specifically ask Asian 
respondents (or any other racial group) immigrant-related questions. 
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ANES reports a sample of respondents from the four racial/ethnic groups, including 876 whites, 
180 blacks, 81 Hispanics, and 28 Asians.15  Data for the closeness models come from the 2004 
National Politics Survey (NPS), which is spearheaded by the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.  This survey asked 3,339 adult 
Americans on the national level about individuals' political attitudes, beliefs, aspirations, and 
behaviors at the beginning of the 21st century, with the primary goal of advancing the study and 
knowledge of racial and ethnic involvement in politics.  For the major racial/ethnic groups of 
interest in this analysis, the sample of respondents in the 2004 NPS contains 919 Whites, 756 
Blacks, 757 Hispanics, and 503 Asians.  The 2004 NPS uses a non-random sampling frame, so it 
does not account for differing selection probabilities in which different members of the 
population have different chances of being selected into the study.  To compensate for these 
unequal probabilities of selection, the survey includes a “centered weight” variable for each NPS 
respondent that is a rescaled version of the population weight for each NPS respondent.16  The 
centered weight for each respondent is equal to that respondent’s population weight * 3339 / 
total sum of population weights.  The centered weight values range from a minimum value of 
0.0614 to a maximum value of 8.750.  The mean of this centered weight is 1.0 with a standard 
deviation of 1.29.  The centered weight variable is used to estimate all models of closeness. 
Dependent Variables 
  I analyze two dependent measures of affect-based perceptions of Asians, whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics.  First, the favorability measure assesses how Americans feel about each group, 
                                                 
15 Although the subsamples of Hispanics and Asians in the 2004 ANES dataset are fairly small in comparison with 
their current respective U.S. population sizes, the 2004 ANES was used in this dissertation chiefly because it 
contains the necessary county FIPS code for the contextual data of the county-level population of each of the four 
groups in this study. 
16 The population weight for each NPS respondent is the product of their non-response weight and their post-
stratification weight, divided by a constant such that the sum of the weights is equal to the number of individuals in 
the U.S. population (minus the specific ethnic groups excluded from the population).  This total population size is 
283,422,198. 
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i.e., whether they have positive, neutral, or negative feelings toward the group.  Political 
scientists have often measured favorability toward groups using a feeling thermometer since its 
introduction in the 1964 American National Election Study (ANES).  Feeling thermometers have 
been used in survey research as an accepted way to determine individual feelings in a range of 
settings (Wilcox et al., 1989; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  Respondents use feeling 
thermometers to position attitude objects in an imaginary scale that ranges from 0 
(cold/unfavorable) to 100 (warm/favorable), with a midpoint at 50 signifying neutral feelings 
(neither cold nor warm).  For this study a feeling thermometer item is used to index general 
respondents’ degree of affect toward Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  Ordinary least 
squares-based (OLS) regression analysis is used to estimate the favorability models since OLS is 
a procedure appropriate for estimating effects on an interval-level dependent variable. 
  To describe the contours of the favorability measure of the four groups, I report all 
respondents’ feeling thermometer rating of each group (Figure 4.1).  Starting first with the 
thermometer of Asians in Figure 4.1(a), the histogram indicates that respondents are more likely 
to have warm feelings toward Asians, and the mean thermometer of Asians at 67.85 (with a 
standard deviation of 18.98) underscores this finding.  Similar results are found for whites 
[Figure 4.1(b)], blacks [Figure 4.1(c)], and Hispanics [Figure 4.1(d)].  These descriptive statistics 
also show, however, that some groups have more favorable views than others.  In comparison of 
the mean thermometer ratings of the four groups in Figure 4.1, respondents tend to have more 
positive views toward whites, followed by blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.  The mean 
thermometer for whites is pretty high at 73.49 degrees, and the mean thermometer for blacks is a 
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(c) Black Americans                (d) Hispanic Americans 
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Figure 4.1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups 
Note: The figures show descriptive statistics of all respondents’ feeling thermometer ratings of 
Asian Americans [(Figure 4.1(a)], white Americans [(Figure 4.1(b)], black Americans [(Figure 
4.1(c)], and Hispanic Americans [(Figure 4.1(d)].  The feeling thermometer scale of each group 
ranges from 0 (cold/unfavorable) to 100 (warm/favorable), with a midpoint at 50 indicating 
neither cold nor warm. 
Source: 2004 ANES. 
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thermometer at 67.88 and 67.85 degrees, respectively, Asians have the least favorable responses 
among the four groups.   
    The overall results in Figure 4.1 indicate that general Americans tend to view Asians 
somewhat less favorably than the other groups.  Yet, respondents from different racial/ethnic 
background may differ in their views of Asian Americans, as well as of the other groups.  Table 
4.1 shows summary statistics of the feeling thermometer rating of each group by respondents 
who reported an Asian, white, black, or Hispanic origin.  Turning first to the thermometer ratings 
of Asian Americans in Table 4.1, Asian respondents are unsurprisingly most likely to have 
favorable views of fellow Asians, with the mean thermometer of Asians of 75.26 degrees.  
Compared with that for Asian respondents, the mean thermometer of Asians drops two degrees 
for Hispanic respondents (mean of 73.02 degrees), about eight degrees for white respondents 
(mean of 67.64 degrees), and ten degrees for black respondents (mean of 65.23 degrees).  In 
other words, compared with Asian respondents, white, black, and Hispanic respondents have a 
weaker likelihood of feeling warm toward Asians.   
      For the thermometer ratings of white Americans in Table 4.1, surprisingly, Hispanic 
respondents are more likely to have favorable views of whites (with the mean thermometer of 
whites of 74.23 degrees), compared with white respondents (with mean of 73.79 degrees).  In 
contrast, black respondents (with mean of 72.66 degrees) and Asian respondents (with mean of 
65.79 degrees) are less likely to have positive views of whites, compared with white respondents.  
For the thermometer ratings of black Americans in Table 4.1, black respondents are most likely 
to have warm feelings toward fellow blacks (with the pretty high mean thermometer of blacks at 
87.04 degrees).  Compared with black respondents, Hispanic, white, and Asian respondents are 
less likely to have favorable views of blacks, with the mean thermometer of blacks of 75.83, 
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69.24, and 67.63 degrees, respectively.  For the thermometer ratings of Hispanic Americans in 
Table 4.1, Hispanic respondents are most likely to have favorable views of fellow Hispanics 
(with the high mean thermometer of Hispanics of 82.65 degrees).  Black respondents (with mean 
of 68.84 degrees), white respondents (with mean of 66.61 degrees), and Asian respondents (with 
mean of 63.61 degrees) have a weaker likelihood to have warm feelings toward Hispanics, 
compared with Hispanic respondents.   
  
Table 4.1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Racial/Ethnic Groups by Respondents’ Race 
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Source: 2004 ANES. 
 
       On the whole, the results of Figure 4.1 indicate that general Americans are more likely to 
have positive views of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics than negative affect of these groups, 
although Asians are the least favored among the four groups.  When respondents of different 
racial/ethnic origins are taken into account, the overall results in Table 4.1 also show that the 
respondents are more likely to have positive views of the four groups, but the results indicate that 
their thermometer ratings of each group tend to vary to some extent.  Further, Table 4.1 reveals 
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some interesting differences in the respondents’ favorability toward the four groups.  For 
example, among the different groups of respondents, Asian respondents are least likely to have 
high favorability ratings of whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  While Asian, black, and Hispanic 
respondents are likely to feel warmer toward their own respective groups, white respondents 
follow Hispanic respondents in their likelihood of having warmer feelings toward fellow whites. 
The second dependent measure is closeness.  The closeness measure further probes how 
general Americans affectively perceive Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The measure is 
based on the following question:  How close do you feel in your ideas, interests and feelings to 
(Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics)?  Respondents were asked indicate their closeness to each 
group on a 4-point scale, with 0 = not close at all, 1 = not too close, 2 = fairly close, and 3 = very 
close.  This variable differs from the favorability measure in that by asking individuals to think 
about their closeness to a particular group, it uncovers not only the respondents’ feelings and 
thoughts about their relationship to that group but also the salience of a particular group’s 
identity and the degree to which the respondents feel attached to that identity.  Because the 
dependent variable is ordinal and rank ordered, ordered logistic regression, a maximum 
likelihood-estimation (MLE) based procedure, is used to estimate the effects of the independent 
variables on closeness to each group. 
To describe the contours of the closeness measure of the four groups, Figure 4.2 shows 
all respondents’ degree of closeness to each group.  Starting first with closeness to Asians in 
Figure 4.2(a), the histogram shows that respondents are more likely to feel fairly close to Asians.  
The median closeness to Asians at 2 indicates that respondents tend to fall in the fairly close 
category.  The histograms of closeness to whites, blacks, and Hispanics in Figure 4.2(b), Figure 












0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Closeness to Asians (3 = very close)
  
(a) Asian Americans          (b) White Americans 
N = 3160                 N = 3236 
Median = 2                Median = 2 
Mean = 1.48               Mean = 1.87 
Standard Deviation = 0.94            Standard Deviation = 0.84 
Minimum = 0, Maximum = 3           Minimum = 0, Maximum = 3 
 











0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5











0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Closeness to Hispanics (3 = very close)
 
    (c) Black Americans          (d) Hispanic Americans 
N = 3236              N = 3211 
Median = 2             Median = 2 
Mean = 1.84             Mean = 1.82 
Standard Deviation = 0.89         Standard Deviation = 0.88 
Minimum = 0, Maximum = 3        Minimum = 0, Maximum = 3 
              
 
Figure 4.2 Closeness Measures of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups 
Note: The figures show descriptive statistics of general respondents’ degree of closeness to 
Asian Americans (Figure 4.2[a]), white Americans (Figure 4.2[b]), black Americans (Figure 
4.2[c]), and Hispanic Americans (Figure 4.2[d]).  The closeness scale comprises the values of 0 
(not close at all), 1 (not too close), 2 (fairly close), and 3 (very close). 
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close to each of these groups.  The median closeness of whites, blacks, and Hispanics is the same 
as that of Asians at a score of 2.   
         Since closeness to each of the four groups may differ across respondents of dissimilar 
racial backgrounds, I also report summary statistics in Table 4.2 of closeness to each group by 
respondents from each of the four racial/ethnic groups.  Turning first to closeness to Asians in 
Table 4.2, Asian and white respondents are more likely to feel fairly close to Asians (both with 
the median score of 2), while black and Hispanic respondents tend to feel not too close to Asians 
(both with the median score of 1).  Conversely, respondents in general have similar tendencies of 
closeness to whites.  Asian, white, black, and Hispanic respondents are more likely to feel fairly 
close to whites (all with the median closeness score of 2).   
     Interestingly, the results of closeness to blacks and to Hispanics reveal some similarities.  
Black and Hispanic respondents are most likely to feel close to their own respective groups (both 
with the median score of 3), and they are least likely to feel close to Asians (both with the 
median score of 1).  Compared with black respondents, white and Hispanic respondents (both 
with the median score of 2) are less likely to feel close to blacks.  Compared with Hispanic 
respondents, white and black respondents (both with the median score of 2) have a weaker 
likelihood of feeling close to Hispanics.  
      In sum, the results of Figure 4.2 reveal that general respondents have a stronger likelihood 
of feeling close to Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  These findings are compatible to the 
overall results of the thermometer ratings of the groups in Figure 4.1.  Similar to the findings of 
the thermometer ratings in Table 4.1, the results of Table 4.2 indicate that respondents of 
different racial backgrounds tend to vary somewhat in their feelings of closeness to each of the 
four groups.  Asian respondents are more likely to feel close to Asians and whites, while they are 
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less likely to feel close to blacks and Hispanics.  Interestingly, white respondents are more likely 
to feel close to all four groups.  Black and Hispanic respondents are more likely to feel close to 
their own respective groups and whites, while they are less likely to feel close to Asians.   
 
Table 4.2 Closeness to Racial/Ethnic Groups by Respondents’ Race 
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Independent Variables   
Several sets of independent variables are expected to have effects on the favorability and 
closeness dependent measures.  They include socio-demographic attributes and measures of 
context, personal contact, self-interest, and symbolic politics.  Although I expect that personal 
contact indicators are likely to influence the favorability dependent measure, data limitations in 
the 2004 ANES prevent measures of personal contact to be included in the favorability models. 
Measures of context (e.g., percent population of a given racial/ethnic group in a specified 
geographic unit) typically used in previous studies of intergroup relations are also not included in 
the closeness models.   
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  Context Measure: Percent Group Population.  Since most people in society tend not to live 
in isolation, their perceptions and attitudes of out-groups can be affected by the context of where 
they reside.  There are two competing theories in regards to contextual determinants of racial 
attitudes.  First, as Allport (1954) suggests, the contact perspective predicts that larger 
populations of minority out-groups can enhance the relationships between the out-groups and a 
majority group as members of the majority group rectify negative views of out-groups with 
personal or direct social experience.  In contrast, the group threat hypothesis (which relates to the 
context perspective) predicts that larger populations of minority out-groups in a specified 
geographic area generate perceptions of economic and/or political threat and competition with 
the out-groups (Key, 1949; Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Stein et. 
al., 2000).  A number of previous studies (e.g., Welch et al., 2001) find that racially or ethnically 
mixed residential areas are likely to foster interracial contact and alleviate interracial antagonism. 
The findings from previous research on these two competing theories generate a difficult puzzle, 
as Oliver and Wong (2003: 569) point out: “how can the proximity of out-groups, a necessary 
prerequisite for interracial contact, simultaneously promote interracial understanding yet also 
correspond with greater levels of interracial competition and animosity?”  As a way to reconcile 
the research that supports both theories, Oliver and Wong (2003) suggest taking into account not 
only that group’s size but also the contextual unit being measured.  They contend that racial 
threat is more likely to take place in comparatively expansive geographic areas with larger 
minority populations, such as counties and metropolitan areas, while racial contact is more likely 
to happen in smaller or more local geographic areas, such as towns and neighborhoods.   
     Only a contextual measure at the county level is included in the favorability models.  The 
percent group population represents the proportion of the population of each of the four groups 
 82
(i.e., Asians, whites, blacks, or Hispanics) at the county-level in 2000.  This context measure has 
been used in previous research to estimate contextual effects on racial attitudes (e.g., Stein et. al., 
2000).  Following the racial threat argument by Oliver and Wong (2003), percent group 
population is expected to be negatively related to favorability toward each group, particularly 
such out-groups as Asians, blacks, and Hispanics.     
  Personal Contact Measures: Residential Neighborhood, Workplace, Place of Worship, and 
Friendship.  To estimate the effects of personal contact measures in the closeness model of each 
group, I use measures of personal contact in four different interactive venues, including 
residential neighborhood, workplace, place of worship, and friendship.17  Respondents were 
asked whether there are Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics in the neighborhood where they live, in 
the place where they work or last worked, in their place of worship, or in their group of friends.  
Responses to each of these questions are coded on a 3-point scale, such that 0 = none, 1 = mixed 
of different groups, and 2 = mostly (Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics).  Following the personal 
contact argument suggesting that interactive venues that provide the opportunities for intergroup 
contact can promote positive views of out-groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1971, 1998; Dixon 
and Rosenbaum, 2004), each of these measures of personal contact is predicted to be positively 
related to closeness to each group.  
  Self-interest Measures: Employment Status, Family Income, Social Class, Job 
Competition, and Political Competition.  The self-interest perspective suggests that racial 
animosity is influenced by perceived higher levels of competition for scarce economic and/or 
                                                 
17 The residential neighborhood variable has been employed in previous research, such as Dixon and Rosenbaum 
(2004), as a personal contact measure to estimate models of racial attitudes, as well as the other specified venues for 
contact.  In this study, it is used to determine the influence of neighbor contact on the closeness models.  Similarly, 
the other measures of contact are used to determine the effects of workplace contact, place of worship contact, and 
friendship contact on closeness to each group.  
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political resources between different groups (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Bobo and Hutchings, 
1996; Sears et al., 1980).  Hence, various measures of self-interest relating to economic/political 
attributes are used to estimate the models of favorability and closeness.  
  Because of data limitations, the models of favorability and closeness comprise different 
measures of self-interest.  The favorability models include employment status, which is a dummy 
variable indexing whether respondents are employed or not; family income, which is measured 
on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (less than $10,000) to 7 ($90,000 and more); and social class, 
which represents levels of social class in the U.S. and is measured on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 0 (lower class) to 4 (upper class). The closeness models include employment status and 
family income, but not social class, and also incorporate job competition and political 
competition.  For the job competition measure, respondents from particular racial origins were 
asked to rate on a 4-point scale how strongly they disagree (which is at the lower end of the 
scale) or agree (which is at the higher end of the scale) with the following statement:  More good 
jobs for (Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics) mean fewer good jobs for people like me.  For 
instance, only non-Asian respondents were asked how strongly they disagree/agree with the 
statement:  More good jobs for Asian Americans mean fewer good jobs for people like me.  
Similarly for political competition, respondents from specific racial origins were asked to rate on 
a 4-point scale how strongly they disagree or agree with the following statement:  The more 
influence (Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics) have in politics, the less influence people like me 
will have in politics.   
    Since previous studies, such as Bobo and Hutchings (1996), suggest that members of a 
particular racial/ethnic group who are unemployed, have lower income levels, or are in lower 
levels of the U.S. social class are more likely to feel vulnerable to or threatened by competition 
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from members of other racial/ethnic groups, I hypothesize that employment status, family 
income, and social class are positively related to favorability toward and closeness to each group.  
Following the self-interest argument, I expect that job competition and political competition to 
negatively influence closeness to each group. 
  Measures of Symbolic Politics:  American Identity, Political Ideology, and Partisanship.  
Several measures of symbolic politics used in previous research on racial attitudes are included 
in the models of favorability and closeness.  American identity is an alternative measure to such 
common symbolic politics measures as political ideology and partisanship.  Citrin et al. (1990) 
find that American identity is a stronger determinant of a group’s (e.g., whites) perception of 
immigrant-dominated groups, such as Asians and Hispanics, than other measures of symbolic 
politics (such as partisanship and ideology).  Moreover, Stein et al. (2000) find that American 
identity is negatively related to white affect toward Hispanics.  In Citrin et al.’s (1990) study, 
respondents were asked to rate how important they felt each of the following six qualities for 
being truly American: 1) believing in God, 2) voting in elections, 3) speaking and writing 
English, 4) trying to get ahead on one's own efforts, 5) treating people of all races and 
backgrounds equally, and 6) defending America when it is criticized.  Two of the original six 
items are used to operationalize the American identity measure used in the favorability models, 
including trying to get ahead on one's own efforts and treating people of all races and 
backgrounds equally.18   Four of the original six items are used to operationalize the American 
identity measure used in the closeness models, including believing in God, voting in elections, 
                                                 
18 The 2004 ANES does not have specific questions about the six items relating to being truly American.  However, 
the survey has related questions for two of the original six items, including trying to get ahead on one's own efforts 
[a 7-point self-placement scale ranging from 0 (need government help to succeed) to 6 (get ahead on one’s own 
efforts) and based on the question: Where would you place yourself on the job and good standard of living scale?] 
and treating people of all races and backgrounds equally [a 5-point scale in which respondents were asked to rate 
how strongly they disagree or agree with the statement: Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure 
that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.].  Although the reliability of the overall scale of these two items 
was less than ideal (alpha = 0.33), a factor analysis of the items resulted in a single factor. 
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speaking and writing English, and trying to get ahead on one's own efforts.19  For each respective 
American identity measure, a principal component factor analysis of the items produced a single 
factor.  American identity is predicted to be negatively related to favorability toward and 
closeness to particularly immigrant-dominated groups (i.e., Asians and Hispanics), while it is 
expected to have the opposite effect on favorability toward and closeness to whites and blacks. 
  The other measures of symbolic politics used in this study include political ideology (i.e., a 
7-point liberal-conservative scale, ranging from 0 = extremely liberal to 6 = extremely 
conservative) and partisanship (i.e., a 7-point party identification scale, ranging from 0 = strong 
Democrat to 6 = strong Republican).  The effects of political ideology and partisanship on 
favorability toward and closeness to each group are not clear in previous research on racial 
attitudes.  For example, in their study of whites’ attitudes toward Hispanics, Stein et al. (2000) 
find that political ideology has a negative influence on white affect toward Hispanics, while 
partisanship has no effect on the dependent variable.  Hence, I expect that the effects of political 
ideology and partisanship on favorability toward and closeness to each group will vary and be 
evaluated using a non-directional test.   
Socio-Demographic Attributes: Education, Age, Gender, and Race.  A number of studies 
indicate that education is a key socialization agent promoting tolerance (Jackman, 1978).  Other 
studies further suggest that as individuals become more educated they are more likely to actively 
participate in society and feel secure in that society, so their milieu does not frustrate or scare 
                                                 
19 The 2004 NPS have similar questions for three of the six items relating to being truly American, all of which are 
measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not important at all) to 3 (very important), including believing in God 
(based on the question: How important do you think each of the following is for being truly American: to be a 
Christian?), voting in elections (based on the question: How important do you think each of the following is for 
being truly American: to vote?), and speaking and writing English (based on the question: How important do you 
think each of the following is for being truly American: to be able to speak English?).  The survey has a related 
question for the fourth item (i.e., trying to get ahead on one's own efforts) which asked respondents to rate on a 4-
point scale how strongly they disagree or agree with the statement: America is a land of opportunity in which you 
only need to work hard to succeed.  Although the reliability of the overall scale of these four items was less than 
ideal (alpha = 0.52), a factor analysis of the items produced a single factor. 
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them (Angell, 1962; Giles and Evans, 1989).  I expect that education is positively related to both 
favorability toward and closeness to each group.  Education is operationalized in the favorability 
models on a 7-point scale, ranging from 0 (less than or equal to grade school) to 6 (advanced 
degree), while the variable is operationalized in the closeness models on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 0 (less than or equal to grade school) to 4 (advanced degree). 
     The effects of age (in years) and gender (1 = female, 0 = male) on the favorability and 
closeness dependent variables, however, are not clear, and so are evaluated case by case (using a 
non-directional test).  In terms of race, dichotomous variables are included for Asian, black, 
white, and/or Hispanic respondents in the favorability and closeness models of the four groups, 
with the reference or omitted category to be the race corresponding to the favorability or 
closeness model of the respective group.  For instance, for the favorability or closeness model of 
Asians, the reference category is Asian.  I expect the effects of race on the favorability and 
closeness measures to be compatible with the findings in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 
Results 
Predicting Patterns of Favorability toward the Four Groups  
     Table 4.3 presents the OLS regression results of the favorability model of each group.  
Starting with favorability toward Asian Americans, the findings reveal that symbolic politics 
(American identity) and socio-demographic (education and race [black]) measures have strong 
effects on the dependent variable (at the .05 or lower level of significance).  As expected, 
Americans who have a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity and higher 
levels of education attainment are more likely to feel warm toward Asians, other conditions 
being equal.  Compared with individuals of Asian ancestry, those of black racial origin have a 
weaker likelihood of possessing warm feelings toward Asians, all else equal.  Relatively  
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Table 4.3 OLS Regression Analysis of Favorability Models of the Four Racial/Ethnic 
Groups 
 




Percent Group Population (county-level)  0.016    0.012    -0.034    0.149** 
            (0.07)    (0.23)    (-0.41)    (2.38) 
 
Self-interest  
 Employment Status        -1.683    -1.094    -2.966*   -1.737 
              (-1.05)    (-0.66)    (-1.89)    (-1.08) 
 
 Family Income         0.134    0.311    0.357    0.542 
              (0.32)    (0.71)    (0.86)    (1.28) 
      
 Social Class          1.949*    0.338   -1.491    0.878 
              (1.89)    (0.32)    (-0.49)    (0.85) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity        -1.436**   -0.550    -1.472**   -1.262* 
              (-1.97)    (-0.73)    (-2.07)    (-1.71) 
 
 Political Ideology        1.703*    2.500**   1.673*    2.021** 
              (1.73)    (2.48)    (1.75)    (2.05) 
 
Partisanship          -0.589    -0.386    -1.046    -0.138 
             (-0.68)    (-0.43)    (-1.23)    (-0.16) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education           2.040***   -0.134    1.508***   1.488*** 
              (4.25)    (-0.27)    (3.20)    (3.08) 
 
 Age            0.020    0.171***   -0.010    -0.026 
              (0.45)    (3.71)    (-0.23)    (-0.59) 
 
 Female           0.949    3.817***   3.911***   2.100 
              (0.71)    (2.76)    (2.99)    (1.56) 
  
 Asian                --    -4.927    -17.880***  -17.630*** 
                   (-1.05)    (-3.81)    (-3.50) 
 
White            -4.459        --    -13.516***  -10.434*** 
             (-1.58)         (-6.97)    (-4.48) 
 
 Black            -6.491**   -1.039        --    -7.762*** 
              (-1.96)    (-0.47)         (-2.72) 
 
 Hispanic           5.048    5.918**   -5.121*       -- 
              (1.34)    (2.01)    (-1.68) 
 
Intercept            59.176***  59.193***  76.863*** 65.779*** 
              (13.47)   (11.37)   (20.61)   (17.29) 
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(Table 4.3 continued) 
 
N              813    820    821    820 
Adjusted R2           0.05    0.04    0.10    0.06 
 
Note: The t-scores are in parentheses.  
Source: 2004 ANES. 
 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
speaking, favorability toward Asians is not associated with the context measure (percent group 
population) and the white and Hispanic race categories.  Neither being employed, nor having 
higher levels of family income, nor identifying more with the Republican Party, nor being older 
in age, nor being female may independently influence favorability toward Asians.  However, in 
nine out of ten times, being in higher levels of the U.S. social class and being conservative in 
political ideology are associated with a higher likelihood of having positive views of Asians, 
holding other factors constant. 
         How do the findings of the favorability model for white Americans compared with those 
for Asian Americans?  The results of the favorability model in the second column of Table 4.3 
reveal that symbolic politics and socio-demographic indicators are also strong predictors of 
favorability toward whites.  However, different measures of these concepts affect favorability 
toward whites, specifically the symbolic politics measure of political ideology and socio-
demographic attributes of age, gender, and race (Hispanic).  All things being equal, individuals 
who are more likely to be conservative in political ideology, older in age, and female are more 
likely to have positive views of whites.  Compared with persons of white descent, individuals of 
Hispanic origin have a stronger likelihood of feeling warm toward whites.  Race (Asian and 
black) and measures of context (percent group population) and self-interest (employment status, 
family income, and social class) have no effects on favorability toward whites.  Neither having a 
stronger belief in the importance of the American identity, nor having higher levels of education 
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attainment, nor identifying more with the Republican Party is related to greater odds of having 
favorable views of whites.    
     In comparison to the findings for Asian Americans, the results in the third column of Table 
4.3 for black Americans show that similar symbolic politics and socio-demographic indicators 
affect favorability toward blacks.  Specifically, the findings show that the symbolic politics 
measure of American identity and socio-demographic attributes of education, race (Asian and 
white), and also gender are strong determinants of favorability toward blacks.  Unexpectedly, 
Americans who have a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity are likely to feel 
warmer toward blacks, holding other factors constant.  As expected, having more education is 
associated with greater odds of having favorable views of blacks.  Being female is related to a 
stronger likelihood of possessing warm feelings toward blacks.  Compared with individuals of 
black racial descent, those of Asian and white origins have a weaker likelihood of possessing 
positive views of blacks.  Employment status, political ideology, and Hispanic origin are also 
significantly related to favorability toward blacks, but at a less stringent .10 level of significance. 
In nine out of ten instances, being conservative in political ideology has a higher likelihood, 
while being employed has a weaker likelihood, of having favorable views of blacks, other 
conditions being equal.  In nine times out of ten, compared with individuals of black racial 
descent, those of Hispanic origin are less likely to feel warm toward blacks, all else equal.  
Relatively speaking, favorability toward blacks is not associated with the context measure 
(percent group population), two of the self-interest measures (family income and social class), 
partisanship, and age. 
  Compared to the results of favorability toward Asian Americans, the findings of 
favorability toward Hispanic Americans in the last column of Table 4.3 reveal that similar socio-
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demographic indicators and other different measures strongly influence favorability toward the 
group.  Specifically, context (percent group population), symbolic politics (political ideology), 
and socio-demographic [education and race (Asian, white, and black)] measures are strong 
predictors of the dependent variable.  Unexpectedly, individuals who live in counties with larger 
populations of Hispanics are more likely to feel warm toward Hispanics, all else equal.  Being 
conservative in political ideology and, as predicted, having more education are associated with 
greater odds of having favorable views of Hispanics, other conditions being equal.  Compared 
with individuals of Hispanic ancestry, those of Asian, white, and black racial origins have a 
weaker likelihood of possessing positive views of Hispanics.  The self-interest measures 
(employment status, family income, and social class), partisanship, age, and gender (female) 
have no effects on favorability toward Hispanics.  However, nine times out of ten, having a 
weaker belief in the importance of the American identity is related to a higher likelihood of 
feeling warm toward Hispanics, other conditions being equal. 
  The overall findings in Table 4.3 indicate that symbolic politics and socio-demographic 
measures are strong determinants of favorability toward Asians and the other groups.  Yet, the 
measures of these concepts vary in their effects on the dependent variable for each group.  For 
Asian Americans, only American identity, education, and race (black) are significantly related to 
favorability toward this group, and the direction of the coefficient of each independent variable is 
as predicted.  For white Americans, political ideology, age, gender, and race (Hispanic) alone are 
significantly and positively associated with favorability toward the group.  For black Americans, 
only American identity, education, gender, and race (Asian and white) have a high likelihood of 
influencing warm feelings toward the group.  For Hispanic Americans, political ideology, 
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education, and race (Asian, white, and black) alone are significantly linked to favorability toward 
this group.   
     Moreover, for Asian, black, and Hispanic groups alone, education has a strong and positive 
influence on the favorability measure of the respective group.  In general, race has a strong effect 
on favorability toward each of the four groups, particularly Hispanics and blacks, and the 
findings for each group are consistent with the respective aggregate-level results in Table 4.1.  
For example, regarding the feeling thermometer ratings of Asians in Table 4.1, black respondents 
are found to have a weaker likelihood of possessing warm feelings toward Asians, compared 
with Asian respondents.  This finding is confirmed with the significant and negative coefficient 
of race (black) in the multivariate result in Table 4.3 for favorability toward Asians. 
  Interestingly, the context measure (percent group population) is significantly related to 
favorability toward only Hispanics, but in the unexpected direction.  The positive direction of 
this coefficient suggests that larger populations of an out-group, such as Hispanics, in 
comparatively expansive geographic units, such as counties, can promote positive affect toward 
the out-group.  This finding supports the contact argument rather than the group threat argument.  
Measures of self-interest (employment status, family income, and social class), in general, have 
little to no effects on favorability toward Asians and the other groups.   
Predicting Patterns of Closeness to the Four Groups 
     Table 4.4 reports the ordered logistic regression results of the closeness models of Asian, 
white, black, and Hispanic Americans.  Turning first to closeness to Asian Americans in the first 
column of Table 4.4, the results indicate that personal contact (workplace and friendship), self-
interest (job competition), symbolic politics (American identity and partisanship), and socio-
demographic (education, gender) measures have strong effects on closeness to the group (at the  
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Table 4.4 Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis of Closeness Models of the Four  
Racial/Ethnic Groups 
 




Residential Neighborhood    0.072     0.133     0.018     0.222 
          (0.41)     (1.02)     (0.13)     (1.59) 
 
Workplace        0.432**    0.023  0.057     0.250 
          (2.34)     (0.24)  (0.39)     (1.59) 
 
Place of Worship      0.089     0.026     0.501**    0.376** 
          (0.54)     (0.22)     (2.51)     (2.00) 
 
Friendship       0.642***    0.454***    0.828***    0.839*** 
          (3.32)     (3.28)     (5.23)     (3.77) 
 
Self-interest  
 Job Competition      -0.347***    -0.146**    -0.272**    -0.214* 
           (-3.55)     (-2.02)     (-2.44)     (-1.88) 
 
 Political Competition    -0.098     -0.169**    -0.151     -0.343*** 
           (-1.07)     (-2.27)     (-1.59)     (-2.93) 
 
 Employment Status     -0.110     0.214     -0.151     0.042 
           (-0.61)     (1.46)     (-0.79)     (0.20) 
 
 Family Income      -0.076     0.015     -0.056     -0.126** 
           (-1.51)     (0.36)     (-0.99)     (-2.04) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity     -0.260***   0.077     -0.243**    -0.264*** 
           (-2.82)     (0.96)     (-2.48)     (-2.80) 
 
 Political Ideology     0.040     0.030     -0.106     0.029 
           (0.48)     (0.40)                         (-1.11)                        (0.30) 
 
 Partisanship       -0.196**    0.014     -0.294***    -0.257** 
           (-1.99)     (0.14)     (-2.60)     (-2.19) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education      0.182**    -0.052     0.017     0.141* 
         (2.43)     (-0.86)     (0.20)     (1.68) 
 
 Age         0.009     0.009*     0.014**    0.013** 
           (1.64)     (1.82)     (2.35)     (2.10) 
 
 Female        -0.423***    -0.240*    -0.039     -0.339** 
           (-2.96)     (-1.72)     (-0.23)     (-2.04) 
 
Asian             --     0.176     -0.726*    -1.037*** 
                 (0.63)     (-1.75)     (-3.07) 
 
 93
(Table 4.4 continued) 
 
White          0.084             --     -0.308     -1.080*** 
          (0.34)           (-0.74)     (-3.19) 
 
Black         0.103     -0.070               --     -0.052 
           (0.44)     (-0.29)           (-0.17) 
 
 Hispanic        -2.508     0.059     -0.578                   -- 
           (-1.09)     (0.23)     (-1.45) 
 
 
Constant1         -1.887     -1.862     -2.910     -3.374 
Constant2         -0.179     -0.628     -1.149     -1.524 
Constant3          2.631           2.072      1.985      1.527 
 
 
N           1601          1339     1367     1359 
LRχ2          116.04          56.82     158.99     129.94 
Prob (χ2)         0.0000         0.0000     0.0000     0.0000 
Pseudo R2         0.07     0.03     0.08     0.10 
 
Note: The z-scores are in parentheses.  
Source: 2004 NPS. 
 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
.05 or lower level of significance).  As predicted, having more Asians in one’s workplace and as 
friends, feeling less threatened by job competition with Asians, having a weaker belief in the 
importance of the American identity, and having more education are associated with greater odds 
of feeling close to Asians in terms of ideas, interests and feelings, other conditions being equal.  
Individuals who identify more with the Democratic Party and are male are more likely to feel 
close to Asians, all else equal.  Relatively speaking, closeness to Asians is not associated with 
two of the personal contact measures (residential neighborhood and place of worship), three of 
the self-interest measures (political competition, employment status, family income), political 
ideology, age, and race (white, black, and Hispanic). 
     Compared with the results of closeness to Asian Americans, the findings for closeness to 
white Americans in the second column of Table 4.4 reveal that only measures of personal contact 
(friendship) and self-interest (job competition and political competition) are strong predictors of 
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closeness to the group.  As expected, having more whites as friends and feeling less threatened 
by job and political competitions with whites are significantly related to feeling closer to whites, 
controlling for all other variables.  Relatively speaking, closeness to whites has no effects on 
three of the personal contact measures (residential neighborhood, workplace, and place of 
worship), two of the self-interest measures (employment status and family income), all measures 
of symbolic politics (American identity, political ideology, and partisanship), education, and race 
(white, black, and Hispanic).  However, nine times out of ten, being older in age and male is 
associated with a higher likelihood of feeling close to whites, holding other factors constant.  
  Compared with the findings of the closeness model for Asians, the results of the closeness 
model for black Americans in the third column of Table 4.4 indicate that similar groups of 
measures have strong effects on the dependent variable.  Specifically, personal contact (place of 
worship and friendship), self-interest (job competition), symbolic politics (American identity and 
partisanship), and socio-demographic (age) measures strongly influence closeness to blacks.  As 
predicted, having more blacks in one’s place of worship and as friends and feeling less 
threatened by job competition with blacks significantly affect feeling closer to blacks, controlling 
for all other variables.  Unexpectedly, having a weaker belief in the importance of the American 
identity is associated with a greater likelihood of closeness to blacks, all else equal.  Individuals 
who identify more with the Democratic Party and are older in age are more likely to feel close to 
blacks, when other conditions are controlled.  Closeness to blacks is not associated with two of 
the personal contact measures (residential neighborhood and workplace), three of the self-interest 
measures (political competition, employment status, and family income), political ideology, 
education, and gender (female).  However, in nine out of ten instances, compared with 
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individuals of black ancestry, those of Asian origin have a weaker likelihood of closeness to 
blacks, all else equal. 
  In comparison to the results of closeness to Asians, the results of closeness to Hispanic 
Americans in the last column of Table 4.4 also show that similar groups of measures strongly 
influence closeness to the group.  In particular, personal contact (place of worship and 
friendship), self-interest (political competition and family income), symbolic politics (American 
identity and partisanship), and socio-demographic (age, gender, and Asian and white origins) 
measures are strong predictors of closeness to Hispanics.  As expected, having more Hispanics in 
one’s place of worship and as friends, feeling less threatened by political competition with 
Hispanics, and having a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity are 
significantly related to a higher likelihood of feeling close to Hispanics, holding all other 
variables constant.  Unexpectedly, individuals with lower levels of family income are more 
likely to feel close to Hispanics, other conditions being equal.  Persons who associate more with 
the Democratic Party, are older in age, and are male are more likely to feel close to Hispanics, all 
else equal.  Compared with individuals of Hispanic ancestry, those of Asian and white origins 
have a weaker likelihood of closeness to Hispanics.  Relatively speaking, two of the personal 
contact measures (residential neighborhood and workplace), employment status, and political 
ideology are not associated with closeness to Hispanics.  However, nine out of ten instances, 
feeling less threatened by job competition with Hispanics and having more education are related 
to having a stronger likelihood of feeling closer to Hispanics, other conditions being equal. 
   In sum, the findings in Table 4.4 indicate that similar sets of measures, including personal 
contact, self-interest, symbolic politics, and socio-demographic attributes, have strong effects on 
closeness to Asians, blacks, and Hispanics, while only personal contact and self-interest 
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measures are strong determinants of closeness to whites.  The indictors of each concept, 
however, differ in their influence on closeness to each group.  Personal contact measures of 
workplace and friendship, self-interest measure of job competition, symbolic politics measures 
of American identity and partisanship, and socio-demographic attributes of education and gender 
are strongly related to closeness to Asians.  Closeness to blacks is significantly influenced by 
personal contact measures of place of worship and friendship, self-interest measure of job 
competition, symbolic politics measures of American identity and partisanship, and socio-
demographic attribute of age.  Closeness to Hispanics is strongly affected by personal contact 
measures of place of worship and friendship, self-interest measures of political competition and 
family income, symbolic politics measures of American identity and partisanship, and socio-
demographic attributes of age, gender, and race (Asian and white).  For whites, only personal 
contact measure of friendship and self-interest measures of job and political competitions are 
strongly associated with closeness to this group. 
     In general, friendship contact is the most consistently influential factor of the closeness 
measure for all groups.  Furthermore, for all groups, the closeness dependent variable is 
significantly and negatively affected by job competition (although at a less stringent .10 level of 
significance for closeness to Hispanics).  For only Asians, blacks, and Hispanics, symbolic 
politics measures of American identity and partisanship are strong determinants of the respective 
closeness measure.  Workplace contact is a significant predictor of closeness to only Asians.  
Race (specifically Asian and white) has a strong effect on the closeness to Hispanics alone.   
      Compared with the impact of the race categories on the favorability models of the four 
groups in Table 4.3, the race categories have significant effects on closeness to only Hispanics 
and blacks, although the effect of race (Asian) is weak on closeness to blacks.  The findings for 
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the respective closeness models in terms of the race categories are compatible to the findings in 
Table 4.2.  Surprisingly, neighbor contact, employment status, and political ideology have no 
effects on closeness to any of the four groups. 
Conclusion 
      The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a systematic analysis of affect-based perceptions 
of Asian Americans in comparison with those of white, black, and Hispanic Americans.  How do 
Americans view Asians compared with the other major groups?  Do Americans have more or 
less favorable views of Asians?  Do Americans feel close to Asians?  Studying affect-based 
perceptions of Asians is important to gain an appreciation of the socioeconomic and political 
factors that determine the positive or negative affect which Americans have for fellow Asian 
Americans, in order to better understand the dynamics of racial prejudice and to identify the 
kinds of individuals more likely to subscribe to such beliefs about or views of Asians.  Moreover, 
some previous studies have made a strong case of the importance of affect, which is argued to be 
first obtained with little cognitive appraisal, in the formation of preferences for groups (Edwards, 
1990; Edwards and von Hippel, 1995).  
  In this chapter, two measures of affect-based perceptions of Asians, whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics are analyzed, including favorability toward and closeness to each group.  At the 
aggregate level, general Americans are found more likely to possess feelings of both warmth 
toward and closeness to Asians and also the other groups.  When respondents of diverse 
racial/ethnic origins are considered, the overall picture looks somewhat different.  Although 
these respondents in general are more likely to have positive views of the groups (in terms of 
favorability and closeness), they tend to vary in some degree in their favorability toward and 
closeness to each group.  For example, compared with Asian respondents, Hispanic respondents 
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have a weaker likelihood of feeling warm toward Asians, followed by white respondents and 
lastly black respondents.  Compared with Asian respondents, white respondents are more likely 
to feel fairly close to Asians while black and Hispanic respondents tend to feel not too close to 
Asians.  These findings indicate that feelings of warmth and closeness are not necessarily 
consistent between different groups.  For instance, among the non-Asian groups of respondents, 
white respondents’ tendency of having more favorable views of Asians falls between that of 
black and Hispanic respondents.  Conversely, among the non-Asian groups of respondents, white 
respondents’ likelihood of being closer to Asians is stronger than that of black and Hispanic 
respondents.  A reason for this discrepancy might be that whites believe they have more things in 
common with Asians, such as socioeconomic status, than with blacks and Hispanics and thus are 
likely to feel closer to Asians, but this belief does not necessarily mean whites are likely to feel 
warmer toward Asians.  These findings suggest that, at the aggregate level, affect-based 
perceptions of groups are fairly complicated and depend on the racial background of who is 
subscribing to the perception as well as on the racial background of who is being perceived.  
      The multivariate analyses of the favorability and closeness models of Asian Americans 
reveal mixed results relative to the key explanatory measures of self-interest, symbolic politics, 
context, and/or personal contact.  The processes shaping both favorability toward and closeness 
to Asians are in several ways different from those affecting both favorability toward and 
closeness to the other groups, especially in terms of symbolic politics.  For example, as expected, 
having a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity is strongly related to greater 
feelings of both warmth toward and closeness to Asian Americans.  American identity is also 
significantly and, as predicted, negatively associated with both models of Hispanic Americans; 
however, the effects of these measures on the dependent variables of Hispanics are not 
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consistently strong at the .05 or lower level of significance, compared with those of Asians.  
Having a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity is associated as well with a 
stronger likelihood of feeling warm toward and close to black Americans, but the effects of 
American identity on both the dependent variables of blacks are not in the hypothesized 
direction.   
    There are quite a few key measures that significantly affect either of the dependent 
variables of Asians that also significantly influence either of those of blacks, Hispanics, and/or 
whites.  For instance, friendship contact has the strongest and most consistent influence on 
closeness to Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics at the .01 level of significance.  In fact, among 
the measures of personal contact in Table 4.4, friendship contact is the strongest determinant of 
closeness to all four groups.  The self-interest measure of job competition is also significantly 
related to closeness to Asians and the other groups, but the effect of job competition is strongest 
on the dependent variable of Asians (b = -0.347; p ≤ .01) and is weak on that of Hispanics (p ≤ 
.10).  The symbolic politics measure of political ideology is significantly linked to favorability 
toward all four groups, but the effect is not strong on favorability toward Asians and also blacks.  
The symbolic politics measures of American identity and partisanship have strong effects on 
closeness to only Asians, blacks, and Hispanics.  There are also some key factors that influence 
evaluations of Asians and not those of any of the other groups.  For example, workplace contact 
and the self-interest measure of social class have significant effects on closeness to only Asians, 
although the effect of social class on the dependent variable is weak (p ≤ .10). 
  Other key measures are found to have no effects on favorability toward or closeness to 
Asians, but have significant influence on either of the models of whites, blacks, and/or 
Hispanics.  In particular, the context measure of percent group population has null effects on 
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favorability toward Asians (and also whites and blacks), while it has a strong but unexpectedly 
negative influence on favorability toward Hispanics.  These findings do not support the argument 
of the group threat hypothesis that the group size of a minority population in larger environments 
matters in increasing hostility toward the out-group.  The null contextual effects on the 
dependent variable of Asians suggest as well that context is less likely to be an important factor 
in understanding Americans’ favorability toward Asians, compared with other key factors, such 
as the symbolic politics measure of American identity.  The self-interest measures also have little 
to no effects on favorability toward Asians, suggesting that perceived economic threats may not 
necessarily account for a racial/ethnic group’s unfavorable or favorable perceptions of another 
racial/ethnic group.   
  In sum, the overall results of favorability toward and closeness to Asian Americans (and 
also the other groups) indicate that both dependent measures have complicated predictors.  The 
findings confirm some aspects of the personal contact, self-interest, and symbolic politics 
hypotheses, as well as those of the socio-demographic hypotheses, discussed in past research in 
the respective models of Asian Americans.  The findings also call into question the validity of 
some key explanatory factors that have been explored in previous studies of racial attitudes, 
particularly relative to context.  Affect-based perceptions of Asians, hence, involve social-
psychological processes that cannot be reduced to a single cause. 
  Ideally, having the full sets of personal contact, self-interest, symbolic politics, and context 
measures in both the favorability and closeness models of Asians would provide a better 
understanding of the dynamics of intergroup relations, but problems, such as data limitations, 
necessitate leaving out certain measures in both models.  In the next chapter, I analyze a different 
component of attitudes toward Asian Americans (i.e., cognitive-based perceptions) that takes 
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into account the effects of context, personal contact, self-interest, and symbolic politics on 
stereotypes about Asian Americans.   
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CHAPTER 5:  COGNITION-BASED PERCEPTIONS OF ASIAN AMERICANS 
     Karl Marx ([1852] 1913) asserted that while individuals make their own history, they do 
not do so in a world of their own making.  This view is especially relevant for Asian Americans 
who have had to cope with a number of stereotypes, but, unlike groups such as black Americans, 
Asians seem to be perceived in both flattering and unflattering ways.  As a “model minority” 
Asians in general are viewed as successful socioeconomically relative largely to blacks and 
Hispanics (see Table 2.10), although the group averages that are assessed on the foundation of 
the broad “Asian” category disguise the considerable differences among the Asian ethnic groups.  
In terms of such measures of socioeconomic success as education, income, and home ownership, 
Asians seem to be quickly assimilating into the larger American society and advancing in such a 
way that typecasts them with the model minority image (see also Alba and Nee, 2003; Chong 
and Kim, 2006).  In contrast, a prevalent stereotype that persists to accentuate the racial minority 
status of Asian Americans is that of members of a perpetually foreign race who exhibit interest 
more in their own Asian countries of origin than in American society and politics (Lien et al., 
2004; Lee, 1999).  Scholars, such as Lee (1998), suggest that the physical characteristics (e.g., 
black hair and almond eyes) as well as the many ethnic origins of Asians have served to 
distinguish them as a racial minority in the United States.  Possible bases of the continued 
predominance of this stereotype, however, are not well substantiated as the findings in Chapter 2 
reveal.  In terms of such measures as English proficiency and U.S. citizenship and interracial 
marriage, the results of Table 2.8 and Figures 2.4 and 2.5, respectively, do not altogether support 
the perception of Asian Americans as culturally, politically, and socially inadaptable to 
mainstream America.   
 103
     Yet, it is not clear whether Americans typically view Asians through such stereotypical 
lenses.  Stereotypes can be thought of as the traits that are mentally linked with a social category 
label stored in long-term memory in cognitive representations, such that as people learn about 
different groups, stereotypes become a part of their memory (Stangor, 2000).  Are Americans 
more likely to evaluate Asians favorably or unfavorably across specific attributes of group 
stereotypes (e.g., “hardworking,” “intelligent”)?  Does Americans’ general stereotyping of 
Asians tend to be positive or negative?  How do the evaluations of Asians compare to those of 
other racial and ethnic groups?  To seek answers to these questions, I conduct a systematic 
examination of cognition-based perceptions of Asians by focusing on the content and 
antecedents of such beliefs.20   
     The purpose in examining the content of Americans’ images of Asians is to ascertain the 
extent to which general Americans (i.e., Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics) subscribe to the 
perceptions of Asians along different trait dimensions of group stereotypes or beliefs about 
personal attributes of groups often included in national surveys (e.g., American National Election 
Study), such as the lazy-hardworking, unintelligent-intelligent, and untrustworthy-trustworthy 
dimensions.  In this study such trait dimensions are used as dependent variables and also as the 
composition of general group stereotype dependent measures.  As Massey et al. (2003) indicate, 
stereotypical attitudes reflect individual predilections and beliefs about the “proper” status 
hierarchy among various groups in U.S. society.  Thus, the images that Americans hold of 
Asians are more likely to affect their status in mainstream society.  For instance, if Americans 
tend to view Asians as hardworking and intelligent, their status as a respected, competent model 
minority is more likely to be confirmed.  If Americans tend to perceive Asians as untrustworthy, 
                                                 
20 Following the work of Peffley and Hurwitz (1998) on racial stereotyping of blacks, I use similar concepts of 
content and antecedents in the analysis of racial stereotyping of Asians.   
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their status as an alien presence or perpetual foreigners in America is more likely to be 
supported.   
     More importantly, the second goal is to gain an insight into the social, economic, and 
political antecedents of current racial stereotypes of Asians in order to identify the kinds of 
individuals who are likely to have such beliefs about Asians and to better comprehend the 
dynamics of racial discrimination.  These antecedents constitute the independent measures in this 
study.  Allport (1954) cautions against seeking the sources of stereotyping and prejudice in a 
“single sovereign explanation”; hence, I suggest that Asian stereotyping is influenced by a range 
of correlates, such as indicators of the context, personal contact, self-interest, and symbolic 
politics theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 3, socio-demographic indicators, and an 
indicator of general view of human nature.  For example, are certain segments of society, such as 
among individuals who have more education or those who are older in age, more likely to view 
Asians as intelligent, hardworking, and/or trustworthy?  Do people who live in areas with high 
proportions of Asians or who have personal contact with Asians more likely to have positive (or 
negative) evaluations of Asians?  Are Americans’ images of Asians influenced by economic self-
interest in terms of such measures as employment status and social class?  To what extent do 
Americans’ stereotyping of Asians is shaped by such political orientations as partisanship, 
ideology, and sense of American identity?  Do individuals who have a positive view of human 
nature more likely to subscribe to positive evaluations of Asians?   
Cognition-Based Responses in Groups    
  Researchers in social psychology have long speculated that cognition can contribute to the 
structure of attitudes, in conjunction with or separate from affect (McGuire, 1969; Fabrigar and 
Petty, 1999; Edwards, 1990; Edwards and von Hippel, 1995; Katz and Stotland, 1959; Breckler, 
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1984; Zajonc and Markus, 1982).  The cognition term has been commonly used to express 
beliefs, judgments, or thoughts about positive and/or negative attributes of an attitude object 
(McGuire, 1969; Fabrigar and Petty, 1999; Edwards and von Hippel, 1995; Coren et al., 1999).  
In contrast to the affect-based response that is an emotional response expressing an individual's 
degree of preference for an object, the cognition-based response is a cognitive evaluation of the 
object that constitutes an individual's beliefs about the object.  Beliefs, judgments, knowledge 
structures, perceptual responses, and thoughts constitute the cognitive component (Breckler, 
1984; Edwards, 1990).  Allport (1935) indicates that a core assumption of the attitude concept is 
that, like the affect component which was explored in the previous chapter, the cognition 
component varies on a common evaluative continuum, such that cognitions or thoughts may vary 
from unfavorable to favorable, such as negative stereotyping versus positive stereotyping of a 
racial/ethnic group (see also Breckler, 1984).   
      In studies of intergroup relations, cognition-based attitudes have been examined to a large 
extent in terms of stereotypes and prejudice.  Stereotypes and prejudice have long engaged the 
interest of researchers in social psychology, sociology, and political science/political psychology.  
They are integrally linked to many key topics in these disciplines, such as attitudes, group 
behavior, conformity, and aggression.  As noted in the previous chapter, the difference between 
stereotypes and prejudice are somewhat hazy because researchers tend to include notions of 
stereotypes in descriptions of prejudice.  Notably, Allport ([1954] 1979: 9) defines prejudice as 
an antipathy rooted in faulty and inflexible generalizations of a particular group in society.  
Blumer (1958: 4) further describes prejudice as a cultural product comprised of feelings that an 
out-group is different, foreign, and inferior compared with one’s own racial/ethnic group.  
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Allport ([1954] 1979: 204) contends that unflattering stereotypes “rationalize” prejudice against 
out-groups by acclimatizing “to the prevailing temper of prejudice or the needs of the situation.”   
      Consistent with Allport (1954), researchers tend to view only negative or unflattering 
stereotypes as signifying prejudice, where prejudice is a uniform aversion or contempt toward 
out-groups across an assortment of dimensions (see also Fiske et al., 2002).  Stereotypes are 
typically maintained “not by completely ignoring reality or making something up out of whole 
cloth, but by forms of selective perception that fixate on partial truths in such a way that the 
fuller truth is obscured” (Wachtel, 1999: 12).  For instance, although the contemporary Asian 
population is predominantly immigrant, many Asian families have been U.S. citizens for a 
number of generations; yet, the image of Asians as an alien presence in America still persists 
(Lee, 1999; Lee, 1998; Lien et. al, 2004).  Stereotypes and prejudice, moreover, are the result of 
social categorization (Stangor, 2000; Milner, 1975).  Stangor (2000) indicates that social 
categorization transpires when, rather than thinking about or viewing another person as a unique 
individual, people think of the person as a member of a particular group on the basis of, for 
example, physical traits (e.g., skin color, gender, or age).  In other words, stereotypes commonly 
involve the application of group perceptions to define individuals.  For example, typecast as a 
model minority, an Asian individual is likely assumed to be more successful socioeconomically, 
say in terms of education, than members of other racial/ethnic groups, even though the person 
may be more poorly educated than the members of the other groups.   
      A number of researchers have explored stereotypes and prejudice toward racial/ethnic and 
other types of out-groups in American society, such as black Americans (Schuman et al., 1985; 
Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Dixon, 
2001; McClain et al., 2006), Hispanic Americans (Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004), multiracial 
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groups (Oliver and Wong, 2003), women (Eagly and Mladinic, 1989; Deaux and Major, 1987), 
homosexuals (Herek, 1987), and the elderly (Brewer et al., 1981).  Few studies have focused 
specifically and systematically on Asian Americans; a small number of past studies that 
concentrated on Asians (e.g., Lin et al., 2005) generally base their analyses on non-random 
samples.  Part of the interest in studying stereotypes and prejudice is because of its considerable 
practical importance.  Many American cities have increasingly become racially and ethnically 
diverse such that individuals from different cultures and ethnic backgrounds are coming into 
more contact with each other (Oliver and Wong, 2003; Jackson et al., 1994).  These augmented 
contacts between people of different racial/ethnic groups increase the opportunities for the 
expression of prejudice and stereotypes, and these contacts may, in some cases, be accompanied 
by overt hostility and conflict between and among races, cultures, and ethnic groups (Stangor, 
2000).  Conversely, supporters of the contact theory (e.g., Allport, 1954) argue that increased 
contact between members of different racial/ethnic groups can break down stereotypes with 
personal or direct social experience (see also Oliver and Wong, 2003).  Hence, researchers are 
interested in studying prejudice and stereotyping of groups because these beliefs can have 
negative (or positive) consequences for the individuals who are targets of prejudice and 
stereotypes and for the larger American society (Crocker and Major, 1989; Jones, 1996; Stangor, 
2000).   
     Understanding group stereotypes also attends to theoretical questions within political 
science.  One question concerns the nature and scope of prejudice in the U.S.  The literature on 
prejudice concentrates primarily on racial groups, especially black Americans.  Attitudes toward 
blacks have changed dramatically over the past several decades, with traditional forms of racism 
of the post-Civil War era—those that accentuated the inferiority of blacks, such as an inherent 
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lack of intelligence—becoming increasingly uncommon, if we can rely on self-reported attitudes 
or other observations of behavior (Schuman et al., 1985; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Peffley and 
Hurwitz, 1998; Sides and Gross, 2009).  These attitude changes have kindled a debate about how 
much and what kind of prejudice persists in the contemporary American society.  I suggest that a 
more complete understanding of modern prejudice necessitates focusing on all groups that are 
salient to politics, including Asian Americans.   
     A second question concerns the multi-dimensionality of attitudes toward groups.  The 
pattern of group stereotypes is rarely neutral, as Lippmann (1922), who first argued that 
stereotyping helps individuals make sense of other groups, acknowledged, since the neutral 
position is likely to indicate no stereotype.  Evaluations of groups tend not to be uniformly 
negative or positive across all traits and all groups (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998; Sides and Gross, 
2009; Lin et al., 2005).  In other words, individuals may value and de-value various groups for 
different reasons (Fiske et al., 2002; Sides and Gross, 2009).  Positive or flattering stereotypes 
have been directed predominantly at in-groups (e.g., whites), whereas negative or unflattering 
generalizations have typically targeted out-groups (Fiske et al., 2002; Sides and Gross, 2009).  
Fiske et al. (2002: 878) note that positive stereotypes may also be directed at out-groups, but 
when they do the stereotypes have presumably suggested a “compunction stemming from 
modern egalitarian ideals.”  The propensity to stereotype is widely known (Allport, 1954; Fiske, 
1998); however, less is known about the content of stereotypes and why the content differs 
across the groups being stereotyped and over time.  For instance, although the findings tend to be 
based on experimental samples of college students’ evaluations of Asian Americans, Asians are 
viewed as highly competent, hardworking, and ambitious, and, at the same time, not sociable or 
friendly (Fiske et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2005; Hurh and Kim, 1989; Kitano and Sue, 1973; Sue and 
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Kitano, 1973).  Conversely, black Americans are frequently perceived as lazy or aggressive 
(Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993).  These dimensions of evaluations can 
have wide-ranging impacts on political and policy attitudes toward out-groups.  For instance, the 
image of Asians as a competent, hard-working model minority that is seemingly not hampered 
by social inequities and not in need of government aid may undermine prospects for Asians to be 
included in multiracial coalitions with other racial/ethnic minority groups (Lien et al., 2004: 8).  
In their study of whites’ stereotypes of blacks, Peffley and Hurwitz (1998) indicate that negative 
stereotypes of blacks as “lazy” or “violent” are an important contribution to whites’ (inaccurate) 
tendency to view the typical welfare recipient and criminal as being black.   
Finally, researchers are also interested in studying stereotypes and prejudice for a more 
basic reason—understanding how people make sense of and react to other people (Lippmann, 
1922; Stangor, 2000; Kunda, 1999).  Many researchers in social psychology concur that 
stereotyping illustrates the universal human propensity to categorize (Allport 1954; Fiske 1998; 
Stangor, 2000; Fiske et al., 2002).  People classify individuals into discrete groups in order to 
simplify, structure, and give meaning to their world (Sides and Gross, 2009; Stangor, 2000; 
Lippmann, 1922).   
In this chapter I explore cognition-based perceptions of Asian Americans to obtain a 
better understanding of how the general American public makes sense of and reacts to Asians.  I 
construct a series of models to determine cognition-relevant responses to Asians in terms of 
different stereotype measures as dependent variables.  The first set of models uses as the 
dependent variables specific trait dimensions of racial stereotyping (e.g., lazy-hardworking, 
unintelligent-intelligent) frequently included in national surveys.  The second set of models 
employs general group stereotype measures as the dependent variables.  Similar to the affect-
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based perception models in Chapter 4, the models are estimated with the general Asian American 
population as the target population.  In addition, in order to compare how people evaluate Asians 
relative to how they assess other racial/ethnic groups (such as whites or Hispanics), each model 
is estimated separately for each particular group.  Evaluations across different groups will help to 
determine whether Americans’ views of Asians are distinctive and also the degree to which the 
coefficients for the independent measures vary across the groups.     
Data and Measures  
         The 2004 American National Election Study (ANES)21 includes various racial stereotyping 
measures of different racial/ethnic groups that allow researchers to compare the evaluations of 
Asians to those of other groups, including whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The ANES also 
enables an examination of specific and general stereotypes that people have of Asians and the 
other groups.  The majority of the models in this study use the 2004 ANES as the data source.  
The 2004 National Politics Survey (NPS)22 also contains stereotype measures of Asians and 
other racial/ethnic groups that are used as general group stereotype dependent measures in this 
study.   
Dependent Variables and the Contours of Racial Stereotyping 
      I examine two sets of dependent measures of cognition-based perceptions of Asians and 
other racial/ethnic groups.  Previous studies (e.g., Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998; Dixon and 
Rosenbaum, 2004) have typically followed Allport’s (1954) description of stereotypes as 
irrational and unflattering generalizations of a group in society that signify prejudice by 
                                                 
21 The 2004 ANES reports a sample of respondents from the four racial/ethnic groups, including 876 whites, 180 
blacks, 81 Hispanics, and 28 Asians.  Although the sub-samples of Asians and Hispanics are small relative to their 
current population sizes, the 2004 ANES have the necessary measures relating to cognition-based relevant responses 
to Asians as well as the other major racial/ethnic groups. 
22 As noted in Chapter 4, the 2004 NPS uses a non-random sampling frame.  Hence, a centered weight variable is 
used to estimate the multivariate models of general stereotyping of Asians and other racial/ethnic groups that 
employ the NPS as the data source.  For the major racial/ethnic groups of interest in this analysis, the sample of 
respondents in the NPS contains 919 Whites, 756 Blacks, 757 Hispanics, and 503 Asians. 
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reflecting higher values of dependent variables to represent more negative views of a group; 
however, this study takes a different approach by having higher values of the dependent 
measures to indicate more positive perceptions of a group.  The rationale for this approach is that 
positive (and neutral) responses outnumber negative responses for all stereotype items of the four 
major racial/ethnic groups in both the 2004 ANES and 2004 NPS (see Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 
5.4).   
     The first set of dependent measures concerns people’s beliefs about specific personal 
attributes of Asians and the other groups.  In the 2004 ANES respondents were asked to rank the 
groups along three different trait dimensions: lazy-hardworking, unintelligent-intelligent, and 
untrustworthy-trustworthy.  Responses to each of these items are coded on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 0 (lazy) to 6 (hardworking), from 0 (unintelligent) to 6 (intelligent), and from 0 
(untrustworthy) to 6 (trustworthy), respectively.  For each item a score of 3 means neutral or a 
group does not personify a positive or negative stereotype.  Ordered logistic regression is used to 
estimate these models because the dependent variables are ordinal and rank ordered.  
      The second set of dependent measures involves general group stereotype measures drawn 
from two different national surveys (2004 ANES and 2004 NPS) to ascertain, in part, whether 
general evaluations of Asians, as well as those of whites, blacks, and Hispanics, across an 
assortment of dimensions vary across different survey samples and instruments.  The measure of 
each group from the ANES is a factor scale comprised of the lazy-hardworking, unintelligent-
intelligent, and untrustworthy-trustworthy dimensions whose higher values indicate more 
positive assessments of the respective group; the factor analysis results for the four groups are in 
Appendix B.23  The dependent measures from the NPS of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics 
                                                 
23 The reliability of the overall scale of the hardworking-lazy, intelligent-unintelligent, and untrustworthy-
trustworthy items for the group stereotype measure of each group is pretty high, as follows: for Asians, alpha = 0.76; 
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differ from those drawn from the ANES in that they encompass a general stereotyping of the 
respective group based on one specific trait dimension.  Respondents were asked to rate each 
group in general on a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 signifies lazy (or negative perception), 6 means 
hardworking (or positive perception), and 3 indicates most Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics are 
not closer to one end or the other.  OLS regression is used to estimate the group stereotype 
models from the ANES since the dependent variables are interval-level.  Ordered logistic 
regression is used to estimate the group stereotype models from the NPS because the dependent 
measures are ordinal and rank ordered. 
      To describe the contours of racial stereotyping of each group in terms of the three trait 
dimensions, I turn first to all respondents’ rankings of Asians along these dimensions in Figure 
5.1 (see also Table 5.1).  The results of Figure 5.1 show that respondents tend not to be uniform 
in their evaluations of Asians across the three traits.  The graphs in Figure 5.1(a) and Figure 
5.1(b) reveal that respondents are more likely to have positive evaluations of Asians on the lazy-
hardworking and unintelligent-intelligent dimensions, respectively.  Respondents are more likely 
to view Asians as hardworking (mean score of 4.16) and intelligent (mean score of 4.04).  In 
contrast, the graph in Figure 5.1(c) shows that respondents are more likely to be fairly neutral in 
their assessments of Asians along the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension.  The mean score of 
this measure at 3.47 indicates that respondents tend to perceive Asians as neither untrustworthy 
nor trustworthy.   
          Do respondents from different racial origins have similar views of Asians along the three 
trait dimensions?  Starting with the lazy-hardworking dimension in the first column and first row  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
for whites, alpha = 0.79; for blacks, alpha = 0.80; and for Hispanics, alpha = 0.73.  For each group stereotype 
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Figure 5.1 Trait Dimensions of Asian Stereotyping 
Note: Each graph shows descriptive statistics of all respondents’ stereotyping of Asian 
Americans in terms of trait dimension measures, including (a) lazy-hardworking, (b) 
unintelligent-intelligent, and (c) untrustworthy-trustworthy.  The scale of each respective 
measure ranges as follows: from 0 (lazy) to 6 (hardworking), from 0 (unintelligent) to 6 
(intelligent), and from 0 (untrustworthy) to 6 (trustworthy).  For each measure a score of 3 means 
not closer to one end or the other.   
Source: 2004 ANES. 
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Table 5.1 All Respondents’ Trait Dimension Measures of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups  










1034     4         4.16 (1.22)       0/6 
1050     4         3.80 (1.11)       0/6 
1047     3         3.09 (1.17)       0/6 
1037     3         3.66 (1.24)       0/6 
1031       4         4.04 (1.20)       0/6 
1046       4         3.97 (1.12)       0/6 
1042       3         3.37 (1.14)       0/6 
1027       3         3.33 (1.07)       0/6 
1020       3        3.47 (1.08)       0/6 
1043       3        3.64 (1.15)       0/6 
1039       3        3.16 (1.10)       0/6 
1027       3        3.24 (1.10)       0/6 
Note:  For each measure, higher mean (and median) scores indicate more positive evaluations of 
each group.  Standard deviation values are in parentheses under each mean column.   
Source: 2004 ANES. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Trait Dimension Measures of the Racial/Ethnic Groups by Respondents’ Race 





 N   Median     Mean          Min/Max N    Median       Mean        Min/Max N      Median      Mean         Min/Max 
Stereotype of Asians:  
   Asian Respondents 
   White Respondents 
   Black Respondents 
   Hispanic Respondents 
 
20         5         4.70 (1.17)      3/6 
759       4         4.17 (1.17)      0/6 
151       4         3.87 (1.36)      0/6 
64         5         4.42 (1.22)      2/6 
 
20            4         4.20 (1.10)       2/6 
759          4         4.02 (1.16)       0/6 
149          4         3.98 (1.36)       1/6 
63            5         4.57 (1.17)       2/6 
 
20            4          3.95 (1.00)     3/6 
754          3          3.51 (1.06)     0/6 
144          3          3.16 (1.13)     0/6 
62            3          3.66 (1.16)     1/6 
Stereotype of Whites: 
   Asian Respondents 
   White Respondents 
   Black Respondents 
   Hispanic Respondents 
 
20         4         4.05 (1.15)       2/6 
771       4         3.82 (1.03)       0/6 
154       3         3.60 (1.35)       0/6 
64         4         3.88 (1.15)       0/6 
 
20            4        4.10 (1.07)        3/6 
769          4        3.95 (1.07)        0/6 
152          4        3.88 (1.26)        0/6 
64            5        4.47 (1.21)        1/6 
 
20            4          3.75 (1.12)     1/6 
768          4          3.75 (1.07)     0/6 
151          3          3.11 (1.34)     0/6 
63            3          3.73 (1.31)     0/6 
Stereotype of Blacks: 
   Asian Respondents 
   White Respondents 
   Black Respondents 
   Hispanic Respondents 
 
19         3         2.95 (0.97)       1/4 
769       3         2.99 (1.09)       0/6 
154       3         3.58 (1.34)       0/6 
64         3         2.95 (1.29)       0/6 
 
19            3         3.00 (1.00)       1/5 
767          3         3.25 (1.06)       0/6 
152          4         3.92 (1.25)       0/6 
63            4         3.79 (1.23)       1/6 
 
19            3          3.21 (0.79)     2/5 
765          3          3.11 (1.08)     0/6 
151          3          3.45 (1.18)     0/6 
63            3          3.11 (1.27)     0/6 
Stereotype of Hispanics: 
   Asian Respondents 
   White Respondents 
   Black Respondents 
   Hispanic Respondents 
 
20         3         3.40 (0.88)       2/5 
763       3         3.57 (1.18)       0/6 
150       4         3.77 (1.44)       0/6 
64         5         4.53 (1.17)       2/6 
 
20            3         3.10 (0.85)       2/5 
754          3         3.25 (1.00)       0/6 
150          3         3.40 (1.18)       0/6 
63            4         4.17 (1.19)       2/6 
 
20            3          3.40 (1.10)      2/6 
756          3          3.22 (1.08)      0/6 
148          3          3.13 (1.09)      0/6 
63            4          3.95 (1.17)      2/6 
Source and Note: See Table 5.1 
 
of Table 5.2, respondents from each racial/ethnic background are overall more likely to view 
Asians as hardworking.  Their evaluations of Asians, however, are not altogether consistent. 
Asian respondents (mean score of 4.70) tend to perceive Asians more positively on this 
dimension than do Hispanic (mean score of 4.42), white (mean score of 4.17), and black (mean 
score of 3.87) respondents.  In terms of the unintelligent-intelligent dimension in the second 
column and first row of Table 5.2, the overall evaluations of Asians are also more likely to be 
flattering.  Interestingly, Hispanic respondents (mean score of 4.57) are more likely than Asian 
(mean score of 4.20), white (mean score of 4.02), and black (mean score of 3.98) respondents to 
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view Asians as intelligent.  In terms of the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension in the last 
column and first row of Table 5.2, Asian respondents (mean score of 3.95) are more likely than 
Hispanic (mean score of 3.66), white (mean score of 3.51), and black (mean score of 3.16) 
respondents to view Asians as trustworthy.   
     How do evaluations of whites, blacks, and Hispanics compare with those of Asians in 
terms of the trait dimensions?  Starting with the evaluations of whites, the results of all 
respondents’ evaluations of whites in Table 5.1 are fairly comparable to those of Asians across 
the first two trait dimensions.  Respondents are more likely to view whites as hardworking (mean 
score of 3.80) and intelligent (mean score of 3.97), although respondents tend to evaluate Asians 
more positively on these dimensions.  In contrast, respondents tend to rate whites (mean score of 
3.64) higher on the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension in Table 5.1 than they do Asians (mean 
score of 3.47).  The evaluations of whites by respondents’ race on the unintelligent-intelligent 
dimension in the second row and second column of Table 5.2 are also comparable to those of 
Asians.  Specifically, Hispanic respondents (mean score of 4.47) are more likely than Asian 
(mean score of 4.10), white (mean score of 3.95), and black (mean score of 3.88) respondents to 
perceive whites as intelligent.  The results of the evaluations of whites by respondents’ race, 
however, vary from those of Asians for the lazy-hardworking (second row, first column of Table 
5.2) and untrustworthy-trustworthy (second row, third column of Table 5.2) dimensions.  Asian 
(mean score of 4.05) are more likely than Hispanic (mean score of 3.88), white (mean score of 
3.82), and black (mean score of 3.60) respondents to view whites as hardworking.  Asian (mean 
score of 3.75), white (mean score of 3.75), and Hispanic (mean score of 3.73) respondents are 
more likely than black respondents (mean score of 3.11) to perceive whites as trustworthy.   
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     The results of the evaluations of blacks and Hispanics by all respondents (Table 5.1) and by 
respondents from different racial groups (Table 5.2), however, differ dramatically from those of 
Asians.  Compared with those of Asians, all respondents’ views of both blacks and Hispanics 
tend to be neutral across all three trait dimensions.  For the evaluations of blacks, the mean score 
of the lazy-hardworking dimension is 3.09, the mean score of the unintelligent-intelligent 
dimension is 3.37, and the mean score of the untrustworthy-trustworthy is 3.16; for the 
evaluations of Hispanics, the mean score of the lazy-hardworking dimension is 3.66, the mean 
score of the unintelligent-intelligent dimension is 3.33, and the mean score of the untrustworthy-
trustworthy is 3.24.  The results of the third row in Table 5.2 also show that Asian, white, black 
and Hispanic respondents are more likely to be neutral in their assessments of blacks in terms of 
the lazy-hardworking (with mean scores ranging from 2.95 to 3.58) and untrustworthy-
trustworthy (with mean scores ranging from 3.11 to 3.45) dimensions.  Black (mean score of 
3.92) and Hispanic (mean score of 3.79) respondents, however, are more likely than Asian (mean 
score of 3) and white (mean score of 3.25) respondents to perceive blacks as intelligent.  In terms 
of the three trait dimensions in the last row of Table 5.2, Hispanic respondents are more likely to 
view Hispanics as hardworking (mean score of 4.53), intelligent (mean score of 4.17), and 
trustworthy (mean score of 3.95) than do Asian, white, and black respondents. 
     To describe the contours of racial stereotyping in terms of general stereotypes of the four 
groups, I report first all respondents’ general Asian stereotype measures in Figure 5.2 (see also 
Table 5.3).  Starting with the measure from the 2004 ANES in Figure 5.2(a), the graph shows 
that respondents are more likely to have positive perceptions of Asians.  The mean score of this 
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Figure 5.2 General Asian Stereotypes  
Note: Each graph shows descriptive statistics of all respondents’ general stereotype of Asians.  
Graph (a) depicts the Asian stereotype measure from the 2004 ANES that is a factor scale 
comprised of the hardworking-lazy, intelligent-unintelligent, and untrustworthy-trustworthy 
dimensions.  Graph (b) describes the Asian stereotype measure from the 2004 NPS that is 
operationalized on a scale from 0 (lazy) to 6 (hardworking).  Higher scores of each measure 





Table 5.3 All Respondents’ General Stereotype Measures of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups  
Racial/Ethnic Group Group Stereotype  
(2004 ANES) 
Group Stereotype  
(2004 NPS) 





1010          0.10              0           -4.07/2.20 
1039         -0.14              0           -4.05/2.32 
1035         -0.21              0           -3.32/2.89 
1009         -0.12              0           -3.32/2.84 
3126            5           4.77 (1.29)           0/6 
3198            4           4.29 (1.36)           0/6 
3174            3           3.70 (1.50)           0/6 
3168            4           4.34 (1.41)           0/6 
Note:  The standard deviations for the Group Stereotype (2004 ANES) measures are equal to 
one; for the Group Stereotype (2004 NPS) measures the standard deviation values are in 
parentheses under the mean column.  Higher scores represent more positive evaluations of each 
group. 
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Table 5.4 General Stereotype Measures of the Racial/Ethnic Groups by Respondents’ Race 




      N        Median    Mean          Min/Max        N       Median         Mean        Min/Max 
Stereotype of Asians:  
    Asian Respondents 
    White Respondents 
    Black Respondents 
    Hispanic Respondents 
 
    20         0.46        0.41            -1.28/1.86 
    746       0.11        0.01            -4.07/2.20 
    142      -0.24      -0.21            -2.33/2.20 
    62         0.46        0.33            -1.63/2.20        
 
       483         5        5.00 (0.94)         1/6 
       857         5        4.70 (1.26)         0/6 
       708         5        4.76 (1.39)         0/6 
       695         5        4.64 (1.39)         0/6 
Stereotype of Whites: 
    Asian Respondents 
    White Respondents 
    Black Respondents 
    Hispanic Respondents 
 
    20       -0.14         0.17           -0.87/2.32 
    765     -0.14         0.03           -4.05/2.32 
    150     -0.50        -0.27           -2.97/2.32 
    63        0.19         0.22            -3.69/2.32 
 
       479         4        4.11 (0.99)         1/6 
       877         4        4.17 (1.21)         0/6 
       727         4        4.33 (1.53)         0/6 
       727         5        4.38 (1.47)         0/6 
Stereotype of Blacks: 
    Asian Respondents 
    White Respondents 
    Black Respondents 
    Hispanic Respondents 
 
    19       -0.17       -0.16            -1.93/0.82 
    762     -0.21       -0.09            -3.32/2.89 
    150      0.14         0.47            -2.99/2.89 
    63       -0.21         0.08            -1.96/2.89 
 
       475         3        3.01 (1.27)         0/6 
       869         3        3.63 (1.27)         0/6 
       729         4        4.30 (1.48)         0/6 
       710         3        3.46 (1.60)         0/6 
Stereotype of Hispanics: 
    Asian Respondents 
    White Respondents 
    Black Respondents 
    Hispanic Respondents 
 
    20        -0.06      -0.12           -1.53/1.43 
    742      -0.19      -0.07           -3.32/2.84 
    144      -0.12       0.04           -2.63/2.84 
    63        -0.21       0.08           -1.96/2.89 
 
       466         4        3.76 (1.22)         0/6 
       870         4        4.11 (1.30)         0/6 
       710         5        4.54 (1.46)         0/6 
       735         5        4.69 (1.41)         0/6 
Note: See Table 5.3 
 
reveals that all respondents also have a greater likelihood of holding flattering views of Asians; 
the mean score is 4.77.  
          When assessing general Asian stereotyping from the 2004 ANES by respondents’ race, the 
results in the first column and first row of Table 5.4 show that Asian respondents (mean score of 
0.41) tend to evaluate Asians more positively than Hispanic (mean score of 0.33), white (mean 
score of 0.01), and black (mean score of -0.21) respondents.  In contrast, the findings of general 
Asian stereotyping from the 2004 NPS in the second column and first row of Table 5.4 reveal 
that respondents from all racial groups are more likely to have positive views of Asians, although 
Asian respondents tend to view Asians somewhat more flatteringly than do white, black, and 
Hispanic respondents.  The mean score for Asian respondents is 5, while for white respondents 
the mean score is 4.70, for black respondents it is 4.76, and for Hispanic respondents it is 4.64. 
     Similar to the results of all respondents’ general stereotyping of Asians from the ANES, 
the findings of that of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the first column of Table 5.3 show that 
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respondents are more likely to have flattering perceptions of these groups.  The mean score of 
the measure of each of these groups is 0.  Compared with those of Asians, all respondents’ 
assessments of whites, blacks, and Hispanics from the NPS in the second column of Table 5.3 
reveal that respondents tend to have less positive views of these groups.  The mean score for 
Asians is 4.77, while for whites the mean score is 4.29, for blacks it is 3.70, and for Hispanics it 
is 4.34. 
     When respondents from different racial backgrounds are considered in the group 
assessments of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the first column of Table 5.4, the results show 
that the group evaluations of blacks and Hispanics are fairly comparable to those of Asians 
whereas the group stereotyping of whites differs somewhat from that of Asians.  Similar to Asian 
respondents’ evaluations of Asians, black and Hispanic respondents tend to have more positive 
perceptions of their fellow groups than do other respondents.  Black respondents (mean score of 
0.47) are more likely than Asian (mean score of -0.16), white (mean score of -0.09), and 
Hispanic (mean score of 0.08) respondents to have positive perceptions of blacks.  Hispanic 
respondents (mean score of 0.08) are more likely to have flattering views of Hispanics than do 
Asian (mean score of -0.12), white (mean score of -0.07), and black (mean score of 0.04) 
respondents.  In contrast, Hispanic (mean score of 0.22) and Asian (mean score of 0.17) 
respondents are more likely than white respondents (mean score of 0.03) to have positive views 
of whites, while black respondents (mean score of -0.27) are less likely to have flattering 
perceptions of whites.  In terms of the group evaluations of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the 
second column of Table 5.4, the results are dramatically different from those of Asians.  
Hispanic respondents (mean score of 4.38) are more likely than Asian (mean score of 4.11), 
white (mean score of 4.17), and black (mean score of 4.33) respondents to hold flattering views 
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of whites.  Black respondents (mean score of 4.30) are more likely to have positive perceptions 
of blacks than do Asian (mean score of 3.01), white (mean score of 3.63), and Hispanic (mean 
score of 3.46) respondents.  Hispanic (mean score of 4.69) and black (mean score of 4.54) 
respondents tend to possess more positive perceptions of Hispanics than do Asian (mean score of 
3.76) and white (mean score of 4.11) respondents.  
      In sum, the contours of racial stereotyping of Asians and the other groups indicate that 
respondents tend to have flattering rather than negative evaluations of each group, but there are 
some variations in these values within each group.  In terms of the lazy-hardworking and 
unintelligent-intelligent dimensions, all respondents are more likely to view Asians and whites as 
hardworking and intelligent than they do blacks and Hispanics, even though respondents from 
different racial groups tend to rate Asians higher than whites on the lazy-hardworking dimension 
(while they tend to have comparable ratings of both groups on the unintelligent-intelligent 
dimension).  Interestingly, respondents are more likely to take a neutral position than a positive 
or negative stance in their evaluations of Asians, as well as whites, blacks, and Hispanics, on the 
untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension.  In fact, 46.8 percent of all respondents in the 2004 ANES 
reported a neutral evaluation of Asians on the untrustworthy-trustworthy measure, while they 
reported 40.5 percent for whites, 49.2 percent for blacks, and 49.5 percent for Hispanics.  In 
terms of the group stereotype measures from the 2004 ANES, the overall assessments of Asians, 
whites, blacks, and Hispanics are more likely to be positive.  Similar results are found for the 
group stereotype measures of Asians, whites, and Hispanics (but not of blacks) from the 2004 
NPS, although the evaluations of Asians by respondents from different racial origins tend to be 




      Several sets of explanatory factors are predicted to influence the cognition-based 
perceptions of Asians and other groups, including measures of context, personal contact, self-
interest, and symbolic politics; socio-demographic indicators; and also a measure of general view 
of human nature.  Data limitations in the 2004 ANES, however, exclude personal contact 
measures from the models that employ the ANES as the data source.  Measures of context (e.g., 
percent population of a particular racial/ethnic group in a specified geographic unit) typically 
used in previous studies are also not included in the models that use the 2004 NPS as the data 
source.  In addition, a measure of general view of human nature is not included in these group 
stereotype models because the NPS lacks such a measure.  
     Context Measure: Percent Group Population.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Americans’ perceptions of groups in society, particularly out-groups, can be influenced by the 
context of where they live.  Individuals from different cultures and ethnic origins are coming into 
more contact with each other as many American cities have increasingly become a racial and 
ethnic melting pot.  As the group threat hypothesis (which relates to the context perspective) 
contends, these augmented contacts between individuals of different racial/ethnic groups 
enhance the opportunities for the expression of prejudice and stereotypes, and, in some cases, be 
accompanied by overt hostility and conflict between members of different groups (Blumer 1958; 
Stein et. al., 2000; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004; see also Stangor, 2000).  In contrast, supporters 
of the contact hypothesis argue that increased contact between members of different racial/ethnic 
groups can break down or discourage negative stereotypes with first-hand social experience 
(Allport, 1954; see also Oliver and Wong, 2003).  Oliver and Wong (2003) suggest that racial 
threat is more likely to take place in comparatively expansive geographic areas with larger 
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minority populations, such as counties and metropolitan areas, while racial contact is more likely 
to happen in smaller or more local geographic areas, such as towns and neighborhoods.   
     Only a contextual measure at the county level is included in the stereotype models.  The 
percent group population represents the proportion of the population of each group (i.e., Asians 
or whites) at the county-level in 2000.  This context measure has been used in previous research 
to estimate contextual effects on racial stereotypes (e.g., Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004; Oliver 
and Wong, 2003).  Following the racial threat argument by Oliver and Wong (2003), percent 
group population is expected to be negatively related to evaluations of Asians as well as those of 
whites, blacks, and Hispanics. 
     Personal Contact Measures: Residential Neighborhood, Workplace, Place of Worship, and 
Friendship.  The personal contact perspective suggests that interactive venues that provide the 
opportunities for intergroup contact can promote positive views of groups (Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew, 1971, 1998; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004).  Hence, personal contact measures in four 
different interactive venues are used to estimate the group stereotype models from the 2004 NPS, 
including residential neighborhood, workplace, place of worship, and friendship.  Respondents 
were asked whether there are Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics in the neighborhood where they 
live, in the place where they work or last worked, in their place of worship, or in their group of 
friends.  Responses to each of these questions are coded on a 3-point scale, such that 0 = none, 1 
= mixed of different groups, and 2 = mostly Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics.  Even though it 
may be possible that these contact measures are proxies for residential segregation (particularly 
neighborhood segregation), this possibility cannot be tested because confidentiality concerns in 
the NPS prohibit connecting respondents to their neighborhoods.  Each of these personal contact 
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variables is predicted to be positively related to evaluations of Asians, whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics.  
  Self-interest Measures: Employment Status, Family Income, Social Class, Job 
Competition, and Political Competition.  The self-interest perspective suggests that a group’s 
racial animus and prejudice is affected by beliefs of significant economic and/or political threat 
from another group (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Sears et al., 1980).  
Various measures of self-interest relating to economic/political attributes are used to estimate the 
stereotype models.  Because of data limitations in the 2004 ANES and 2004 NPS, the stereotype 
models comprise different measures of self-interest.  The stereotype models from the ANES 
include: (1) employment status coded as a dummy variable indexing whether respondents are 
employed or not (1 = employed, 0 otherwise); (2) social class which represents levels of social 
class in the U.S. and is measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from 0 (lower class) to 4 (upper 
class); and (3) family income which is measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (less than 
$10,000) to 7 ($90,000 and more).  Although Gay (2006) suggests that relative income (i.e., the 
income of members of a racial/ethnic group relative to that of members of another group) rather 
than simply income (e.g., family income) affects racial animus between different groups, family 
income is used as a measure of self-interest because the ANES (as well as the NPS) does not 
have a measure of relative income of racial/ethnic groups.   
     The stereotype models from the NPS include employment status and family income (but 
not social class); these measures are operationalized in a similar fashion as those of the 
corresponding measures drawn from the ANES.  The models also incorporate measures of job 
competition and political competition.  For the job competition measure, respondents from 
particular racial origins were asked to rate on a 4-point scale how strongly they disagree (which 
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is at the lower end of the scale) or agree (which is at the higher end of the scale) with the 
following statement:  More good jobs for Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics mean fewer good jobs 
for people like me.  For instance, only non-Asian respondents were asked how strongly they 
disagree/agree with the statement:  More good jobs for Asian Americans mean fewer good jobs 
for people like me.  Likewise for political competition, respondents from specific racial origins 
were asked to rate on a 4-point scale how strongly they disagree or agree with the following 
statement:  The more influence Asians/whites/blacks/Hispanics have in politics, the less 
influence people like me will have in politics.   
    Scholars, such as Bobo and Hutchings (1996), suggest that members of a racial/ethnic 
group who are confronted with unemployment, have low incomes, or are in lower levels of social 
class in the U.S. are more likely to regard members of another group as considerable competitors 
for scarce economic and/or political resources and, hence, are more likely to have negative 
perceptions of them.  Therefore, I hypothesized that stereotypes of Asians, whites, blacks, or 
Hispanics are positively associated with employment status, family income, and social class.  In 
addition, following the self-interest argument, I expect that job competition and political 
competition to negatively influence the evaluation of each group. 
     Symbolic Politics Measures:  American Identity, Political Ideology, and Partisanship.  
Several measures of symbolic politics used in previous research on racial attitudes are included 
in all the stereotype models.  American identity is an alternative measure to such common 
symbolic politics measures as political ideology and partisanship.  Citrin et al. (1990) find that 
American identity is a stronger determinant of a group’s perception of immigrant-dominated 
groups, such as Asians and Hispanics, than other measures of symbolic politics (e.g., 
partisanship and ideology).  Thus, I expect that people who believe in the importance of the 
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American identity are less likely to have positive stereotypes of Asians or Hispanics, while they 
are more likely to hold positive stereotypes of whites or blacks.  The American identity measure 
used in the stereotype models from the 2004 ANES is a factor scale consisting of two items that 
correspond to qualities Citrin et al. (1990) suggest for being truly American.24  The first item 
depicts the quality of trying to get ahead on one’s own efforts; respondents were asked to place 
themselves on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (need government help to succeed) to 6 (get ahead 
on one’s own efforts), based on the question: Where would you place yourself on the job and 
good standard of living scale?  The second item describes the quality of treating people of all 
races and backgrounds equally; respondents were asked to rate how strongly they disagree or 
agree with the following statement on a 5-point scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree): Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an 
equal opportunity to succeed.   
     The American identity measure employed in the stereotype models from the 2004 NPS is a 
factor scale comprised of four items representing qualities of the American identity that Citrin et 
al. (1990) propose.  The first three items include the qualities of (1) being a Christian (based on 
the question: How important do you think each of the following is for being truly American: to 
be a Christian?), (2) voting in elections (based on the question: How important do you think each 
of the following is for being truly American: to vote?), and (3) speaking and/or writing English 
(based on the question: How important do you think each of the following is for being truly 
American: to be able to speak English?); all of these items are measured on a 4-point scale 
                                                 
24 As discussed in Chapter 4, Citrin et al.’s (1990) propose six qualities that embody the importance of the American 
identity.  In their study respondents were asked to rate how important they felt each of the following six qualities for 
being truly American: 1) believing in God, 2) voting in elections, 3) speaking and writing English, 4) trying to get 
ahead on one's own efforts, 5) treating people of all races and backgrounds equally, and 6) defending America when 
it is criticized.  The 2004 ANES and 2004 NPS include some of these qualities that nicely capture the American 
identity measure.  
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ranging from 0 (not important at all) to 3 (very important).  The fourth item describes the quality 
of trying to get ahead on one’s own efforts; respondents were asked to rate on a 4-point scale 
how strongly they disagree (which is at the lower end of the scale) or agree (which is at the 
higher end of the scale) with the statement: America is a land of opportunity in which you only 
need to work hard to succeed.   
     The other measures of symbolic politics used in this study include political ideology (i.e., a 
7-point liberal-conservative scale, ranging from 0 = extremely liberal to 6 = extremely 
conservative) and partisanship (i.e., a 7-point party identification scale, ranging from 0 = strong 
Democrat to 6 = strong Republican).  The effects of political ideology and partisanship on 
stereotypes of racial/ethnic groups, particularly blacks, are not clear in previous research on 
racial attitudes.  For example, in their study of whites’ stereotypes of blacks, Peffley and Hurwitz 
(1998) find that neither political ideology nor party identification has an effect on the dependent 
variables.  Therefore, the effects of political ideology and partisanship on the evaluations of 
Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics will be assessed case by case (using a non-directional test). 
Socio-Demographic Measures: Education, Age, Gender, and Race.  Studies of socio-
demographic correlates of stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Schuman et al., 1985) typically 
presume that racial animosity originates from a person’s social background and early 
socialization experiences (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998: 63).  Several socio-demographic measures 
are included in the stereotype models.  A number of studies (e.g., Jackman, 1978) indicate that 
education is a key socialization agent promoting tolerance.  Hence, I expect that education 
positively affects evaluations of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  Education is 
operationalized on a 7-point scale, ranging from 0 (for less than or equal to grade school) to 6 
(advanced degree), in the stereotype models from the 2004 ANES, and the variable is indexed on 
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a 5-point scale, ranging from 0 (for less than or equal to grade school) to 4 (advanced degree), in 
the stereotype models from the 2004 NPS. 
In terms of age (in years), previous studies have found that older people are more likely 
than younger people to express negative stereotypes of racial/ethnic groups, such as blacks 
(Peffley and Hurwitz, 1998; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004) and Hispanics (Dixon and 
Rosenbaum, 2004) because stereotypes (often negative) are likely transmitted across generations 
(and cultures) through childhood and adulthood socialization processes and likely become more 
rigid in adulthood (Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004).  Given the findings of previous studies, I 
expect age to be negatively related to evaluations of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The 
effects of gender (1 = female, 0 = male) on the dependent variables, however, are unclear, and 
thus are evaluated using a non-directional test.  In terms of race, dummy variables are included 
for Asian, black, white, and/or Hispanic respondents in all stereotype models, with the reference 
or omitted category to be the race corresponding to the stereotype models of the respective 
group.  For example, for the evaluations of Asians, the reference category is Asian.  I expect the 
effects of race on the dependent measures to be compatible with the findings in Tables 5.2 and 
5.4. 
     Measure of General View of Human Nature.  How individuals perceive people in general 
can conceivably influence how they stereotype racial/ethnic groups.  For example, individuals 
who have a positive view of human nature are likely to differ from those who a negative view of 
human nature in that the former group are more likely to have flattering stereotypes of Asians.  
The measure of general view of human nature drawn from the 2004 ANES is a factor scale of 
three dummy variables, including items operationalizing trust of people in general whose scale is 
1 (most people can be trusted) and 0 (otherwise), fairness in treatment of people whose scale is 1 
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(most people try to be fair) and 0 (otherwise), and helpfulness of people whose scale is 1 (most 
people try to be helpful) and 0 (otherwise).25  Higher values of this measure represent more 
positive view of human nature.  I expect that general view of human nature is positively related 
to stereotypes of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics. 
Results 
Predicting Patterns of Racial Stereotyping in Terms of the Trait Dimensions   
     Table 5.5 presents the ordered logistic regression results of the lazy-hardworking 
dimension models of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  Starting with the lazy-hardworking 
model of Asians in the first column, the results show that the self-interest measure of family 
income and the symbolic politics measure of partisanship have strong effects on the stereotyping 
of Asians on this dimension.  Other conditions being equal, Americans who have higher income 
levels and identify more with the Republican Party have a stronger likelihood of viewing Asians 
as hardworking.  Education also has a significant influence on the evaluation of Asians but at a 
less stringent .10 level of significance.  Holding other factors constant, nine times out of ten, 
having more education is associated with greater odds of perceiving Asians as hardworking. 
     Compared with those for Asians, the results for whites in the second column reveal that 
different measures significantly affect the stereotyping of whites on the lazy-hardworking 
dimension.  Specifically, social class, American identity, and age are strong predictors of the 
evaluation of whites but not in the hypothesized direction.  Americans who are in lower levels of 
the U.S. social class, have a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity, and are 
older in age are more likely to perceive whites as hardworking, all else equal. 
 
                                                 
25 The reliability of the overall scale of these items for the measure of general view of human nature is alpha = 0.72.  
A principal component factor analysis of the items produced a single factor. 
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Table 5.5 Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses of Lazy-Hardworking Dimension Models 
of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups 
 




Percent Group Population (county-level)  0.031    0.006    -0.011    0.012** 
            (1.45)    (1.15)    (-1.24)    (1.99) 
 
Self-interest  
 Employment Status        -0.230    -0.251    0.054    -0.083 
              (-1.47)    (-1.59)    (0.34)    (-0.53) 
 
 Family Income         0.089**   0.067    0.005    0.049 
              (2.16)    (1.57)    (0.11)    (1.16) 
      
 Social Class          0.057    -0.260**   -1.246**   -0.129 
              (0.57)    (-2.54)    (-2.42)    (-1.29) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity        -0.084    -0.148**   -1.164**   -0.056 
              (-1.16)    (-2.01)    (-2.23)    (-0.78) 
 
 Political Ideology        -0.027    0.091    -0.102    0.005 
              (-0.28)    (0.94)    (-1.04)    (0.05) 
 
Partisanship          0.257***   0.090    -1.136    0.071 
             (3.02)    (1.05)    (-1.55)    (0.82) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education           0.091*    -0.064    0.075    -0.056 
              (1.92)    (-1.36)    (1.56)    (-1.19) 
 
 Age            -0.005    0.012***   -0.001    -0.012*** 
              (-1.25)    (2.70)    (-0.14)    (-2.69) 
 
 Female           0.022    0.165    -0.017    -0.014 
              (0.17)    (1.26)    (-0.12)    (-0.11) 
  
 Asian                --    0.386    -0.941**   -1.090** 
                   (0.90)    (-1.99)    (-2.42) 
 
White            -0.177        --    -0.760***   -0.622*** 
             (-0.64)         (-3.80)    (-2.73) 
 
 Black            -0.498    -0.322        --    -0.252 
              (-1.52)    (-1.45)         (-0.89) 
 
 Hispanic           0.119    0.260    -0.774**       -- 
              (0.32)    (0.91)    (-2.42) 
 
Positive View of Human Nature     -0.008    0.061    0.232***   0.137* 
              (-0.11)    (0.83)    (3.13)    (1.87) 
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(Table 5.5 continued) 
 
Constant1            -5.154    -5.004    -5.505              -6.788 
Constant2            -3.751    -4.016    -3.694    -4.977 
Constant3            -2.580    -2.330    -2.364    -3.152 
Constant4            -0.325    0.495    -0.156    -1.120 
Constant5            0.798    1.778    1.019    -0.051 
Constant6            2.404    3.395    2.302    1.171 
 
 
N              810         821    818    810 
LRχ2             47.79    40.40    63.74    35.72 
Prob (χ2)            0.0000        0.0002    0.0000    0.0011 
Pseudo R2            0.02    0.02    0.03    0.01 
 
Note: The z-scores are in parentheses.  
Source: 2004 ANES. 
 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
      The results for blacks in the third column also show that different measures significantly 
affect the stereotyping of blacks relative to that of Asians on the lazy-hardworking dimension.  
Social class, American identity, race (Asian, white, and Hispanic), and positive view of human 
nature strongly influence the evaluations of blacks, although some of the measures (i.e., social 
class and American identity) are not in the hypothesized direction.  Unexpectedly, Americans 
who are in lower levels of the U.S. social class and have a weaker belief in the importance of the 
American identity are more likely to view blacks as hardworking, all else equal.  As predicted, 
Americans who have a more positive view of human nature are more likely to view blacks as 
hardworking, other conditions being equal.  Compared to individuals of black descent, those of 
Asian, white, and Hispanic origins are less likely to perceive blacks as hardworking.  These 
results of the effects of race are consistent with the findings of the evaluations of blacks by 
respondents’ race along the lazy-hardworking dimension in Table 5.2. 
      The findings for Hispanics in the last column of Table 5.5 reveal that the measures that 
significantly influence the stereotyping of Hispanics on the lazy-hardworking dimension do not 
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affect that of Asians.  Percent group population, age, and race (Asian and white) are strong 
determinants of the dependent variable.  Unexpectedly, Americans who reside in counties with a 
higher population of Hispanics are more likely to view Hispanics as hardworking, all else equal.  
Holding other factors constant, as expected, older people are less likely to perceive Hispanics as 
hardworking.  Compared to individuals of Hispanic descent, those of Asian and white origins are 
less likely to perceive Hispanics as hardworking.  These findings of the effects of race are 
comparable to the results of the evaluations of Hispanics by respondents’ race along the lazy-
hardworking dimension in Table 5.2.  The positive view of human nature variable also 
significantly and positively (as expected) affects respondents’ evaluation of Hispanics but only at 
the .10 level of significance. 
     Table 5.6 reports the ordered logistic regression results of the unintelligent-intelligent 
dimension models of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The findings of the evaluation of 
Asians on the unintelligent-intelligent dimension in the first column of Table 5.6 show that 
family income, social class, partisanship, and race (Hispanic) have strong effects on the 
dependent variable.  Holding other factors constant, individuals who have higher income levels 
and identify more with the Republican Party have a higher likelihood of viewing Asians as 
intelligent.  Unexpectedly, individuals who are in lower levels of the U.S. social class are more 
likely to perceive Asians as intelligent.  Compared with individuals of Asian descent, those of 
Hispanic origin have a greater likelihood of viewing Asians as intelligent.  This finding of the 
effect of race is consistent with the results of the evaluations of Asians by respondents’ race 
along the unintelligent-intelligent dimension in Table 5.2.  Age is also significantly and 
negatively related to the evaluations of Asians but at only the .10 level of significance.  In nine 
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Table 5.6 Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses of Unintelligent-Intelligent Dimension 
Models of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups 
 




Percent Group Population (county-level)  0.017    0.003    -0.002    0.005 
            (0.79)    (0.58)    (-0.28)    (0.85) 
 
Self-interest  
 Employment Status        -0.078    -0.010    0.026    -0.002 
              (-0.50)    (-0.06)    (0.16)    (-0.01) 
 
 Family Income         0.081**   0.026    0.027    0.011 
              (1.98)    (0.62)    (0.63)    (0.26) 
      
 Social Class          -0.296***   -0.238**   -0.331***   -0.186* 
              (-2.93)    (-2.34)    (-3.17)    (-1.77) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity        -0.041    -0.140*   -0.103    -0.148** 
              (-0.56)    (-1.88)    (-1.35)    (-1.96) 
 
 Political Ideology        -0.036    0.021    -0.003    -0.031 
              (-0.37)    (0.22)    (-0.03)    (-0.31) 
 
Partisanship          0.232***   0.194**   -0.101    0.126 
             (2.74)    (2.30)    (-1.16)    (1.41) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education           0.022    -0.141***   0.037    0.022 
              (0.46)    (-2.93)    (0.77)    (0.44) 
 
 Age            -0.008*   0.008*    -0.009*   -0.001 
              (-1.68)    (1.71)    (-1.90)    (-0.23) 
 
 Female           0.164    0.180    0.203    0.135 
              (1.26)    (1.38)    (1.52)    (0.99) 
  
 Asian                --    0.321    -1.383***   -1.470*** 
                   (0.76)    (-2.84)    (-3.00) 
 
White            0.064        --    -0.694***   -0.830*** 
             (0.24)         (-3.45)    (-3.48) 
 
 Black            0.061    -0.248        --    -0.450 
              (0.19)    (-1.11)         (-1.54) 
 
 Hispanic           0.745**   0.899***   -0.067        -- 
              (2.09)    (3.21)    (-0.22) 
 
Positive View of Human Nature     0.069    0.039    0.195***   0.177** 
              (0.96)    (0.54)    (2.60)    (2.32) 
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(Table 5.6 continued) 
 
Constant1            -6.804    -5.997    -6.332              -6.804 
Constant2            -4.485    -4.485  -4.722    -4.379 
Constant3            -3.026    -3.289    -3.093   -2.590 
Constant4            -0.626    -0.276    -0.679   -0.112 
Constant5            0.361    0.812    0.365    1.058 
Constant6            1.876    2.448    1.786    2.507 
 
 
N              808         817    815    804 
LRχ2             35.45    50.96    60.47    32.26 
Prob (χ2)            0.0013    0.0000    0.0000    0.0037 
Pseudo R2            0.01    0.02    0.03    0.01 
 
Note: The z-scores are in parentheses.  
Source: 2004 ANES. 
 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
out of ten times, as expected, individuals who are older in age are less likely to perceive Asians 
as intelligent, all else equal.   
     The results of the stereotyping of whites in the second column of Table 5.6 reveal some 
similarities to that of Asians on the unintelligent-intelligent dimension.  Social class, 
partisanship, and race (Hispanic) have a strong influence on the dependent variable.  Americans 
who are in lower levels of the U.S. social class and identify more with the Republican Party have 
greater odds of perceiving whites as intelligent, other conditions being equal.  Compared with 
individuals of white descent, those of Hispanic origin are more likely to view whites as 
intelligent.  This finding of the effect of race is consistent with the results of the evaluations of 
whites by respondents’ race along the unintelligent-intelligent dimension in Table 5.2.  Similar to 
that of Asians, age has a significant but unexpectedly positive effect on the evaluation of whites 
at the .10 level of significance.  There are also a few differences.  Education has a strong but 
unexpectedly negative effect on the evaluation of whites.  Individuals with more education are 
less likely to view whites as intelligent, all else equal.  American identity also has a significant 
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but unexpectedly negative association with the evaluation of whites, albeit at a less stringent .10 
level of significance.  Nine times out of ten, individuals who have a weaker belief in the 
importance of the American identity are more likely to perceive whites as intelligent. 
     The results of the stereotyping of blacks in the third column of Table 5.6 show few 
similarities to that of Asians on the unintelligent-intelligent dimension.  Only social class 
strongly affects the stereotyping of blacks as it does that of Asians.  Unexpectedly, Americans 
who are in lower levels of the U.S. social class are more likely to view blacks as intelligent, other 
conditions being equal.  Other strong predictors of the stereotyping of blacks on the 
unintelligent-intelligent dimension include race (Asian and white) and positive view of human 
nature.  As expected, Americans who have a more positive view of human nature are more likely 
to view blacks as intelligent, other conditions being equal.  Compared to individuals of black 
descent, those of Asian and white origins are less likely to perceive blacks as intelligent.  These 
results of the effects of race are comparable to the findings of the evaluations of blacks in terms 
of the unintelligent-intelligent dimension in Table 5.2.  Similar to that of Asians, age also has a 
significant and expectedly negative effect on the evaluation of blacks, albeit at only the .10 level 
of significance. 
     The results of the stereotyping of Hispanics in the last column of Table 5.6 reveal no 
similarities to that of Asians on the unintelligent-intelligent dimension.  The exception is social 
class, but this variable is significantly and negatively related to the evaluation of Hispanics only 
at a less stringent .10 level of significance.  The strong predictors of the stereotyping of 
Hispanics on the unintelligent-intelligent dimension include American identity, race (Asian and 
white), and positive view of human nature.  As hypothesized, Americans who have a weaker 
belief in the importance of the American identity and a more positive view of human nature are 
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more likely to perceive Hispanics as intelligent, all else equal.  Compared to individuals of 
Hispanic descent, those of Asian and white origins are less likely to view Hispanics as 
intelligent.  These results of the effects of race are consistent with the findings of the evaluations 
of Hispanics in terms of the unintelligent-intelligent dimension in Table 5.2. 
     Table 5.7 presents the ordered logistic regression results of the untrustworthy-trustworthy 
dimension models of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The findings of the evaluation of 
Asians on the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension in the first column of Table 5.7 show that 
partisanship and positive view of human nature have strong effects on the dependent variable.  
Other conditions being equal, Americans who identify more with the Republican Party and hold 
a more positive view of human nature have a greater likelihood of viewing Asians as 
trustworthy.  Family income is significantly and, as expected, positively related to the evaluation 
of Asians but only at the .10 level of significance. 
     The results of the stereotyping of whites in the second column of Table 5.7 show few 
similarities to that of Asians on the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension.  Similar to that of 
Asians, only positive view of human nature has a strong influence on the evaluation of whites; 
partisanship also has an effect but at a less stringent .10 level of significance.  All else equal, as 
predicted, Americans with a more positive view of human nature are more likely to view whites 
as trustworthy.  Other strong predictors of the evaluation of whites are education, age, gender, 
and race (black).  Unexpectedly, individuals with lower levels of education and who are older in 
age are more likely to perceive whites as trustworthy, other conditions being equal.  Females 
have a greater likelihood of viewing whites as trustworthy, all else equal.  Compared to 
individuals of white descent, those of black origin are less likely to view whites as trustworthy.   
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Table 5.7 Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses of Untrustworthy-Trustworthy Dimension  
Models of the Four Racial/Ethnic Groups 
 




Percent Group Population (county-level)  -0.006    0.007    0.001    0.009 
            (-0.25)    (1.41)    (0.09)    (1.43) 
 
Self-interest  
 Employment Status        0.118    0.098    0.262    0.275* 
              (0.72)    (0.61)    (1.62)    (1.69) 
 
 Family Income         0.080*    0.038    0.046    0.060 
              (1.86)    (0.91)    (1.07)    (1.38) 
      
 Social Class          -0.087    -0.062   -0.134    0.002 
              (-0.85)    (-0.60)    (-1.29)    (0.02) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity        -0.085    -0.081    -0.141*   -0.028 
              (-1.14)    (-1.11)    (-1.90)    (-0.38) 
 
 Political Ideology        -0.128    0.067    -0.020    -0.074 
              (-1.28)    (0.69)    (-0.20)    (-0.73) 
 
Partisanship          0.201**   0.143*    -0.035    0.097 
             (2.28)    (1.68)    (-0.40)    (1.07) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education           0.076    -0.105**   0.071    0.005 
              (1.56)    (-2.18)    (1.46)    (0.10) 
 
 Age            0.007    0.018***   0.004    0.008* 
              (1.48)    (3.97)    (0.83)    (1.75) 
 
 Female           0.060    0.298**   0.193    0.132 
              (0.45)    (2.25)    (1.43)    (0.97) 
  
 Asian                --    0.415    -0.817*   -0.762 
                   (1.01)    (-1.76)    (-1.55) 
 
White            -0.082        --    -0.668***   -0.684*** 
             (-0.30)         (-3.31)    (-2.81) 
 
 Black            -0.286    -0.653***       --    -0.313 
              (-0.85)    (-2.79)         (-1.05) 
 
 Hispanic           0.425    0.432    -0.598*       -- 
              (1.13)    (1.48)    (-1.85) 
 
Positive View of Human Nature     0.320***   0.351***   0.461***   0.468*** 
              (4.24)    (4.65)    (6.00)    (6.05) 
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(Table 5.7 continued) 
 
Constant1            -4.567    -3.543    -4.977              -4.413 
Constant2 -2.784    -2.410    -2.864    -2.684 
Constant3            -1.261    -0.972    -1.324    -1.226 
Constant4            1.190                    1.476    1.016    1.202 
Constant5            2.306    2.657    1.996    2.266 
Constant6            4.510    4.662    4.142    4.353 
 
 
N              798    816    813    804 
LRχ2             60.92    90.67    72.49    68.90 
Prob (χ2)            0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Pseudo R2            0.03    0.04    0.03    0.03 
 
Note: The z-scores are in parentheses.  
Source: 2004 ANES. 
 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
This finding of the effect of race is consistent with the results of the evaluations of whites on the 
untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension in Table 5.2.   
     The results of the stereotyping of blacks in the third column of Table 5.7 reveal that only 
positive view of human nature has a strong influence on the evaluations of both blacks and 
Asians along the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension.  Holding other factors constant, as 
expected, Americans with a more positive view of human nature are more likely to view blacks 
as trustworthy.  Race (white) is also a strong predictor of the evaluation of blacks.  Compared to 
individuals of black origin, those of white origin are less likely to view blacks as trustworthy.  
This finding of the effect of race is consistent with the results of the evaluations of blacks on the 
untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension in Table 5.2.  American identity and race (Asian and 
Hispanic) have significant and negative effects on the stereotyping of blacks but only at the .10 
level of significance. 
     The findings of the stereotyping of Hispanics in the last column of Table 5.7 also show 
that only positive view of human nature has a strong effect on the evaluations of both Hispanics 
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and Asians along the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension.  As expected, Americans with a 
more positive view of human nature are more likely to view Hispanics as trustworthy, other 
conditions being equal.  Race (white) is also a strong predictor of the evaluation of Hispanics.  
Compared to individuals of Hispanic origin, those of white descent are less likely to view 
Hispanics as trustworthy.  This finding of the effect of race is consistent with the results of the 
evaluations of Hispanics on the untrustworthy-trustworthy dimension in Table 5.2.  Employment 
status and age are significantly and positively associated with the stereotyping of Hispanics but 
at a more relaxed .10 level of significance.      
     In sum, the findings of Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 indicate that the stereotyping of Asians and 
that of the other groups in terms of the lazy-hardworking, unintelligent-intelligent, and 
untrustworthy-trustworthy dimensions, respectively, have little common antecedents.  For 
example, partisanship is the most consistent and strong determinant of the evaluations of Asians, 
whereas race (white) is the strongest and most consistent predictor of the evaluations of both 
blacks and Hispanics, across the three trait dimensions.  There are a few explanatory factors, 
however, that highly influence the racial stereotyping of Asians and that of the other groups.  For 
instance, positive view of human nature is the strongest predictor (at the .01 level of 
significance) of the evaluations of all the groups relative to the untrustworthy-trustworthy 
dimension.  The overall results of the three trait dimension models confirm the significant effects 
of some of the key measures, particularly those of self-interest (family income) and symbolic 
politics (partisanship), on the evaluations of Asians.  The effects of self-interest and symbolic 
politics measures, however, are mixed on the evaluations of the other groups.  The other key 
measure—the context measure (percent group population)—has no impact on the evaluations of 
Asians, as well as those of whites and blacks, across the three trait dimensions.  The context 
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measure is significantly related to only the stereotyping of Hispanics on the lazy-hardworking 
dimension, but the effect is not in the hypothesized direction.  These findings do not support the 
group threat argument that augmented contacts between different racial groups in counties with 
high proportions of a minority population, such as Asians, increase expressions of negative 
stereotypes (in terms of specific factual attributes) of the out-group.  
Predicting Patterns of Group Stereotypes, 2004 ANES  
     Table 5.8 reports the OLS regression results of the group stereotype models of Asians, 
whites, blacks, and Hispanics from the 2004 ANES.  The measure of each group stereotype is a 
factor scale comprised of the lazy-hardworking, unintelligent-intelligent, and untrustworthy-
trustworthy dimensions whose higher values signify more positive assessments of the respective 
group.  Turning first to the stereotype model of Asians in the first column, the self-interest 
(family income) and symbolic politics (partisanship) measures are the strongest predictors of 
general stereotyping of Asians at the .01 level of significance.  Americans who possess higher 
income levels (as expected) and identify more with the Republican Party are more likely to have 
positive stereotypes of Asians, other conditions being equal.  The positive view of human nature 
variable also has a strong effect on general stereotyping of Asians.  As expected, individuals who 
have a more positive view of human nature have greater odds of holding flattering stereotypes of 
Asians, all else equal.  Neither the context measure (percent group population) nor any of the 
socio-demographic variables may independently influence racial stereotyping of Asians. 
     The results of the group stereotype of whites in the second column of Table 5.8 reveal that 
general stereotyping of whites and that of Asians have hardly any common antecedents.  Only 
positive view of human nature is strongly related to the evaluations of both whites and Asians.  
As expected, individuals who have a more positive view of human nature are more likely to have  
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Table 5.8 OLS Regression Analyses of Group Stereotype Models, 2004 ANES 
 




Percent Group Population (county-level)  0.012    0.002    -0.002    0.007** 
            (1.06)    (0.98)    (-0.38)    (2.16) 
 
Self-interest  
 Employment Status        -0.025    -0.045    0.068    0.048 
              (-0.31)    (-0.56)    (0.83)    (0.57) 
 
 Family Income         0.059***   0.028    0.013    0.025 
              (2.65)    (1.28)    (0.59)    (1.14) 
      
 Social Class          -0.074    -0.122**   -0.148***   -0.094* 
              (-1.36)    (-2.31)    (-2.78)    (-1.74) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity        -0.047    -0.079**   -0.080**   -0.064* 
              (-1.22)    (-2.12)    (-2.13)    (-1.67) 
 
 Political Ideology        -0.023    0.047    -0.017    -0.027 
              (-0.45)    (0.95)    (-0.33)    (-0.52) 
 
Partisanship          0.120***   0.072    -0.046    0.067 
             (2.61)    (1.62)    (-1.04)    (1.48) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education           0.037    -0.060**   0.030    -0.006 
              (1.45)    (-2.41)    (1.19)    (-0.22) 
 
 Age            -0.002    0.007***   -0.002    -0.001 
              (-1.01)    (2.84)    (-0.64)    (-0.52) 
 
 Female           0.060    0.154**   0.077    0.075 
              (0.85)    (2.26)    (1.13)    (1.07) 
  
 Asian                --    0.231    -0.656***   -0.707*** 
                   (1.03)    (-2.66)    (-2.87) 
 
White            -0.034        --    -0.433***   -0.443*** 
             (-0.24)         (-4.19)    (-3.67) 
 
 Black            -0.142    -0.229**       --    -0.226 
              (-0.83)    (-2.04)         (-1.52) 
 
 Hispanic           0.250    0.325**   -0.289*       -- 
              (1.31)    (2.24)    (-1.80) 
 
Positive View of Human Nature     0.082**   0.096**   0.184***   0.168*** 
              (2.13)    (2.54)    (4.82)    (4.37) 
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(Table 5.8 continued) 
 
Intercept            -0.217    -0.358    0.533***  0.358* 
              (-0.93)    (-1.33)    (2.67)    (1.75) 
 
 
N              791    814    810    790 
Adjusted R2           0.04    0.06    0.07    0.04 
 
Note: The t-scores are in parentheses. 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
positive views of whites, holding other factors constant.  Social class, American identity, 
education, age, gender, and race (black and Hispanic) are also strong predictors of general 
stereotyping of whites.  Unexpectedly, Americans who are in lower levels of the U.S. social 
class, have a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity, are less educated, and are 
older in age have a greater likelihood of holding flattering stereotypes of whites, all else equal.  
Females are more likely than males to have positive views of whites, other conditions being 
equal.  Compared to those of white descent, individuals of Hispanic origin are more likely, while 
those of black origin are less likely, to possess positive stereotypes of whites.  These results of 
the effects of race are consistent with the results of the group stereotype measures of whites from 
the ANES in Table 5.4.   
          The results of the group stereotype of blacks in the third column of Table 5.8 also show 
that only positive view of human nature has a strong impact on the evaluations of both blacks 
and Asians.  As expected, individuals who have a more positive view of human nature are more 
likely to have positive perceptions of blacks.  Social class, American identity, and race (Asian 
and white) are also strongly related to general stereotyping of blacks, while race (Hispanic) has a 
significant and negative effect on the dependent variable but at a more relaxed .10 level of 
significance.  Other conditions being equal, unexpectedly, Americans who are in lower levels of 
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the U.S. social class and have a weaker belief in the importance of the American identity are 
more likely to hold flattering views of blacks.  Compared to individuals of black descent, those 
of Asian and white origins are less likely to have positive views of blacks.  These results of the 
effects of race are comparable to the findings of the group stereotype measures of blacks from 
the ANES in Table 5.4.   
     The findings of the group stereotype of Hispanics in the last column of Table 5.8 also 
indicate that only positive view of human nature has a strong effect on the evaluations of both 
Hispanics and Asians.  As expected, Americans who have a more positive view of human nature 
are more likely to have positive views of Hispanics, other conditions being equal.  Percent group 
population and race (Asian and white) are also strong determinants of general stereotyping of 
Hispanics.  Surprisingly, individuals who reside in counties with a higher proportion of 
Hispanics are more likely to have positive stereotypes of Hispanics, all else equal.  Compared to 
individuals of Hispanic descent, those of Asian and white origins are less likely to possess 
flattering views of Hispanics.  These findings of the effects of race are comparable to the results 
of the group stereotype measures of Hispanics from the ANES in Table 5.4.  Social class and 
American identity have significant and negative effects on general stereotyping of Hispanics, 
albeit at only the .10 level of significance. 
     The overall findings in Table 5.8 indicate that most factors that influence general 
stereotyping of Asians are not likely to affect that of whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The 
exception is positive view of human nature, but this variable has a stronger impact on general 
stereotyping of particularly blacks (b=0.184, p ≤ .01) and Hispanics (b=0.168, p ≤ .01) than that 
of Asians (b=0.082, p ≤ .05).  The overall results also reveal that some of the key measures, 
especially those of self-interest (family income) and symbolic politics (partisanship), strongly 
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influence general stereotyping of Asians, while the self-interest measure of social class and the 
symbolic politics measure of American identity significantly affect general stereotyping of 
whites and blacks, and to a lesser degree, Hispanics.  The other key measure (the context 
measure [percent group population]), however, does not independently influence general 
stereotyping of Asians or that of whites and blacks.  The exception is its effect on general 
stereotyping of Hispanics, although the effect is not in the expected direction. 
Predicting Patterns of Group Stereotypes, 2004 NPS 
      The results of the group stereotype models of Asians, whites, blacks, and Hispanics from 
the 2004 NPS are reported in Table 5.9.  Starting with the stereotype model of Asians in the first 
column of Table 5.9, workplace contact, employment status, education, and race (white, black, 
and Hispanic) are strongly related to general stereotyping of Asians.  Unexpectedly, having more 
Asians in one’s workplace and being employed are associated with a weaker likelihood of having 
positive stereotypes of Asians, holding other factors constant.  As expected, Americans with 
higher levels of education attainment are more likely to hold flattering views of Asians.  
Compared with those of Asian descent, individuals of white, black, and Hispanic origins are less 
likely to have positive perceptions of Asians.  These findings of the effects of race are 
comparable to the results of the group stereotype measures of Asians from the NPS in Table 5.4.  
Place of worship contact is also significantly and (as expected) positively related to general 
stereotyping of Asians, but the effect is modest. 
          Compared with that of Asians, general stereotyping of whites in the second column of 
Table 5.9 is strongly affected by only job competition.  Other conditions being equal, as 
expected, Americans who feel less threatened by job competition with whites are more likely to 
have flattering views of whites.  Although the effect is small, residential neighborhood contact  
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Table 5.9 Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses of Group Stereotype Models, 2004 NPS 
 




Residential Neighborhood    0.223     -0.176*    -0.178     0.055 
          (1.20)     (-1.89)     (-1.19)     (0.36) 
 
Workplace        -0.403**    -0.017  0.061     0.296** 
          (-2.16)     (-0.18)  (0.43)     (2.11) 
 
Place of Worship      0.303*     -0.126     0.328*     -0.190 
          (1.83)     (-1.28)     (1.90)     (-0.89) 
 
Friendship       0.227     0.082     0.159     0.236 
          (1.16)     (0.76)     (0.87)     (1.21) 
 
Self-interest  
 Job Competition      -0.115     -0.176**    -0.196**    -0.022 
           (-1.16)     (-2.41)     (-1.98)     (-0.23) 
 
 Political Competition    0.116     0.073     -0.355***    -0.220** 
           (1.32)     (1.06)     (-3.50)     (-1.98) 
 
 Employment Status     -0.368**    -0.185     -0.345*    -0.646*** 
           (-2.28)     (-1.34)     (-1.80)     (-3.54) 
 
 Family Income      -0.041     0.002     -0.092*    -0.056 
           (-0.83)     (0.04)     (-1.70)     (-1.07) 
 
Symbolic Politics 
 American Identity     -0.089    0.103     -0.204**    0.031 
           (-0.91)     (1.39)     (-2.09)     (0.35) 
 
 Political Ideology     0.131     0.059     0.286***    0.293*** 
           (1.56)     (0.79)                         (2.93)                        (2.71) 
 
 Partisanship       -0.084     -0.123     -0.317***    -0.186* 
           (-0.85)     (-1.32)     (-2.71)     (-1.73) 
  
Socio-demographic Attributes 
 Education      0.251***    0.022     0.122     0.141* 
         (3.78)     (0.34)     (1.60)     (1.79) 
 
 Age         0.003     0.006     0.005     -0.008 
           (0.63)     (1.30)     (0.83)     (-1.46) 
 
 Female        0.208     0.137     0.477***    0.177 
           (1.44)     (1.01)     (3.10)     (1.16) 
 
Asian             --     -0.341     -0.850**    -0.993*** 
                 (-1.57)     (-2.28)     (-3.56) 
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(Table 5.9 continued) 
 
White          -0.752***           --     -0.648**    -0.663** 
          (-2.81)           (-2.00)     (-2.38) 
 
 
 Black         -0.528**    -0.332               --       0.169 
           (-2.10)     (-1.56)           (0.67) 
 
 Hispanic        -0.702***    -0.282     -0.494                   -- 
           (-2.82)     (-1.40)     (-1.48) 
 
 
Constant1         -5.036     -3.772     -4.882     -6.000 
Constant2          4.466     -3.560     -3.797     -5.240 
Constant3         -3.868     -2.980     -2.549     -3.796 
Constant4         -1.549     -1.011     -0.651     -1.701 
Constant5         -0.712     -0.213      0.431     -0.876 
Constant6          0.397      0.662      1.583      0.368 
   
 
N           1581          1313     1358     1348 
LRχ2          50.92          32.74     101.98     78.30 
Prob (χ2)         0.0000         0.0122     0.0000     0.0000 
Pseudo R2         0.02     0.01     0.04     0.03 
 
Note: The z-scores are in parentheses.  
 
*** p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
 
has a significant but unexpectedly negative influence on general stereotyping of whites.  Nine 
times out of ten, individuals who have more whites in their residential neighborhood are less 
likely to hold positive perceptions of whites.  
     The results of the stereotype model of blacks in the third column of Table 5.9 reveal much 
more differences than similarities to those of the stereotype model of Asians.  The only 
significant common antecedents of general stereotyping of both blacks and Asians include place 
of worship and employment status; however, these variables are significantly associated with 
general stereotyping of blacks at a less stringent .10 level of significance.  Although the effects 
are modest, Americans who have more blacks in their place of worship are more likely, while, 
unexpectedly, those who are employed are less likely, to hold positive stereotypes of blacks, all 
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else equal.  Compared with that of Asians, job competition, political competition, American 
identity, political ideology, partisanship, gender, and race (Asian and white) are strong predictors 
of general stereotyping of blacks.  Other conditions being equal, as expected, Americans who 
feel less threatened by job competition and political competition with blacks are more likely to 
have positive views of blacks.  Unexpectedly, individuals who have a weaker belief in the 
importance of the American identity are more likely to possess flatteringly perceptions of blacks, 
all else equal.  Interestingly, individuals who are more conservative in political ideology and are 
female are more likely, while those who identify more with the Republican Party are less likely, 
to hold positive stereotypes of blacks.  Compared with those of black descent, individuals of 
Asian and white origins are less likely to have positive views of blacks.  These findings of the 
effects of race are consistent with the results of the group stereotype measures of blacks from the 
NPS in Table 5.4.  Family income is significantly and negatively related to general stereotyping 
of blacks, but the effect of this variable is small. 
     The results of the stereotype model of Hispanics in the last column of Table 5.9 reveal 
some similarities to those of the stereotype model of Asians.  Workplace contact, employment 
status, and race (white) are strongly associated with general stereotyping of both Hispanics and 
Asians, although the direction of the workplace contact’s coefficient differs from that of the 
coefficient in the stereotype model of Asians.  As expected, Americans who have more 
Hispanics in their workplace are more likely to possess flattering views of Hispanics, all else 
equal.  Unexpectedly, individuals who are employed are less likely to have positive views of 
Hispanics, holding other factors constant.  Compared with persons of Hispanic descent, as 
expected, those of Asian and white origins have a weaker likelihood of holding positive 
perceptions of Hispanics.  Education also significantly and (as expected) positively affects 
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general stereotyping of Hispanics, but the effect is much smaller (b = 0.141; p ≤ .10) than that of 
Asians (b = 0.251; p ≤ .01).  There are also some differences.  Compared with that of Asians, 
general stereotyping of Hispanics is strongly influenced by political competition and political 
ideology.  Individuals who feel less threatened by political competition with Hispanics and are 
more conservative in political ideology have a stronger likelihood of holding flattering views of 
Hispanics.  Although the effect is small, those who identify more with the Republican Party are 
less likely to have positive perceptions of Hispanics.  
      In sum, the findings in Table 5.9 indicate that general stereotyping of Asians has no 
common antecedents with that of whites but has some mutual antecedents with that of Hispanics 
(such as employment status and race [white]) and blacks (such as place of worship and 
employment status, although the effects of these variables are small).  The overall results reveal 
that the strongest explanatory factors influencing general images of Asians, whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics vary.  The strongest predictors of general stereotyping of Asians are education and 
race (white and Hispanic); the strongest determinant of that of whites (albeit at the .05 level of 
significance) is job competition; the strongest determinants of that of blacks are political 
competition, political ideology, partisanship, and gender; and the strongest predictors of that of 
Hispanics are employment status, political ideology, and race (Asian).  The overall results also 
indicate that some of the key measures, particularly measures of personal contact (workplace) 
and self-interest (employment status), strongly influence general stereotyping of Asians.  
However, the other key measures, i.e., those of symbolic politics, have no effects on general 
stereotyping of Asians (or that of whites).   Moreover, the personal contact measures have only 
mixed effects on the evaluations of Asians and the other groups.  For example, workplace 
contact alone has a strong impact (at the .05 level of significance) on general stereotyping of 
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only Asians and Hispanics, but the direction of the workplace contact’s coefficient is not the 
same for both models as expected.  These findings reveal that working with Hispanics increases 
positive stereotypes of Hispanics (as hypothesized), whereas working with Asians increases 
negative stereotypes of Asians (not as hypothesized).   
Conclusion 
    What light do the findings in this chapter shed on Americans’ cognition-relevant responses 
to Asians?  How do the evaluations of Asians compare to those of other racial/ethnic groups?   
Judging from the results of Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 at the aggregate level, Americans 
(including those of Asian, white, black, and Hispanic origins) have a greater likelihood of 
viewing Asians as hardworking and intelligent and of evaluating Asians in general with positive 
impressions.  The overall evaluations of Asians tend to be flattering even across different survey 
samples and instruments.  For example, compared with those of Asians at the aggregate level, the 
overall assessments of whites tend to be somewhat less positive (in terms of the mean [or 
median] scores) relative to especially the lazy-hardworking dimension (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) 
and the group stereotype measure from the NPS (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4).  The overall 
evaluations of Hispanics and blacks from the NPS also tend to be less flattering than those of 
Asians (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4).  Moreover, the overall assessments of blacks and Hispanics 
from the ANES are more likely than those of Asians to be neutral across all three trait 
dimensions (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  These results suggest that the popular stereotype of the 
Asian American community as a model minority is not altogether unfounded, assuming there 
may be a small tendency for respondents from various racial/ethnic origins to underreport 
negative sentiments toward Asians. 
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     The multivariate analyses of the antecedents of these beliefs indicate mixed results for the 
key explanatory factors, including those of context, personal contact, self-interest, and symbolic 
politics, that are expected to influence Americans’ stereotyping of Asians.  Relative to the 
stereotype measures from the ANES, only the symbolic politics measure of partisanship and the 
self-interest measure of family income have consistent effects on evaluations of Asians.  Only 
the workplace contact measure and the self-interest measure of employment status are 
significantly associated with Asian stereotyping from the NPS, although the effects of these 
variables on the dependent variable are not in the hypothesized direction.  The context measure 
(percent group population), however, has no influence on Asian stereotyping (or on stereotyping 
of whites and blacks), while it has a significant but unexpectedly positive impact on Hispanic 
stereotyping.  These findings suggest that, in contrast to the argument of the group threat 
hypothesis, racial animosity toward another group may not be based simply on that group’s size 
in larger geographic environments like counties.  The null contextual effects on Asian 
stereotyping also suggest that context is less likely to be an important factor in explaining and 
understanding racial stereotyping with respect to Asians.  It may be, as Gay (2006) suggests, 
more, for instance, the relative economic status of racial groups—and less the relative size of 
racial groups—that influences Americans’ attitudes toward Asians.  In fact, economic self-
interest measures (such as family income) are found to have a significant impact on Asian 
stereotyping in this study.  Moreover, the personal contact measures have surprisingly mixed 
effects on Asian stereotyping (from the NPS).  Only workplace contact has a strong impact, 
while the other personal contact measures (i.e., residential neighborhood, place of worship, and 
friendship contacts) have little to no effects, on the dependent variable.  It is particularly 
surprising that friendship contact has no influence on Asian stereotyping (or on general 
 150
stereotyping of any of the other groups).  One would expect that having more Asian friends to be 
strongly associated with positive perceptions of Asians, but it is not the case in this study.  
     The effects of the key explanatory factors on racial stereotyping of Asians also vary across 
different survey samples and instruments.  For instance, unlike the independent impact of 
symbolic politics (partisanship) on general stereotyping of Asians from the ANES, symbolic 
politics has no effects on general stereotyping of Asians from the NPS.  The self-interest measure 
of family income is significantly associated with Asian stereotyping from the ANES, while the 
self-interest measure of employment status is significantly associated with Asian stereotyping 
from the NPS (although the effect of employment status on the dependent variable is not in the 
hypothesized direction).   
     The multivariate regression results also reveal that Americans’ stereotyping of Asians has 
little, if any, common antecedents with that of whites, blacks, and Hispanics across all stereotype 
measures from the ANES and NPS.  For example, the strongest predictors of general 
stereotyping of Asians from the ANES are family income and partisanship, while the strongest 
predictor of that of whites is age.  The strongest determinant of stereotyping of Asians on the 
lazy-hardworking dimension is partisanship, whereas the strongest determinants of that of blacks 
are race (white) and positive view of human nature.  Education and race (white and Hispanic) 
have the strongest influence on general stereotyping of Asians from the NPS, while employment 
status, political ideology, and race (Asian) are the strongest determinants of that of Hispanics.   
      In conclusion, the overall findings suggest that stereotyping of Asians is fairly distinctive 
from that of other racial/ethnic groups across different survey samples and instruments.  
Although Americans are more likely to have positive views of Asians as well as whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics, the evaluations of Asians in general at the aggregate level have a tendency to be 
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somewhat more positive than those of the other groups.  Furthermore, the types of individuals 
who are most likely to have such beliefs about Asians tend not to hold such views of whites, 
blacks, and Hispanics.  The findings also validate some aspects of the personal contact, self-
interest, and symbolic politics hypotheses, as well as those of the socio-demographic and general 
view of human nature hypotheses; while they contest the validity of such hypotheses as those 
relating to context.  By drawing on various explanatory factors likely to influence cognition-
based perceptions of Asians, this study heeds Allport’s (1954) warning that racial stereotyping of 
groups is more likely to have complex determinants and less likely explained by a single 
sovereign cause.   
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS  
     With significant population growth of Asian Americans—a multiethnic, relatively 
socioeconomically prosperous, and immigrant-dominated population—in recent years, the 
political impact of the evolving Asian community in the racial landscape of the United States is 
likely to garner increasing attention from scholars, the media, and politicians.  Yet, as Chapters 1 
and 2 conveyed, Asian Americans are in many ways still misunderstood.  For example, a number 
of scholars have noted that Asian Americans as a whole tend to be viewed through stereotypical 
lenses of popular myths and perceptions of them, such as their image as a model minority.  The 
Asian community today, however, cannot be easily understood as an amalgamated population 
with shared history, identity, culture, and politics, since it is diverse in terms of such attributes as 
national origins and languages and multiple concerns distinctive to each ethnic group, such as 
naturalization and socioeconomic progress.  Understanding Americans’ attitudes toward Asians, 
hence, is important in light of the changing face of the American electorate, whose recent 
additions comprise largely of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, and the likelihood that 
Americans’ beliefs or thoughts about race and ethnicity will be altered beyond the black-white 
divide in U.S. politics.  As an attempt to gain such understanding, this dissertation’s principal 
goal is to provide a systematic study of Americans’ perceptions of Asian Americans in terms of 
affect- and cognition-relevant responses.  In this chapter, I first review the major findings of 
affect- and cognition-based perceptions of Asians by assessing the effectiveness of the 
conceptual frameworks discussed in Chapter 3 on these perceptions, and discuss possible future 
research on attitudes toward Asians.  Then I discuss the implications of the findings relative to 
how Americans’ evaluations of Asians might affect political empowerment for Asians, such as in 
coalition building across race and political representation. 
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Major Findings of the Contours and Sources of Perceptions of Asian Americans 
     The key findings of the contours of Americans’ affect- and cognition-based assessments of 
Asians indicate that, in general, favorability toward and closeness to Asians and Asian 
stereotyping, respectively, tend to be positive.  Nonetheless, there are some variations in these 
values compared with those of whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  In terms of both affect-based 
measures of the respective groups, Americans are somewhat less likely to feel warm toward and 
close to Asians than they do whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  In contrast, relative to the cognition-
based measures of the respective groups, Americans are likely to have more flattering views of 
Asians than those of the other groups. 
     The findings of the key sources of Americans’ perceptions of Asians, however, resist 
simple formulations.  Starting with personal contact, the impact of personal contact on affect-
based (i.e., closeness) and cognition-based (i.e., group stereotype) perceptions of Asians tends to 
be mixed and inconsistent.  Of the contact measures used in this study, including friendship, 
residential neighborhood, place of worship, and workplace contacts, friendship contact is the 
strongest predictor of closeness to Asians.  Individuals with more Asian friends have greater 
odds of feeling close to Asians.  In contrast, friendship contact surprisingly has no effects on 
general stereotyping of Asians.  Workplace contact also has a strong influence on closeness to 
Asians as well as Asian stereotyping, but its effect on these dependent variables is not in the 
same expected direction.  Individuals who work with more Asians are more likely to feel close to 
Asians, but they are less likely to have positive views of Asians.  The other measures (i.e., 
residential neighborhood and place of worship) have little to no effects on affect- or cognition-
based perceptions of Asians.  These results suggest that the contact theory better explains affect-
based perceptions of Asians than cognition-based perceptions of the group.  
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      The effects of self-interest on affect- and cognition-based perceptions of Asians are mixed 
and inconsistent as well.  While the self-interest measures have little to no effects on favorability 
toward Asians or stereotyping of Asians in terms of the untrustworthy-trustworthy trait 
dimension, different measures of self-interest influence closeness to Asians and the other 
stereotype dependent variables.  Individuals who feel less threatened by job competition with 
Asians are more likely to feel close to Asians.  Those with higher levels of family income are 
more likely to hold positive stereotypes of Asians.  Conversely, being employed and in higher 
levels of the U.S. social class are associated unexpectedly with a weaker likelihood of having 
flattering stereotypes of Asians.   
      The findings also reveal varied effects of symbolic politics on both affect- and cognition-
based perceptions of Asians.  American identity has a strong impact on both favorability toward 
and closeness to Asians, while it has no influence on Asian stereotyping.  Individuals who have a 
weaker belief in the importance of the American identity are more likely to feel warm toward 
and close to Asians.  These results are consistent with Stein et al.’s (2000) finding that American 
identity is negatively related to affect toward Hispanics, another immigrant-dominated group.  
Partisanship is strongly related to only closeness to Asians and the stereotype variables from the 
2004 ANES, although the effect of partisanship on these dependent variables is in the opposite 
direction.  People who are identify more with the Democratic Party are more likely to feel close 
to Asians, whereas those who identify more with the Republican Party are more likely to have 
positive views of Asians.  Political ideology, conversely, has mostly null effects on affect- and 
cognition-based perceptions of Asians. 
      In contrast, the context measure (i.e., percent group population) is not significantly related 
to either affect- or cognition-based perceptions of Asians.  These findings do not support the 
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argument of the group threat/context hypothesis that the size of a minority population in larger 
geographic environments, such as counties, increases animosity toward the out-group, 
particularly with respect to Asians.  The increasing diversity of neighborhoods and cities across 
the United States may not be a significant threat to intergroup amity, as the context literature 
suggests.  In contrast to previous findings (e.g., Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004) that whites’ 
animosity toward minority out-groups, such as blacks, augments in direct proportion to the group 
size of the nearby minority population, for Asians size and propinquity alone do not necessary 
incite racial animosity.  The null contextual effects on both affect- and cognition-based responses 
to Asians, thus, suggest that context is less likely to be an important factor in understanding 
Americans’ views of Asians.   
      In terms of the key measures, the findings also reveal that Americans’ affect-based 
perceptions of Asians have some common antecedents with those of whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics.  For example, friendship contact has the strongest and most consistent influence on 
closeness to all four groups.  Job competition is significantly associated with closeness to all four 
groups as well, but the effect of job competition on the dependent variable of Asians is stronger 
(at the .01 level of significance) than that of the other groups.  Conversely, Americans’ 
cognition-based perceptions of Asians have no shared antecedents with those of whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics.  For instance, family income and partisanship strongly affect only Asian 
stereotyping.  There are, however, some key sources that influence racial stereotyping of both 
Asians and another group, such as Hispanics.  For example, individuals who are employed are 
unexpectedly less likely to have positive views of both Asians and Hispanics.   
     Other non-key sources (i.e., socio-demographic indicators and a general view of human 
nature measure) also are strong predictors of affect- and cognition-based perceptions of Asians.  
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For instance, people with more education have greater odds of feeling both warm toward and 
close to Asians.  Individuals who have a more positive view of human nature are more likely to 
have flattering stereotypes of Asians. 
     In sum, the major findings confirm some aspects of the personal contact, self-interest, and 
symbolic politics hypotheses discussed in past studies of political attitudes toward other racial 
groups in the United States, while they call into question the validity of such hypotheses as those 
relating to context.  These results suggest that different explanations need to be sought to 
understand the sources of Americans’ affect- and cognition-based responses to Asians and that 
perceptions of Asians, hence, are more likely to involve social and psychological processes that 
are less likely explained by a single sovereign cause.  
Future Research 
     The major findings of this dissertation have provided some important insights into 
Americans’ views of Asians, but some of the findings are conflicting to expectations discussed in 
previous research, suggesting that further research is warranted.  Although problems, such as 
data limitations, prevented testing the effectiveness of the full sets of personal contact, context, 
self-interest, and symbolic politics measures on all the models, including all of these measures 
should be a high priority in future research to help better understand affect- and cognition-based 
attitudes toward Asians.  With the benefit of more contemporary and larger sized samples of 
Asians (as well as whites, blacks, and Hispanics), future research may uncover more fully and 
conclusively the sources of Americans’ perceptions of Asians.   
     Other future research examining perceptions of Asians would consider using survey 
experiments to determine the possible effects of the media, which is often described as having a 
major impact on cognitions and, ultimately, affect toward racial/ethnic groups.  For example, 
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using experiments, several past studies (e.g., Valentino, 1999; Ramasubramanian and Oliver, 
2007; Oliver, 2003) find that media portrayals of racial groups influence viewers’ racial attitudes 
toward the groups.  Hence, using survey experiments would be useful to determine, for instance, 
whether race plays a role in voters’ preferences of Asian candidates versus candidates of other 
races.   
     Following past studies of intergroup relations, this dissertation examines affect- and 
cognition-based perceptions of Asians separately from each other.  Yet, it is possible that, for 
example, Americans’ stereotypes of Asians may influence their favorability toward Asians.  
Future research would explore as well the relationship between cognitions about Asians and 
other racial/ethnic groups and affect toward the groups by examining how stereotypes of these 
groups influence affect-relevant responses toward them.   
Implications  
     Junn and Matto (2008) note that American democracy has continuously been marked by 
dynamism, such as the constant alterations to the makeup of its electorate as minorities, women, 
and young adults are admitted as eligible voting citizens.  With the recent influx of immigrants 
from largely Asia (and Latin America) into the American polity that affects especially the 
changing face of the voting public as well as Americans’ likely changing attitudes toward race 
and ethnicity, Asian Americans present an ideal opportunity for researchers to examine and 
validate competing theories of racial attitudes, including context, personal contact, self-interest, 
and symbolic politics.  These theories have been developed to explain the relationship largely 
between white and black Americans (and more recently views toward Hispanic Americans), but 
they provide a useful framework from which to explore systematically attitudes toward Asians.  
The findings reviewed in the previous section of this chapter indicate mixed effects of the key 
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explanatory factors on the negative/positive evaluations and the perceptions of factual attributes 
of Asian Americans.  Nonetheless, they provide some understanding of the patterns and sources 
of Americans’ views of Asians.  What do these findings suggest about political opportunities for 
Asians, such as prospects for cross-racial coalition building between Asians and other groups in 
the United States?  Do the findings reveal possibilities for increased Asian representation?  These 
questions are examined below. 
Prospects for Cross-racial Coalition 
      Some scholars, such as Lien et al. (2001) and Gay (2006), suggest that coalition building 
with other groups in the United States is a critical step to achieve political empowerment in 
mainstream American society for minority groups, such as Asian Americans.  The Asian 
community makes up a comparatively small percentage of the current U.S. population (about 5 
percent as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2009); therefore, cooperation and alliance 
with other major racial groups would greatly help to gain political empowerment for Asian 
Americans.  Even in places where Asians have a significant presence, such as New York City 
and Los Angeles as reported in the 2000 Census, the Asian population lacks the numbers to 
attain such empowerment on its own (Lien et al., 2001).  Gay (2006) indicates that history has 
demonstrated the importance of cross-racial coalition building in such issues as bringing the 
minority vote to the forefront of political elites’ attention and making it count in elections. 
     An essential feature of coalition building is having common interests (Sonenshein, 1993).  
The minority politics literature has largely accentuated the shared interests of minority groups 
and particularly the role of political elites as the positive bases for alliance (Browning, Marshall, 
and Tabb, 1984; see also Gay, 2006).  Yet, as Tedin and Murray (1994) indicate, cooperation at 
the mass level is more likely to involve attitudes and beliefs that direct the behavior of average 
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Americans.  For example, a group perceived as “lazy” or “unintelligent” is less likely to be seen 
as a potential partner in coalition building.       
      The major findings of Americans’ affect- and cognition-based perceptions of Asians 
indicate that, relative to shared interests with other racial groups, Asians are likely to find some 
common ground with Hispanics, whites, and blacks.  Asians may connect with Hispanics 
through their common interests concerning immigration-related policies and issues because both 
are immigrant-dominated groups in America.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Asians and 
Hispanics currently comprise the majority of the immigrant U.S. population.  Hence, it might be 
expected that these two groups would band together around policies that are important to 
immigrants and their needs, such as bilingual government services (Lien et al., 2001).  
      Asians may also form an alliance with both Hispanics and blacks based on common racial 
minority interests, such as those involving experiences with discrimination and hate crime and 
policy attitudes (Lien et al., 2001).  For example, Asians might unite with both groups in support 
of affirmative action, although differences among these groups may exist in particular areas of 
the policy (Lien et al., 2001).  Bobo and Johnson (2000) also note that a coalition comprised of 
black, Hispanic, and Asian community leaders was formed in the aftermath of the 1992 riots in 
Los Angeles to develop long-term solutions to intense ethnic conflict among the three groups.    
     It is also possible for Asians to forge a coalition with white Americans based on 
socioeconomic or class interests (Lien et al., 2001).  The findings in Chapter 2 reveal that Asians 
are more likely to have similar socioeconomic attributes with whites than with both blacks and 
Hispanics.  For instance, both Asians and whites tend to outperform blacks and Hispanics in 
terms of such socioeconomic attributes as higher levels of education attainment, homeownership, 
high-skill occupation, and median family income.   
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Prospects for Asian Representation 
     The key findings of the contours and sources of Americans’ attitudes toward Asian 
Americans also have important implications in the prospects for increasing Asian representation 
in elective office.  Moreover, increasing Asian representation is another important step in 
achieving political empowerment for Asian Americans.   
     Compared with their proportion of the U.S. population, racial and ethnic minorities remain 
relatively underrepresented among elected officials at local, state, and national levels.  For 
example, Asian Americans comprise about five percent of the current U.S. population (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009), and three percent of members of the current 112th U.S. Congress are 
Asian (or 13 members).  Yet, compared with Asians, blacks and Hispanics are somewhat more 
underrepresented in the current Congress in comparison with their current respective U.S. 
population sizes.   Black Americans make up approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population 
and eight percent of current members of Congress (or 44 members), while Hispanic Americans 
constitute about 16 percent of the U.S. population and six percent of current members  of 
Congress (or 31 members). 
     Past research indicates that Asian candidates in the U.S. mainland are more likely than 
candidates from other racial minority groups to be elected by non-Asian voters (Uhlaner et al., 
1989; Lai, 2000b).  Although there are currently no Asian majority political districts in the U.S. 
mainland states, some researchers note that Asian American candidates have been successful in 
districts where Asians comprise a relatively small proportion of the population.  Lai et al. (2001) 
indicate that many recent Asian elected officials emerge from political districts with low levels 
of Asian constituents.  In fact, most mainland Asian elected officials at the state and national 
levels represented non-Asian districts (Lai et al., 2001).  For example, as Lawrence (2008) notes, 
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Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, who is Indian American, represents a state with a majority 
white population (64 percent according to the 2000 Census) and only one percent Asian 
population (according to the 2000 Census).  In contrast to recent black and Hispanic officials 
who were elected from districts composed of 40 percent or more of the respective racial groups, 
Asian elected officials on the U.S. mainland predominantly come from political districts where 
Asians comprise much less than 50 percent of the population (Lai et al., 2001).   
     The ability of Asian American candidates to have mainstream or crossover appeal in 
today’s American politics challenges traditional notions of racial/ethnic cleavages that were part 
of multiracial coalitions during the latter part of the 20th century (Rodriguez, 1998; see also Lai 
et al., 2001).  Yet, since the Asian community is geographically dispersed and largely foreign-
born, Asian American candidates at all levels, particularly those on the U.S. mainland, need to 
seek the support of mostly non-Asian constituents and concentrate on broader campaign issues in 
order to be victorious (Lai et al., 2001). 
     This dissertation argues that Asian Americans, a politically meaningful but understudied 
group, are a crucial part of the American political life.  The literature on racial attitudes has 
concentrated largely on black-white relations and more recently on views toward Hispanics; yet, 
a better or fuller understanding of contemporary racial attitudes in American politics, as well as 
the dynamics of racial prejudice, requires focusing on all groups that are salient to politics, 
including Asian Americans.  This dissertation hopes that focusing on Asian Americans has 
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APPENDIX B 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR GROUP 
STEREOTYPES (2004 ANES) 
 
Factor Scale for Group Stereotype of Asian Americans 
 
Number of observations = 1010 
Retained factors = 1 
Factor 1:  Eigenvalue = 2.018; proportion explained = 0.673 
 
Variable          Factor Loading          Unique Variance 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------             
Lazy-hardworking          0.838       0.297 
Unintelligent-intelligent        0.863            0.255 
Untrustworthy-trustworthy       0.755           0.429 
 
Factor Scale for Group Stereotype of White Americans 
 
Number of observations = 1039 
Retained factors = 1 
Factor 1:  Eigenvalue = 2.114; proportion explained = 0.704 
 
Variable          Factor Loading          Unique Variance 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------             
Lazy-hardworking          0.849       0.279 
Unintelligent-intelligent        0.857             0.265 
Untrustworthy-trustworthy       0.811           0.342 
 
Factor Scale for Group Stereotype of Black Americans 
 
Number of observations = 1035 
Retained factors = 1 
Factor 1:  Eigenvalue = 2.152; proportion explained = 0.717 
 
Variable          Factor Loading          Unique Variance 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------             
Lazy-hardworking          0.843       0.289 
Unintelligent-intelligent        0.844            0.288 
Untrustworthy-trustworthy       0.854          0.271 
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Factor Scale for Group Stereotype of Hispanic Americans 
 
Number of observations = 1009 
Retained factors = 1 
Factor 1:  Eigenvalue = 1.968; proportion explained = 0.656 
 
Variable          Factor Loading          Unique Variance 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------             
Lazy-hardworking          0.772       0.404 
Unintelligent-intelligent        0.827            0.316 
Untrustworthy-trustworthy       0.829           0.312 
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